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  1. Cotard Syndrome, Self-Awareness, and I-Concepts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.
    Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M.” I have argued in previous work that a (...)
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  • Pure Awareness Experience.Brentyn J. Ramm - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
    I am aware of the red and orange autumn leaves. Am I aware of my awareness of the leaves? Not so according to many philosophers. By contrast, many meditative traditions report an experience of awareness itself. I argue that such a pure awareness experience must have a non-sensory phenomenal character. I use Douglas Harding’s first-person experiments for assisting in recognizing pure awareness. In particular, I investigate the gap where one cannot see one’s head. This is not a mere gap because (...)
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  • The identity of experiences and the identity of the subject.Donnchadh O’Conaill - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):987-1005.
    Barry Dainton has developed a sophisticated version of the bundle theory of the subject of experiences. I shall focus on three claims Dainton makes: the identity-conditions of subjects can be specified in terms of capacities to produce experiences; the identity-conditions of token capacities are not determined by their subjects; and a subject is nothing over and above a bundle of such capacities. I shall argue that Dainton’s key notion of co-consciousness, a primitive relation of experienced togetherness, presupposes a subject common (...)
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  • For-Me-Ness, For-Us-Ness, and the We-Relationship.Felipe León - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):547-558.
    This article investigates the relationship between for-me-ness and sociality. I start by pointing out some ambiguities in claims pursued by critics that have recently pressed on the relationship between the two notions. I next articulate a question concerning for-me-ness and sociality that builds on the idea that, occasionally at least, there is something it is like ‘for us’ to have an experience. This idea has been explored in recent literature on shared experiences and collective intentionality, and it gestures towards the (...)
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  • “I” and “Me”: The Self in the Context of Consciousness.Mateusz Woźniak - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Self-Defense: Deflecting Deflationary and Eliminativist Critiques of the Sense of Ownership.Shaun Gallagher - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
  • The Essential Tension in Phenomenal Consciousness.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2020 - Philosophical Papers 49 (1):159-190.
    The contemporary standard view of phenomenal consciousness —shared by reductionists and non-reductionists alike—takes it to be a simple, ‘low-level’, ‘pre-reflective’ feature of mental states,...
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  • II- Dainton on Subjects of Experience.Paul F. Snowdon - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):145-159.
    The paper discusses some of the themes in Professor Dainton’s article ‘The Sense of Self’. In the first part it is proposed that some of the arguments in favour of the theory that Dainton proposes are questionable, and that in its more extreme version there are features which look doubtful. A simpler account of subjects is then proposed. In the second part some aspects of Dainton’s discussion of the sense of self are analysed. It is argued that although Dainton’s own (...)
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  • Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness.Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects (...)
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