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Martin Davies (1991). Individualism and Perceptual Content.

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  1. How to Think About Mental Content.Frances Egan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-21.
    Introduction: representationalismMost theorists of cognition endorse some version of representationalism, which I will understand as the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are representational capacities. Of course, notions such as ‘representation’ and ‘information-using’ are terms of art that require explication. As a first pass, representations are “mediating states of an intelligent system that carry information” (Markman and Dietrich 2001, p. 471). They have two important features: (1) they are physically realized, and so (...)
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  2. Naturalising Representational Content.Nicholas Shea - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):496-509.
    This paper sets out a view about the explanatory role of representational content and advocates one approach to naturalising content – to giving a naturalistic account of what makes an entity a representation and in virtue of what it has the content it does. It argues for pluralism about the metaphysics of content and suggests that a good strategy is to ask the content question with respect to a variety of predictively successful information processing models in experimental psychology and cognitive (...)
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  3. Smelling Lessons.Clare Batty - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):161-174.
    Much of the philosophical work on perception has focused on vision. Recently, however, philosophers have begun to correct this ‘tunnel vision’ by considering other modalities. Nevertheless, relatively little has been written about the chemical senses—olfaction and gustation. The focus of this paper is olfaction. In this paper, I consider the question: does human olfactory experience represents objects as thus and so? If we take visual experience as the paradigm of how experience can achieve object representation, we might think that the (...)
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  4.  32
    Levels of Explanation Vindicated.Víctor M. Verdejo & Daniel Quesada - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):77-88.
    Marr’s celebrated contribution to cognitive science (Marr 1982, chap. 1) was the introduction of (at least) three levels of description/explanation. However, most contemporary research has relegated the distinction between levels to a rather dispensable remark. Ignoring such an important contribution comes at a price, or so we shall argue. In the present paper, first we review Marr’s main points and motivations regarding levels of explanation. Second, we examine two cases in which the distinction between levels has been neglected when considering (...)
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  5.  8
    A Representational Account of Olfactory Experience.Clare Batty - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):511-538.
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  6.  84
    Computation, Individuation, and the Received View on Representation.Mark Sprevak - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):260-270.
    The ‘received view’ about computation is that all computations must involve representational content. Egan and Piccinini argue against the received view. In this paper, I focus on Egan’s arguments, claiming that they fall short of establishing that computations do not involve representational content. I provide positive arguments explaining why computation has to involve representational content, and how that representational content may be of any type. I also argue that there is no need for computational psychology to be individualistic. Finally, I (...)
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  7. The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad J. Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
    To what extent is the external world the way that it appears to us in perceptual experience? This perennial question in philosophy is no doubt ambiguous in many ways. For example, it might be taken as equivalent to the question of whether or not the external world is the way that it appears to be? This is a question about the epistemology of perception: Are our perceptual experiences by and large veridical representations of the external world? Alternatively, the question might (...)
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  8. Semantic Externalism and the Mechanics of Thought.Carrie Figdor - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (1):1-24.
    I review a widely accepted argument to the conclusion that the contents of our beliefs, desires and other mental states cannot be causally efficacious in a classical computational model of the mind. I reply that this argument rests essentially on an assumption about the nature of neural structure that we have no good scientific reason to accept. I conclude that computationalism is compatible with wide semantic causal efficacy, and suggest how the computational model might be modified to accommodate this possibility.
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  9.  58
    Computation, External Factors, and Cognitive Explanations.Amir Horowitz - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):65-80.
    Computational properties, it is standardly assumed, are to be sharply distinguished from semantic properties. Specifically, while it is standardly assumed that the semantic properties of a cognitive system are externally or non-individualistically individuated, computational properties are supposed to be individualistic and internal. Yet some philosophers (e.g., Tyler Burge) argue that content impacts computation, and further, that environmental factors impact computation. Oron Shagrir has recently argued for these theses in a novel way, and gave them novel interpretations. In this paper I (...)
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  10. Nonconceptual Content.Josefa Toribio - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):445–460.
    Nonconceptualists maintain that there are ways of representing the world that do not reflect the concepts a creature possesses. They claim that the content of these representational states is genuine content because it is subject to correctness conditions, but it is nonconceptual because the creature to which we attribute it need not possess any of the concepts involved in the specification of that content. Appeals to nonconceptual content have seemed especially useful in attempts to capture the representational properties of perceptual (...)
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  11. Why We View the Brain as a Computer.Oron Shagrir - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):393-416.
    The view that the brain is a sort of computer has functioned as a theoretical guideline both in cognitive science and, more recently, in neuroscience. But since we can view every physical system as a computer, it has been less than clear what this view amounts to. By considering in some detail a seminal study in computational neuroscience, I first suggest that neuroscientists invoke the computational outlook to explain regularities that are formulated in terms of the information content of electrical (...)
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  12.  96
    Chomsky and Egan on Computational Theories of Vision.Arnold Silverberg - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (4):495-524.
  13.  28
    Metaphysics, Method, and the Mouth: Philosophical Lessons of Speech Perception.J. D. Trout - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):261-291.
    This paper advances a novel argument that speech perception is a complex system best understood nonindividualistically and therefore that individualism fails as a general philosophical program for understanding cognition. The argument proceeds in four steps. First, I describe a "replaceability strategy", commonly deployed by individualists, in which one imagines replacing an object with an appropriate surrogate. This strategy conveys the appearance that relata can be substituted without changing the laws that hold within the domain. Second, I advance a "counterfactual test" (...)
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  14.  41
    Individualism, Twin Scenarios and Visual Content.M. J. Cain - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):441-463.
    In this paper I address an important question concerning the nature of visual content: are the contents of human visual states and experiences exhaustively fixed or determined (in the non-causal sense) by our intrinsic physical properties? The individualist answers this question affirmatively. I will argue that such an answer is mistaken. A common anti-individualist or externalist tactic is to attempt to construct a twin scenario involving humanoid duplicates who are embedded in environments that diverge in such a way that it (...)
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  15.  49
    Individualism and Marr's Computational Theory of Vision.Keith Butler - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (4):313-37.
  16.  67
    Emdedded Systems Vs. Individualism.Michael Losonsky - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (3):357-71.
    The dispute between individualism and anti-individualism is about the individuation of psychological states, and individualism, on some accounts, is committed to the claim that psychological subjects together with their environments do not constitute integrated computational systems. Hence on this view the computational states that explain psychological states in computational accounts of mind will not involve the subject''s natural and social environment. Moreover, the explanation of a system''s interaction with the environment is, on this view, not the primary goal of computational (...)
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  17.  8
    The Real Problem with Constructivism.Paul Bloom & Karen Wynn - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):707.
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  18.  10
    Representational Redescription: A Question of Sequence.Margaret A. Boden - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):708.
  19.  7
    A Fodorian Guide to Switzerland: Jung and Piaget Combined?Péter Bodor & Csaba Pléh - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):709.
  20.  7
    What's Getting Redescribed?Robert L. Campbell - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):710.
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    Representational Redescription and Cognitive Architectures.Antonella Carassa & Maurizio Tirassa - 1994 - Carassa, Antonella and Tirassa, Maurizio (1994) Representational Redescription and Cognitive Architectures. [Journal (Paginated)] 17 (4):711-712.
    We focus on Karmiloff-Smith's Representational redescription model, arguing that it poses some problems concerning the architecture of a redescribing system. To discuss the topic, we consider the implicit/explicit dichotomy and the relations between natur al language and the language of thought. We argue that the model regards how knowledge is employed rather than how it is represented in the system.
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    Representational Redescription and Cognitive Architectures.Antonella Carassa & Maurizio Tirassa - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):711.
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  23.  6
    Redescribing Redescription.Terry Dartnall - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):712.
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  24.  3
    The Risks of Rationalising Cognitive Development.Beatrice de Gelder - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):713.
  25.  9
    Representation: Ontogenesis and Phylogenesis.Merlin Donald - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):714.
  26.  10
    Developmental Psychology for the Twenty-First Century.David Estes - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):715.
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    Arguments Against Linguistic “Modularization”.Susan H. Foster-Cohen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):716.
  28.  6
    Redescription of Intentionality.Norman H. Freeman - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):717.
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    Do You Have to Be Right to Redescribe?Susan Goldin-Meadow & Martha Wagner Alibali - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):718.
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  30.  8
    Dissociation, Self-Attribution, and Redescription.George Graham - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):719.
  31.  9
    Beyond Connectionist Versus Classical Al: A Control Theoretic Perspective on Development and Cognitive Science.Rick Grush - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):720.
  32.  6
    Representational Redescription, Memory, and Connectionism.P. J. Hampson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):721.
  33.  5
    Genes, Development, and the “Innate” Structure of the Mind.Timothy D. Johnston - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):721.
  34.  35
    Précis of Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science.Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):693.
  35.  9
    Transforming a Partially Structured Brain Into a Creative Mind.Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):732.
  36.  5
    The Power of Explicit Knowing.Deanna Kuhn - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):722.
  37.  5
    Beyond Methodological Solipsism?Michael Losonsky - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):723.
  38.  14
    Representational Change, Generality Versus Specificity, and Nature Versus Nurture: Perennial Issues in Cognitive Research.Stellan Ohlsson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):724-725.
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  39.  4
    Where Redescriptions Come From.David R. Olson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):725.
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  40.  10
    Beyond Modularity: Neural Evidence for Constructivist Principles in Development.Steven R. Quartz & Terrence J. Sejnowski - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):725.
  41.  6
    Situating Representational Redescriptionin Infants' Pragmatic Knowledge.Julie C. Rutkowska - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):726.
  42.  7
    Redescribing Development.Ellin Kofsky Scholnick - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):727.
  43.  8
    The Challenge of Representational Redescription.Thomas R. Shultz - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):728.
  44.  4
    Modal Knowledge and Transmodularity.Leslie Smith - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):729.
  45.  7
    Is There an Implicit Level of Representation?Annie Vinter & Pierre Perruchet - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):730.
  46.  6
    From the Decline of Development to the Ascent of Consciousness.Philip David Zelazo - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):731.