According to Suszko’s Thesis, there are but two logical values, true and false. In this paper, R. Suszko’s, G. Malinowski’s, and M. Tsuji’s analyses of logical twovaluedness are critically discussed. Another analysis is presented, which favors a notion of a logical system as encompassing possibly more than one consequence relation. [A] fundamental problem concerning many-valuedness is to know what it really is. [13, p. 281].

Neste artigo, discutimos em que sentido a verdade é considerada como um objeto matemático na lógica proposicional. Depois de esclarecer como este conceito é usado na lógica clássica, através das noções de tabela de verdade, de função de verdade, de bivaloração, examinamos algumas generalizações desse conceito nas lógicas não clássicas: semânticas matriciais multi-valoradas com três ou quatro valores, semântica bivalente não veritativa, semânticas dos mundos possiveis de Kripke. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p31.

According to Suszko's Thesis,any multi-valued semantics for a logical system can be replaced by an equivalent bivalent one. Moreover: bivalent semantics for families of logics can frequently be developed in a modular way. On the other hand bivalent semantics usually lacks the crucial property of analycity, a property which is guaranteed for the semantics of multi-valued matrices. We show that one can get both modularity and analycity by using the semantic framework of multi-valued non-deterministic matrices. We further show that for (...) using this framework in a constructive way it is best to view "truth-values" as information carriers, or "information-values". (shrink)