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Barry F. Dainton (2003). Time in Experience: Reply to Gallagher.

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  1. Dual‐Aspect Monism.Jiri Benovsky - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (4):335-352.
    In this article, I am interested in dual-aspect monism as a solution to the mind-body problem. This view is not new, but it is somewhat under-represented in the contemporary debate, and I would like to help it make its way. Dual-aspect monism is a parsimonious, elegant and simple view. It avoids problems with “mental causation”. It naturally explains how and why mental states are correlated with physical states while avoiding any mysteries concerning the nature of this relation. It fits well (...)
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    Endurance, Dualism, Temporal Passage, and Intuitions.Jiri Benovsky - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):851-862.
    Endurantism, as opposed to perdurantism, is supposed to be the intuitive view. But the ‘endurantist intuition’ – roughly, that objects persist through time by being numerically identical and wholly located at all times at which they exist – is behind more than just endurantism. Indeed, it plays an important role in the motivation of some theories about the passage of time, and some theories about the nature of the subject. As we shall see, the endurantist intuition is often taken in (...)
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  3. The Present Vs. The Specious Present.Jiri Benovsky - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):193-203.
    This article is concerned with the alleged incompatibility between presentism and specious present theories of temporal experience. According to presentism, the present time is instantaneous (or, near-instantaneous), while according to specious present theories, the specious present is temporally extended—therefore, it seems that there is no room in reality for the whole of a specious present, if presentism is true. It seems then that one of the two claims—presentism or the specious present theory—has to go. I shall argue that this kind (...)
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  4. The Metaphysics of the 'Specious' Present.Sean Enda Power - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):121-132.
    The doctrine of the specious present, that we perceive or, at least, seem to perceive a period of time is often taken to be an obvious claim about perception. Yet, it also seems just as commonly rejected as being incoherent. In this paper, following a distinction between three conceptions of the specious present, it is argued that the incoherence is due to hidden metaphysical assumptions about perception and time. It is argued that for those who do not hold such assumptions, (...)
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  5. Sensing Change.Barry Dainton - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):362-384.
    We can anticipate what is yet to happen, remember what has already happened, but our immediate experience is confined to the present, the here and now. So much seems common sense. So much so that it is no surprise to see Thomas Reid, that pre-eminent champion of common sense in philosophy, advocating precisely this position.
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  6. The Experience of Time and Change.Barry Dainton - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):619-638.
    Can we directly experience change? Although some philosophers have denied it, the phenomenological evidence is unambiguous: we can, and do. But how is this possible? What structures or features of consciousness render such experience possible? A variety of very different answers to this question have been proposed, answers which have very different implications for the nature of consciousness itself. In this brief survey no attempt is made to engage with the often complex (and sometimes obscure) literature on this topic. Instead, (...)
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  7. Perception of Duration Presupposes Duration of Perception - or Does It? Husserl and Dainton on Time.Dan Zahavi - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):453-471.
    In his recent book The Stream of Consciousness, Dainton provides what must surely count as one of the most comprehensive discussions of time-consciousness in analytical philosophy. In the course of doing so, he also challenges Husserl's classical account in a number of ways. In the following contribution, I will compare Dainton's and Husserl's respective accounts. Such a comparison will not only make it evident why an analysis of time-consciousness is so important, but will also provide a neat opportunity to appraise (...)
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  8. The Self and the Phenomenal.Barry F. Dainton - 2004 - Ratio 17 (4):365-89.
    As is widely appreciated and easily demonstrated, the notion that we are essentially experiential (or conscious) beings has a good deal of appeal; what is less obvious, and more controversial, is whether it is possible to devise a viable account of the self along such lines within the confines of a broadly naturalistic metaphysical framework. There are many avenues to explore, but here I confine myself to outlining the case for one particular approach. I suggest that we should think of (...)
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