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  1. Quasi-Truth, Supervaluations and Free Logic.Newton C. A. da Costa & Otavio Bueno - 1999 - History and Philosophy of Logic 20 (3-4):215-226.
    The partial structures approach has two major components: a broad notion of structure (partial structure) and a weak notion of truth (quasi-truth). In this paper, we discuss the relationship between this approach and free logic. We also compare the model-theoretic analysis supplied by partial structures with the method of supervaluations, which was initially introduced as a technique to provide a semantic analysis of free logic. We then combine the three formal frameworks (partial structures, free logic and supervaluations), and apply the (...)
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  • Empiricism, Scientific Change and Mathematical Change.Otávio Bueno - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (2):269-296.
    The aim of this paper is to provide a unified account of scientific and mathematical change in a thoroughly empiricist setting. After providing a formal modelling in terms of embedding, and criticising it for being too restrictive, a second modelling is advanced. It generalises the first, providing a more open-ended pattern of theory development, and is articulated in terms of da Costa and French's partial structures approach. The crucial component of scientific and mathematical change is spelled out in terms of (...)
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  • Can the Constructive Empiricist Be a Nominalist? Quasi-Truth, Commitment and Consistency.Paul Dicken - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2):191-209.
    In this paper, I explore Rosen’s ‘transcendental’ objection to constructive empiricism—the argument that in order to be a constructive empiricist, one must be ontologically committed to just the sort of abstract, mathematical objects constructive empiricism seems committed to denying. In particular, I assess Bueno’s ‘partial structures’ response to Rosen, and argue that such a strategy cannot succeed, on the grounds that it cannot provide an adequate metalogic for our scientific discourse. I conclude by arguing that this result provides some interesting (...)
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  • Belief Systems and Partial Spaces.Otávio Bueno - 2016 - Foundations of Science 21 (1):225-236.
    One important role of belief systems is to allow us to represent information about a certain domain of inquiry. This paper presents a formal framework to accommodate such information representation. Three cognitive models to represent information are discussed: conceptual spaces, state-spaces, and the problem spaces familiar from artificial intelligence. After indicating their weakness to deal with partial information, it is argued that an alternative, formulated in terms of partial structures, can be provided which not only captures the positive features of (...)
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  • Structural Realism, Scientific Change, and Partial Structures.Otávio Bueno - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (2):213-235.
    Scientific change has two important dimensions: conceptual change and structural change. In this paper, I argue that the existence of conceptual change brings serious difficulties for scientific realism, and the existence of structural change makes structural realism look quite implausible. I then sketch an alternative account of scientific change, in terms of partial structures, that accommodates both conceptual and structural changes. The proposal, however, is not realist, and supports a structuralist version of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (structural empiricism).
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  • Defeasible Reasoning + Partial Models: A Formal Framework for the Methodology of Research Programs. [REVIEW]Fernando Tohmé, Claudio Delrieux & Otávio Bueno - 2011 - Foundations of Science 16 (1):47-65.
    In this paper we show that any reasoning process in which conclusions can be both fallible and corrigible can be formalized in terms of two approaches: (i) syntactically, with the use of defeasible reasoning, according to which reasoning consists in the construction and assessment of arguments for and against a given claim, and (ii) semantically, with the use of partial structures, which allow for the representation of less than conclusive information. We are particularly interested in the formalization of scientific reasoning, (...)
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  • Two Types of Empirical Adequacy: A Partial Structures Approach.John M. Dukich - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2801-2820.
    The notion of empirical adequacy has received recent philosophical attention, especially within the framework of the semantic approach. Empirical adequacy, as explicated in the semantic approach, concerns the relationship between empirical substructures and some phenomena. The aim here is to differentiate this notion of empirical adequacy from one concerning the relationship between data and phenomena. Distinguishing each notion of empirical adequacy emphasizes different aspects of scientific practice—one concerning theory-development from the basis of an established theory, the other concerning theory-development from (...)
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  • On Russell's Principle of Induction.Newton C. A. Costa & Steven French - 1991 - Synthese 86 (2):285-295.
    An improvement on Horwich's so-called pseudo-proof of Russell 's principle of induction is offered, which, we believe, avoids certain objections to the former. Although strictly independent of our other work in this area, a connection can be made and in the final section we comment on this and certain questions regarding rationality, etc.
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  • Quasi-Truth, Paraconsistency, and the Foundations of Science.Otávio Bueno & Newton C. A. da Costa - 2007 - Synthese 154 (3):383-399.
    In order to develop an account of scientific rationality, two problems need to be addressed: (i) how to make sense of episodes of theory change in science where the lack of a cumulative development is found, and (ii) how to accommodate cases of scientific change where lack of consistency is involved. In this paper, we sketch a model of scientific rationality that accommodates both problems. We first provide a framework within which it is possible to make sense of scientific revolutions, (...)
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  • On Russell's Principle of Induction.Newton C. A. da Costa & Steven French - 1991 - Synthese 86 (2):285 - 295.
    An improvement on Horwich's so-called "pseudo-proof" of Russell's principle of induction is offered, which, we believe, avoids certain objections to the former. Although strictly independent of our other work in this area, a connection can be made and in the final section we comment on this and certain questions regarding rationality, etc.
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