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Intuition and Emotion

Ethics 124 (4):787-812 (2014)

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  1. Methods in Ethics: Introduction.Ben Colburn - 2015 - The Virtual Issue of the Aristotelian Society 3: Methods in Ethics.
    The Aristotelian Society’s Virtual Issue is a free, online publication, made publically available on the Aristotelian Society website. Each volume is theme-based, collecting together papers from the archives of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society and the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume that address the chosen theme. This year's Virtual Issue includes a selection of papers from across the Society’s fourteen decades, each accompanied by a specially commissioned present-day response. The aim of the volume is to aid reflection (...)
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  • H Anno S Auer Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2017. 312 Pp. Isbn 9780262035606. $50.00. [REVIEW]Amna Whiston - 2019 - Theoria 85 (2):171-178.
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  • Practical Perception and Intelligent Action.John Bengson - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):25-58.
    Perceiving things to be a certain way may in some cases lead directly to action that is intelligent. This phenomenon has not often been discussed, though it is of broad philosophical interest. It also raises a difficult question: how can perception produce intelligent action? After clarifying the question—which I call the question of “practical perception”—and explaining what is required for an adequate answer, I critically examine two candidate answers drawn from work on related topics: the first, inspired by Hubert Dreyfus's (...)
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  • Sinnott-Armstrong’s Empirical Challenge to Moral Intuitionism: A Novel Critique.Julia Hermann - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):829-842.
    This paper provides a novel critique of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s influential argument against epistemological moral intuitionism, the view that some people are non-inferentially justified in believing some moral propositions. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, this view experienced a revival, which coincided with an increasing interest in empirical research on intuitions. The results of that research are seen by some as casting serious doubt on the reliability of our moral intuitions. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, empirical evidence shows that our moral beliefs (...)
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  • In Search of Greene's Argument.Norbert Paulo - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (1):38-58.
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  • Epistemic Perceptualism and Neo-Sentimentalist Objections.Robert Cowan - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):59-81.
    Epistemic Perceptualists claim that emotions are sources of immediate defeasible justification for evaluative propositions that can sometimes ground undefeated immediately justified evaluative beliefs. For example, fear can constitute the justificatory ground for a belief that some object or event is dangerous. Despite its attractiveness, the view is apparently vulnerable to several objections. In this paper, I provide a limited defence of Epistemic Perceptualism by responding to a family of objections which all take as a premise a popular and attractive view (...)
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  • Don't Mind the Gap: Intuitions, Emotions, and Reasons in the Enhancement Debate.Alberto Giubilini - 2015 - Hastings Center Report 45 (5):39-47.
    Reliance on intuitive and emotive responses is widespread across many areas of bioethics, and the current debate on biotechnological human enhancement is particularly interesting in this respect. A strand of “bioconservatives” that has explicitly drawn connections to the modern conservative tradition, dating back to Edmund Burke, appeals explicitly to the alleged wisdom of our intuitions and emotions to ground opposition to some biotechnologies or their uses. So-called bioliberals, those who in principle do not oppose human bioenhancement, tend to rely on (...)
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  • Reasons for Emotion and Moral Motivation.Reid Blackman - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
    Internalism about normative reasons is the view that an agent’s normative reasons depend on her motivational constitution. On the assumption that there are reasons for emotion I argue that externalism about reasons for emotion entails that all rational agents have reasons to be morally motivated and internalism about reasons for emotion is implausible. If the arguments are sound we can conclude that all rational agents have reasons to be morally motivated. Resisting this conclusion requires either justifying internalism about reasons for (...)
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