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Crispin Wright (1995). Truth in Ethics.

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  1.  5
    Irreplaceability and the Intentionality of Sexual Arousal.Jeffrey Hershfield - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
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  2. The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement1.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.
    This paper has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epistemic accessibility requirement. Namely, moral facts must be accessible to some possible agent. In the second part I show that because this accessibility requirement on moral facts holds, there is a route from facts about the moral disagreements of agents in idealized conditions to conclusions about what moral facts there are. In the third part I build on this route to show (...)
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  3.  11
    The Epistemic Dimension of Reasonableness.Federica Liveriero - 2015 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 41 (6):517-535.
    My aim in this article is to investigate the epistemic dimension of reasonableness. In the last decades, the concept of reasonableness has been deeply analysed, and yet, I maintain that a strictly epistemic analysis of reasonableness is still lacking. The goal of this article is to clarify which epistemic features characterize reasonableness as one of the fundamental virtues in the political domain. In order to justify political liberalism through a public justification that averts the risk of falling into a dilemma, (...)
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  4.  47
    Rule Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism.Alexander Miller - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):323-336.
    In this paper, I argue for three main claims. First, that there are two broad sorts of error theory about a particular region of thought and talk, eliminativist error theories and non-eliminativist error theories. Second, that an error theory about rule following can only be an eliminativist view of rule following, and therefore an eliminativist view of meaning and content on a par with Paul Churchland’s prima facie implausible eliminativism about the propositional attitudes. Third, that despite some superficial appearances to (...)
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  5. Resolute Expressivism.Nicholas Smyth - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):1-12.
    Over the years, metaethicists have witnessed the rise of a cottage industry devoted to claiming that expressivist analyses cannot capture some allegedly important feature of moral language. In this paper, I show how Simon Blackburn's pragmatist method enables him to respond decisively to many of these objections. In doing so, I hope to call into question some prevailing assumptions about the linguistic phenomena that a metaethical theory should be expected to capture.
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  6. Truthmaking, Metaethics, and Creeping Minimalism.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):213-232.
    Creeping minimalism threatens to cloud the distinction between realist and anti-realist metaethical views. When anti-realist views equip themselves with minimalist theories of truth and other semantic notions, they are able to take on more and more of the doctrines of realism (such as the existence of moral truths, facts, and beliefs). But then they start to look suspiciously like realist views. I suggest that creeping minimalism is a problem only if moral realism is understood primarily as a semantic doctrine. I (...)
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  7. Expressivism and Plural Truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):385-401.
    Contemporary expressivists typically deny that all true judgments must represent reality. Many instead adopt truth minimalism, according to which there is no substantive property of judgments in virtue of which they are true. In this article, I suggest that expressivists would be better suited to adopt truth pluralism, or the view that there is more than one substantive property of judgments in virtue of which judgments are true. My point is not that an expressivism that takes this form is true, (...)
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  8. Against Quietist Normative Realism.Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.
    Recently, some philosophers have suggested that a form of robust realism about ethics, or normativity more generally, does not face a significant explanatory burden in metaphysics. I call this view metaphysically quietist normative realism . This paper argues that while this view can appear to constitute an attractive alternative to more traditional forms of normative realism, it cannot deliver on this promise. I examine Scanlon’s attempt to defend such a quietist realism, and argue that rather than silencing metaphysical questions about (...)
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  9.  91
    Moral Truth: Observational or Theoretical?Catherine Wilson - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):97-114.
    Moral properties are widely held to be response-dependent properties of actions, situations, events and persons. There is controversy as to whether the putative response-dependence of these properties nullifies any truth-claims for moral judgements, or rather supports them. The present paper argues that moral judgements are more profitably compared with theoretical judgements in the natural sciences than with the judgements of immediate sense-perception. The notion of moral truth is dependent on the notion of moral knowledge, which in turn is best understood (...)
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  10. A Coherent Moral Relativism.David Capps, Michael P. Lynch & Daniel Massey - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):413 - 430.
    Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.
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  11. “True” as Ambiguous.Max Kölbel - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):359-384.
    In this paper, I argue (a) that the predicate "true" is ambiguously used to express a deflationary and a substantial concept of truth and (b) that the two concepts are systematically related in that substantial truths are deflationary truths of a certain kind. Claim (a) allows one to accept the main insights of deflationism but still take seriously, and participate in, the traditional debate about the nature of truth. Claim (b) is a contribution to that debate. The overall position is (...)
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  12. Normative Judgement.Scott Sturgeon - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):569–587.
  13. Moral Facts as Configuring Causes.Terence Cuneo - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):141–162.
    The overarching aim of this essay is to argue that moral realists should be "causalists" or claim that moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. To this end, I engage in two tasks. The first is to develop an account of the sense in which moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. After having sketched the concept of what I call a "configuring" cause, I contend that the exercise of the moral virtues is plausibly viewed as a configuring (...)
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  14.  99
    The Context Principle and Dummett's Argument for Anti-Realism.Karen Green - 2005 - Theoria 71 (2):92-117.
  15.  30
    Moral Explanations, Minimalism, and Cognitive Command.Terence Cuneo - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):351-365.
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  16.  74
    Disciplined Syntacticism and Moral Expressivism.James Lenman - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):32–57.
    Moral Expressivists typically concede that, in some minimal sense, moral sentences are truth-apt but claim that in some more robust sense they are not. The Immodest Disciplined Syntacticist, a species of minimalist about truth, raises a doubt as to whether this contrast can be made out. I here address this challenge by motivating and describing a distinction between reducibly and irreducibly truth-apt sentences. In the light of this distinction the Disciplined Syntacticist must either adopt a more modest version of his (...)
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  17.  37
    Cannibals, Communists and Cognitivists.Folke Tersman - 1999 - Theoria 65 (1):70-85.
  18.  9
    Afterword: Whither Moral Philosophy?Jocelyne Couture & Kai Nielsen - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (sup1):273-337.
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