As part of the roundtable “Economic Sanctions and Their Consequences,” this essay discusses whether economic sanctions are morally acceptable policy tools. It notes that both conventional and targeted sanctions not only often fail to achieve their stated objectives but also bring about significant negative externalities in target countries. Economic dislocation and increases in political instability instigated by sanctions disproportionately affect the well-being of opposition groups and marginalized segments of society, while target elites and their support base remain insulated from the (...) intended costs of foreign pressure. Sanctions might also incentivize target governments to use repressive means to consolidate their rule and weaken the opposition. Given these serious shortcomings, I argue that sanctions are ethically problematic tools of foreign policy. Nonetheless, this does not mean that sanctions should be rejected outright, as there might be cases where sanctions are the only viable option, and they might work effectively under certain circumstances. Rather, the essay suggests that policymakers should apply more caution in considering the use of sanctions given their low probability of success, and should be more concerned with the delicate balance between political gain and civilian pain before levying sanctions, whether comprehensive or targeted. (shrink)

Economic sanctions are emerging as one of the major tools of international governance in the post-Cold War era. Gordon considers the issue of sanctions within three ethical frameworks: just war doctrine, deontological ethics, and utilitarianism.

The ethics of economic sanctions is an issue that has been curiously neglected by philosophers and political theorists. Only a handful of philosophical journal articles and book chapters have ever been published on the subject; yet economic sanctions, as I will show, are significantly morally problematic and their use stands in need of moral justification. The aim of this thesis then is to consider how economic sanctions might be morally justified. Of the few writers who have considered this issue, the (...) majority point to the analogies between economic sanctions and war and use the just war principles (just cause, proportionality etc.) as a framework within which to assess their moral permissibility. I argue that this is a mistake. The just war principles are derived from a set of complex and detailed arguments all planted firmly within the context of war. These arguments contain premises that, whilst they may hold true in the case of war, do not always hold true in the case of economic sanctions. Nevertheless, the rich just war tradition does offer a valuable starting point for theorising about economic sanctions and in the thesis I consider how the wider just war tradition might be brought to bear on the case of economic sanctions, beginning, not with the just war principles, but with the underlying arguments for those principles. In particular, I consider whether economic sanctions can be justified on the grounds that they are a form of self- or other-defence, that they are the ‘lesser evil’ and that they are a form of punishment. I argue that certain types of economic sanctions can be justified on the grounds that they are a form of self- or other- defence and that, in extreme circumstances, certain types of economic sanctions can be justified as the ‘lesser evil’. However, I argue that economic sanctions cannot be justified on the grounds of punishment. I also develop a ‘clean hands’ argument for economic sanctions that is unavailable to the just war theorist; I argue that where the goods and services to be supplied would contribute to human rights violations or other wrongful acts, there is a duty to impose economic sanctions to avoid complicity in this wrongdoing. (shrink)

abstract Using as a background the ongoing crisis afflicting the international cricket scene over whether or not to boycott Zimbabwe, this paper seeks to explore the moral complexities surrounding the case of the sporting boycott in general as a response to morally odious regimes. Rather than attempting to provide some easy formula by which to determine justifiable from unjustifiable boycotts, we take as our starting point many of the arguments raised in the national press and explore and develop these arguments (...) in order to shed light on the fundamental problems underlying the use of sporting boycotts as moral tools. The paper thus aims to show the inadequacy of the standard responses on both sides of the fence and, hopefully, clears the ground for future, more informed approaches to the issue. (shrink)