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  1. Who's afraid of assessment? Remarks on Winch and Gingell's reply.Andrew Davis - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 30 (3):389–400.
    This paper defends my argument that criterion-referenced assessment should not be used to render an education system accountable to the state. Winch and Gingell's reply to my original paper understands me as denying the ‘plasticity’ of abilities. Considerable space is devoted to further discussion of this issue.‘Plasticity’ is not denied, but problems about the ‘identity’ of capacities, abilities, processes and rules are explored in some depth. Winch and Gingell defend certain kinds of pedagogy such as rote learning and ‘teaching to (...)
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  • Who's Afraid of Assessment? remarks on Winch and Gingell's reply.Andrew Davis - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 30 (3):389-400.
    This paper defends my argument that criterion-referenced assessment should not be used to render an education system accountable to the state. Winch and Gingell's reply to my original paper understands me as denying the ‘plasticity’ of abilities. Considerable space is devoted to further discussion of this issue.‘Plasticity’ is not denied, but problems about the ‘identity’ of capacities, abilities, processes and rules are explored in some depth. Winch and Gingell defend certain kinds of pedagogy such as rote learning and ‘teaching to (...)
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  • Logical Defects of the TGAT Report.Andrew Davis - 1990 - British Journal of Educational Studies 38 (3):237 - 250.
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  • Logical defects of the TGAT report.Andrew Davis - 1990 - British Journal of Educational Studies 38 (3):237-250.
  • Teaching thinking, and the sanctity of content.Michael Bonnett - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 29 (3):295–309.
    There are renewed claims that thinking, or important aspects of it, should be conceived in terms of certain general powers, skills or competencies which should be taught as such. Some possibilities for confusion within this view are identified and it is argued that its undoubted attractions must be weighed against certain severe dangers, particularly with regard to how it may predispose us to conceive of content and its role in thinking. Some implications for teaching of a view of thinking that (...)
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  • Teaching Thinking, and the Sanctity of Content.Michael Bonnett - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 29 (3):295-309.
    There are renewed claims that thinking, or important aspects of it, should be conceived in terms of certain general powers, skills or competencies which should be taught as such. Some possibilities for confusion within this view are identified and it is argued that its undoubted attractions must be weighed against certain severe dangers, particularly with regard to how it may predispose us to conceive of content and its role in thinking. Some implications for teaching of a view of thinking that (...)
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  • A Reappraisal of Children’s ‘Potential’.Clémentine Beauvais & Rupert Higham - 2016 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 35 (6):573-587.
    What does it mean for a child to fulfil his or her potential? This article explores the contexts and implications of the much-used concept of potential in educational discourses. We claim that many of the popular, political and educational uses of the term in relation to childhood have a problematic blind spot: interpersonality, and the necessary coexistence for the concept to be receivable of all children’s ‘potentials’. Rather than advocating abandoning the term—a futile gesture given its emotive force—we argue that (...)
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