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  1. A New Understanding of the First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives.Alla Choifer - 2018 - Philosophical Papers 47 (3):333-371.
    Characterizing the first- and third-person perspectives is essential to the study of consciousness, yet we lack a rigorous definition of or criteria for these two perspectives. Our intuitive understanding of how personal pronouns help to specify the perspectives gives rise to mutually exclusive notions of the first-person perspective. This contradiction thwarts our progress in studying consciousness. We can resolve the current ambiguity of the first-person perspective by introducing a new distinction between the first-person and third-person perspectives, based on two modes (...)
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  • Introspection, mindreading, and the transparency of belief.Uwe Peters - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1086-1102.
    This paper explores the nature of self-knowledge of beliefs by investigating the relationship between self-knowledge of beliefs and one's knowledge of other people's beliefs. It introduces and defends a new account of self-knowledge of beliefs according to which this type of knowledge is developmentally interconnected with and dependent on resources already used for acquiring knowledge of other people's beliefs, which is inferential in nature. But when these resources are applied to oneself, one attains and subsequently frequently uses a method for (...)
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  • Knowing Other Minds: A Scorekeeping Model.Patrizio Lo Presti - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1279-1308.
    The prepositional ‘in’ and possessive pronouns, e.g., ‘my’ and ‘mine,’ in the context of attributions of mental states, such as “in my mind” or “in your mind,” threaten to confuse attempts to account for knowledge of other minds. This paper distinguishes proper from improper uses of such expressions. I will argue that proper use of the prepositional ‘in’ and possessive pronouns in the context of mental state attributions presupposes capacities to properly track and attribute what are really, in a sense (...)
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