Argues that there are original positions to be found in the work of Latin American philosophers. This book brings the history of Latin American philosophy to an English-speaking audience through the prominent voices of Mauricio Beuchot, Horacio Cerutti-Guldberg, María Luisa Femenías, Jorge J. E. Gracia, Oscar R. Martí, León Olivé, Carlos Pereda, and Eduardo Rabossi. They argue that Spanish is not a philosophically irrelevant language and that there are original positions to be found in the work of Latin American philosophers. (...) Part I of the book looks at why the history of philosophy has not developed in Latin America. A range of theoretical issues are explored, each focusing on specific problems that have hindered the development of a solid history. Part II details the complex task of writing a history of philosophy for a region still haunted by the specter of colonialism. Arleen Salles is Assistant Professor in the Department of Art, Music, and Philosophy at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, The City University of New York. Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at DePaul University and the coeditor (with Jorge J. E. Gracia) of Latin American Philosophy for the 21st Century: The Human Condition, Values, and the Search for Identity. (shrink)

Contributors: Steven Barbone, Laurent Bove, Edwin Curley, Valérie Debuiche, Michael Della Rocca, Simon B. Duffy, Daniel Garber, Pascale Gillot, Céline Hervet, Jonathan Israel, Chantal Jaquet, Mogens Lærke, Jacqueline Lagrée, Martin Lin, Yitzhak Y. Melamed, Pierre-François Moreau, Steven Nadler, Knox Peden, Alison Peterman, Charles Ramond, Michael A. Rosenthal, Pascal Sévérac, Hasana Sharp, Jack Stetter, Ariel Suhamy, Lorenzo Vinciguerra.

In this comment on John Yolton's Is There a History of Philosophy? (Yolton, 1985) I review his account of the development during the 17th to 19th centuries of a common sense of the range of philosophical problems and of the canon of philosophical works. I suggest that his account may be read in light of Rorty's four genres of historiography (Rorty, 1984). I criticize his view of the place of the history of philosophy in philosophy as too timid, though correct (...) as far as it goes. I then suggest, but do not attempt to establish, a bolder thesis. Finally, I raise some doubts about the adequacy of Yolton's reading of Descartes and Berkeley set out in two of his Puzzlements. The Puzzlements themselves are supposed to illustrate typical misreading of major figures in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

The present paper has a double aim: it attempts to present an aspect of Plotinus’ philosophical and hermeneutical methodology on the basis of relevant remarks in the treatise “On Eternity and Time”; it seeks to connect this attitude with contemporary methodological questions concerning the relation between philosophy and history of philosophy. After an introduction where it is emphasized that the term “Neo-Platonism” is of recent coinage, I exploit David Sedley’s remarks regarding the function of ancient philosophical schools: the quest for (...) the “correct” interpretation of the school’s founder as a philosophical enterprise in itself is not an exclusively Neoplatonic characteristic. Nonetheless, the example of Plotinus’ Enneads III.7, owing to the complexity of its theme, shows that Plotinus does not pay attention only to the Platonic teachings regarding eternity and time, but also to all the other philosophical schools’ theories, including the Epicurean. The aim is the ascertainment of the truth inherent in them and its apt interpretation. Hence, I follow Steven K. Strange, who relates the Plotinian methodology to Aristotle’s endoxic method. After a presentation of similarities and differences between the two philosophers, I conclude that the problematic features posed by several philosophical theories are resolved via an innovative Plotinian reading of Plato. Thus, the non-Platonic theories play a role in the more adequate interpretation of Plato, which is identified with the successful answer to the philosophical problems. This fact makes us wonder as to the best characterization of Plotinus’ enterprise: philosophy or history of philosophy? Although the question is somehow anachronistic, Plotinus gives an explicit response in his aforementioned tractate: to the extent that he is interested in solving philosophical problems, rather than compiling a “catalogue” of past philosophical positions, his enterprise is not historical, but philosophical. Two final corollaries stem from this: to a certain extent, the previous enunciation explains the Neoplatonic reading of Plato; it teaches us that the difference between philosophizing and a historical treatment of philosophy does not lie only on the content, but also on the manner according to which the interpreter approaches past or contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to exploit some lessons drawn from reading Plato in order to comment on the methodological ‘meta-level’ regarding the relation between philosophizing and writing. After all, it is due to the medium of written word that we come to know past philosophers. I do this on the occasion of the ostensible conclusion in Plato’s Meno. This example illuminates the ‘double-dialogue’ hermeneutics of Plato and helps to differentiate Plato’s dialogues from dialogical works written by other philosophers, such (...) as Berkeley. As a result, it becomes clear that, like with Plato’s case, a historian of philosophy must not only have a philosophical training, but also a subtle philological background, when attempting to come into dialogue with dead philosophers. (shrink)

In response to widespread doubts among professional philosophers (Russell, Horwich, Dietrich, McGinn, Chalmers), Stoljar argues for a ‘reasonable optimism’ about progress in philosophy. He defends the large and surprising claim that ‘there is progress on all or reasonably many of the big questions.’ However, Stoljar’s caveats and admitted avoidance of historical evidence permits overlooking persistent controversies in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are essentially unchanged since the 17th Century. Stoljar suggests that his claims are commonplace in philosophy departments (...) and, indeed, the evidence I adduce constitutes an indictment of the widely shared view among professional analytic philosophers. (shrink)

Science depends on judgments of the bearing of evidence on theory. Scientists must judge whether an observation or the result of an experiment supports, disconfirms, or is simply irrelevant to a given hypothesis. Similarly, scientists may judge that, given all the available evidence, a hypothesis ought to be accepted as correct or nearly so, rejected as false, or neither. Occasionally, these evidential judgments can be made on deductive grounds. If an experimental result strictly contradicts a hypothesis, then the truth of (...) the data deductively entails the falsity of the hypothesis. In the great majority of cases, however, the connection between evidence and hypothesis is non-demonstrative, or inductive. In particular, this is so whenever a general hypothesis is inferred to be correct on the basis of the available data, since the truth of the data will not deductively entail the truth of the hypothesis. It always remains possible that the hypothesis is false even though the data are correct. (shrink)

The much-welcomed recent acknowledgement that there is a plurality of philosophical traditions has an important consequence: that we must acknowledge too that there are many philosophical modernities. Modernity, I will claim, is a polycentric notion, and I will substantiate my claim by examining in some detail one particular non-western philosophical modernity, a remarkable period in 16th to 17th century India where a diversity of philosophical projects fully deserve the label.