Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Epistemic Significance of Emotional Experience.Brian Scott Ballard - 2020 - Emotion Review 13 (2):113-124.
    Some philosophers claim that emotions are, at best, hindrances to the discovery of evaluative truths, while others omit them entirely from their epistemology of value. I argue, however, that this is a mistake. Drawing an evaluative parallel with Frank Jackson’s Mary case, I show there is a distinctive way in which emotions epistemically enhance evaluative judgment. This is, in fact, a conclusion philosophers of emotion have been eager to endorse. However, after considering several influential proposals—such as the view that emotions (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Puzzle for Evaluation Theories of Desire.Alex Grzankowski - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):90-98.
    How we evaluate things and what we desire are closely connected. In typical cases, the things we desire are things that we evaluate as good or desirable. According to evaluation theories of desire, this connection is a very tight one: desires are evaluations of their objects as good or as desirable. There are two main varieties of this view. According to Doxastic Evaluativism, to desire that p is to believe or judge that p is good. According to Perceptual Evaluativism, to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Extended Emotion.J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & S. Orestis Palermos - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):198-217.
    Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas and, in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Is There Such a Thing as Genuinely Moral Disgust?Mara Bollard - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    In this paper, I defend a novel skeptical view about moral disgust. I argue that much recent discussion of moral disgust neglects an important ontological question: is there a distinctive psychological state of moral disgust that is differentiable from generic disgust, and from other psychological states? I investigate the ontological question and propose two conditions that any aspiring account of moral disgust must satisfy: (1) it must be a genuine form of disgust, and (2) it must be genuinely moral. Next, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Blameless Guilt: The Case of Carer Guilt and Chronic and Terminal Illness.Matthew Bennett - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (1):72-89.
    My ambition in this paper is to provide an account of an unacknowledged example of blameless guilt that, I argue, merits further examination. The example is what I call carer guilt: guilt felt by nurses and family members caring for patients with palliative-care needs. Nurses and carers involved in palliative care often feel guilty about what they perceive as their failure to provide sufficient care for a patient. However, in some cases the guilty carer does not think that he has (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Emotion Account of Blame.Leonhard Menges - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):257-273.
    For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Descent of Shame1.Heidi L. Maibom - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):566-594.
    Shame is a painful emotion concerned with failure to live up to certain standards, norms, or ideals. The subject feels that she falls in the regard of others; she feels watched and exposed. As a result, she feels bad about the person that she is. The most popular view of shame is that someone only feels ashamed if she fails to live up to standards, norms, or ideals that she, herself, accepts. In this paper, I provide support for a different (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Shame, Stigma, HIV: Philosophical Reflections.Phil Hutchinson & Rageshri Dhairyawan - 2017 - Medical Humanities 43 (4):225-230.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Qualities of Will.David Shoemaker - 2013 - Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):95-120.
    One of P. F. Strawson's suggestions in “Freedom and Resentment” was that there might be an elegant theory of moral responsibility that accounted for all of our responsibility responses in a way that also explained why we get off the hook from those responses. Such a theory would appeal exclusively toquality of will: when we react with any of a variety of responsibility responses to someone, we are responding to the quality of her will with respect to us, and when (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Cognition, Representations and Embodied Emotions: Investigating Cognitive Theory.Somogy Varga - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):165-190.
    Cognitive theory (CT) is currently the most widely acknowledged framework used to describe the psychological processes in affective disorders like depression. The purpose of this paper is to assess the philosophical assumptions upon which CT rests. It is argued that CT must be revised due to significant flaws in many of these philosophical assumptions. The paper contains suggestions as to how these problems could be overcome in a manner that would secure philosophical accuracy, while also providing an account that is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Loving People for Who They Are (Even When They Don't Love You Back).Sara Protasi - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):214-234.
    The debate on love's reasons ignores unrequited love, which—I argue—can be as genuine and as valuable as reciprocated love. I start by showing that the relationship view of love cannot account for either the reasons or the value of unrequited love. I then present the simple property view, an alternative to the relationship view that is beset with its own problems. In order to solve these problems, I present a more sophisticated version of the property view that integrates ideas from (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Neo-Sentimentalism and the Bodily Attitudinal Theory of Emotions.Chun Nam Chan - unknown
    Section 1 of this thesis investigates one issue in meta-ethics, namely, the nature of moral judgments. What are moral judgments? What does it mean by "wrong" when we assert "Killing is wrong?" Neo-sentimentalism is a meta-ethical theory which holds that the judgment that killing wrong is the judgment that it is appropriate to have a particular negative emotion towards the action. In other words, to judge that murder is wrong is to judge that we have a right reason for having (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Authenticity Anyone? The Enhancement of Emotions Via Neuro-Psychopharmacology.Felicitas Kraemer - 2011 - Neuroethics 4 (1):51-64.
    This article will examine how the notion of emotional authenticity is intertwined with the notions of naturalness and artificiality in the context of the recent debates about ‘neuro-enhancement’ and ‘neuro-psychopharmacology.’ In the philosophy of mind, the concept of authenticity plays a key role in the discussion of the emotions. There is a widely held intuition that an artificial means will always lead to an inauthentic result. This article, however, proposes that artificial substances do not necessarily result in inauthentic emotions. The (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Forgiving as Emotional Distancing.Santiago Amaya - 2019 - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (1):6-26.
    :In this essay, I present an account of forgiveness as a process of emotional distancing. The central claim is that, understood in these terms, forgiveness does not require a change in judgment. Rationally forgiving someone, in other words, does not require that one judges the significance of the wrongdoing differently or that one comes to the conclusion that the attitudes behind it have changed in a favorable way. The model shows in what sense forgiving is inherently social, shows why we (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Not All Attitudes Are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.
    Most contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality start and end with a treatment of the propositional attitudes. In fact, many theorists hold that all attitudes are propositional attitudes. Our folk-psychological ascriptions suggest, however, that there are non-propositional attitudes: I like Sally, my brother fears snakes, everyone loves my grandmother, and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. I argue that things are as they appear: there are non-propositional attitudes. More specifically, I argue that there are attitudes that relate individuals to non-propositional objects and do (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Knowing How You Feel: The Structure and Importance of Emotional Self-Knowledge.Robert Boudreau - unknown
    The aim of this thesis is to offer up a structure of what I call Emotional Self-Knowledge—roughly, knowledge of one’s own emotions. I begin with a broad understanding of an emotion event, according to which emotion events include a set of bodily feelings in response to some object. I then argue that knowledge of the object and the feeling of the emotion are required parts of knowing one’s own emotions if we expect emotional self-knowledge to be prudentially useful. I then (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Possibility of Robots Having Emotions.Cameron Hamilton - unknown
    I argue against the commonly held intuition that robots and virtual agents will never have emotions by contending robots can have emotions in a sense that is functionally similar to humans, even if the robots' emotions are not exactly equivalent to those of humans. To establish a foundation for assessing the robots' emotional capacities, I first define what emotions are by characterizing the components of emotion consistent across emotion theories. Second, I dissect the affective-cognitive architecture of MIT's Kismet and Leonardo, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Descent of Shame.Heidi L. Maibom - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):566 - 594.
    Shame is a painful emotion concerned with failure to live up to certain standards, norms, or ideals. The subject feels that she falls in the regard of others; she feels watched and exposed. As a result, she feels bad about the person that she is. The most popular view of shame is that someone only feels ashamed if she fails to live up to standards, norms, or ideals that she, herself, accepts. In this paper, I provide support for a different (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • What Cèyǐn Zhī Xīn (Compassion/Familial Affection) Really Is.Myeong-Seok Kim - 2010 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 9 (4):407-425.
    This essay aims to delineate Mengzi’s view of emotion by analyzing his first ethical sprout, often referred to by the Chinese term cèyǐn zhī xīn 惻隱之心.Previous scholars usually translate this term as “compassion,” “sympathy,” or “commiseration,” in the sense of the painful feeling one feels at the misfortune of others. My goal in this article is to clarify the nature of this painful feeling, and specifically I argue that (1) cèyǐn zhī xīn is primarily construing another being’s misfortune with sympathetic (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Boredom and the Divided Mind.Vida Yao - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (4):937-957.
    On one predominant conception of virtue, the virtuous agent is, among other things, wholehearted in doing what she believes best. I challenge this condition of wholeheartedness by making explicit the connections between the emotion of boredom and the states of continence and akrasia. An easily bored person is more susceptible to these forms of disharmony because of two familiar characteristics of boredom. First, that we can be – and often are – bored by what it is that we know would (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Neither Here nor There: The Cognitive Nature of Emotion.Remy Debes - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):1-27.
    The philosophy of emotion has long been divided over the cognitive nature of emotion. In this paper I argue that this debate suffers from deep confusion over the meaning of “cognition” itself. This confusion has in turn obscured critical substantive agreement between the debate’s principal opponents. Capturing this agreement and remedying this confusion requires re-conceptualizing “the cognitive” as it functions in first-order theories of emotion. Correspondingly, a sketch for a new account of cognitivity is offered. However, I also argue that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Sentimentalism and the Intersubjectivity of Aesthetic Evaluations.Fabian Dorsch - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):417-446.
    Within the debate on the epistemology of aesthetic appreciation, it has a long tradition, and is still very common, to endorse the sentimentalist view that our aesthetic evaluations are rationally grounded on, or even constituted by, certain of our emotional responses to the objects concerned. Such a view faces, however, the serious challenge to satisfactorily deal with the seeming possibility of faultless disagreement among emotionally based and epistemically appropriate verdicts. I will argue that the sentimentalist approach to aesthetic epistemology cannot (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Jealousy: A Response to Infidelity? On the Nature and Appropriateness Conditions of Jealousy.Anna Welpinghus - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):322-337.
    This paper critically assesses the widespread claim that jealousy is a response to infidelity. According to this claim, herewith called the entitlement theory, jealousy is only an appropriate response to a relationship between a loved one and a rival if, by entertaining this relationship, the loved one does not treat the jealous person the way she is entitled to be treated. I reconstruct different versions of ET, each of them providing a different answer to the question why we should assume (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Cruel Jokes and Normative Competence.David Shoemaker - 2018 - Social Philosophy and Policy 35 (1):173-195.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark