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Andrew Cullison (2011). A Defence of the No-Minimum Response to the Problem of Evil: Andrew Cullison.

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  1.  13
    God and Gratuitous Evil.Klaas J. Kraay - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):913-922.
    In contemporary analytic philosophy, the problem of evil refers to a family of arguments that attempt to show, by appeal to evil, that God does not exist. Some very important arguments in this family focus on gratuitous evil. Most participants in the relevant discussions, including theists and atheists, agree that God is able to prevent all gratuitous evil, and that God would do so. On this view, of course, the occurrence of even a single instance of gratuitous evil falsifies theism. (...)
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    The No-Minimum Argument and Satisficing: A Reply to Chris Dragos.Jeff Jordan - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (3):1-8.
    Chris Dragos has recently presented two objections to criticisms I've published against Peter van Inwagen's No-Minimum argument. He also suggests that the best way to criticize the No-Minimum argument is via the concept of divine satisficing. In this article I argue that both of Dragos's objections fail, and I question whether satisficing is relevant to the viability of the No-Minimum argument.
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    The No-Minimum Argument and Satisficing: A Reply to Chris Dragos.Jeff Jordan - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (3):379-386.
  4.  19
    The No-Minimum Argument, Satisficing, and No-Best-World: A Reply to Jeff Jordan.Chris Dragos - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (3):421-429.
  5.  26
    Is the No-Minimum Claim True? Reply to Cullison.Jeff Jordan - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (1):125 - 127.
    Is the no-minimum claim true? I have argued that it is not. Andrew Cullison contends that my argument fails, since human sentience is variable; while Michael Schrynemakers has contended that the failure is my neglect of vagueness. Both, I argue, are wrong.
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