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  1. Game Theory, Evolution, and Justice.Peter Vanderschraaf - 1999 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (4):325-358.
  • Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models.Brian Skyrms - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):94-113.
    even if an equilibrium is asymptotically stable, that is no guarantee that the system will reach that equilibrium unless we know that the system's initial state is sufficiently close to the equilibrium. Global stability of an equilibrium, when we have it, gives the equilibrium a much more powerful explanatory role. An equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable if the dynamics carries every possible initial state in the interior of the state space to that equilibrium. If an equilibrium is globally stable, it (...)
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  • Game Theoretic Explanations and the Evolution of Justice.Justin D'Arms, Robert Batterman & Krzyzstof Górny - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (1):76-102.
    Game theoretic explanations of the evolution of human behavior have become increasingly widespread. At their best, they allow us to abstract from misleading particulars in order to better recognize and appreciate broad patterns in the phenomena of human social life. We discuss this explanatory strategy, contrasting it with the particularist methodology of contemporary evolutionary psychology. We introduce some guidelines for the assessment of evolutionary game theoretic explanations of human behavior: such explanations should be representative, robust, and flexible. Distinguishing these features (...)
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  • Modeling Morality.Walter Veit - 2019 - In Matthieu Fontaine, Cristina Barés-Gómez, Francisco Salguero-Lamillar, Lorenzo Magnani & Ángel Nepomuceno-Fernández (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Springer Verlag. pp. 83–102.
    Unlike any other field, the science of morality has drawn attention from an extraordinarily diverse set of disciplines. An interdisciplinary research program has formed in which economists, biologists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and even philosophers have been eager to provide answers to puzzling questions raised by the existence of human morality. Models and simulations, for a variety of reasons, have played various important roles in this endeavor. Their use, however, has sometimes been deemed as useless, trivial and inadequate. The role of models (...)
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  • Strategic Interdependence, Hypothetical Bargaining, and Mutual Advantage in Non-Cooperative Games.Mantas Radzvilas - unknown
    One of the conceptual limitations of the orthodox game theory is its inability to offer definitive theoretical predictions concerning the outcomes of noncooperative games with multiple rationalizable outcomes. This prompted the emergence of goal-directed theories of reasoning – the team reasoning theory and the theory of hypothetical bargaining. Both theories suggest that people resolve non-cooperative games by using a reasoning algorithm which allows them to identify mutually advantageous solutions of non-cooperative games. The primary aim of this thesis is to enrich (...)
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  • Evolutionary Explanations of Simple Communication: Signalling Games and Their Models.Travis LaCroix - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):19-43.
    This paper applies the theoretical criteria laid out by D’Arms et al. to various aspects of evolutionary models of signalling. The question that D’Arms et al. seek to answer can be formulated as follows: Are the models that we use to explain the phenomena in question conceptually adequate? The conceptual adequacy question relates the formal aspects of the model to those aspects of the natural world that the model is supposed to capture. Moreover, this paper extends the analysis of D’Arms (...)
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  • Evolutionary Game Theory.Alexander J. McKenzie & Edward N. Zalta - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
     
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