Citations of work:

Stephen Darwall (1995). The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': 1640–1740.

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  1. Hobbes's Struggle with Contractual Obligation. On the Status of the Laws of Nature in Hobbes's Work.Matthias Kiesselbach - 2010 - Hobbes Studies 23 (2):105-123.
    This paper argues that throughout his intellectual career, Hobbes remains unsatisfied with his own attempts at proving the invariant advisability of contract-keeping. Not only does he see himself forced to abandon his early idea that contractual obligation is a matter of physical laws. He also develops and retains doubts concerning its theoretical successor, the doctrine that the obligatoriness characteristic of contracts is the interest in self-preservation in alliance with instrumental reason - i.e. prudence. In fact, it is during his work (...)
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    Anthropocentrism Vs. Nonanthropocentrism: Why Should We Care?Mcshane Katie - 2007 - Environmental Values 16 (May):169-186.
    Many recent critical discussions of anthropocentrism have focused on Bryan Norton's 'convergence hypothesis': the claim that both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric ethics will recommend the same environmentally responsible behaviours and policies. I argue that even if we grant the truth of Norton's convergence hypothesis, there are still good reasons to worry about anthropocentric ethics. Ethics legitimately raises questions about how to feel, not just about which actions to take or which policies to adopt. From the point of view of norms for (...)
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  3. Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume’s Metaethics.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
    Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that (...)
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  4. De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism.Jon Tresan - 2006 - Noûs 40 (1):143–165.