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Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & N. Breen (2001). Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.

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  1.  13
    Bodily Ownership, Psychological Ownership, and Psychopathology.José Luis Bermúdez - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    Debates about bodily ownership and psychological ownership have typically proceeded independently of each other. This paper explores the relation between them, with particular reference to how each is illuminated by psychopathology. I propose a general framework for studying ownership that is applicable both to bodily ownership and psychological ownership. The framework proposes studying ownership by starting with explicit judgments of ownership and then exploring the bases for those judgments. Section 3 discusses John Campbell’s account of ψ-ownership in the light of (...)
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  2.  1
    Intensity of Experience: Maher’s Theory of Schizophrenic Delusion Revisited.Eisuke Sakakibara - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-12.
    Maher proposed in 1974 that schizophrenic delusions are hypotheses formed to explain anomalous experiences. He stated that they are “rational, given the intensity of the experiences that they are developed to explain.” Two-factor theorists of delusion criticized Maher’s theory because 1) it does not explain why some patients with anomalous experiences do not develop delusions, and 2) adopting and adhering to delusional hypotheses is irrational, considering the totality of experiences and patients’ other beliefs. In this paper, the notion of the (...)
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  3.  5
    Abnormal Certainty: Examining the Epistemological Status of Delusional Beliefs.Svetlana Bardina - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (4):546-560.
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  4.  18
    A New Defence of Doxasticism About Delusions: The Cognitive Phenomenological Defence.Peter Clutton - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (2):198-217.
    Clinicians and cognitive scientists typically conceive of delusions as doxastic—they view delusions as beliefs. But some philosophers have countered with anti-doxastic objections: delusions cannot be beliefs because they fail the necessary conditions of belief. A common response involves meeting these objections on their own terms by accepting necessary conditions on belief but trying to blunt their force. I take a different approach by invoking a cognitive-phenomenal view of belief and jettisoning the rational/behavioural conditions. On this view, the anti-doxastic claims can (...)
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  5.  14
    Delusions, Harmful Dysfunctions, and Treatable Conditions.Peter Clutton & Stephen Gadsby - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (2):167-181.
    It has recently been suggested that delusions be conceived of as symptoms on the harmful dysfunction account of disorder: delusions sometimes arise from dysfunction, but can also arise through normal cognition. Much attention has thus been payed to the question of how we can determine whether a delusion arises from dysfunction as opposed to normal cognition. In this paper, we consider another question, one that remains under-explored: which delusions warrant treatment? On the harmful dysfunction account, this question dissociates from the (...)
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  6.  7
    Monothematic Delusion: A Case of Innocence From Experience.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):920-947.
    ABSTRACTEmpiricists about monothematic delusion formation agree that anomalous experience is a factor in the formation of these attitudes, but disagree markedly on which further factors need to be specified. I argue that epistemic innocence may be a unifying feature of monothematic delusions, insofar as a judgment of epistemic innocence to this class of attitudes is one that opposing empiricist accounts can make. The notion of epistemic innocence allows us to tell a richer story when investigating the epistemic status of monothematic (...)
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  7. Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings.Richard Dub - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):27-60.
    Psychopathological delusions have a number of features that are curiously difficult to explain. Delusions are resistant to counterevidence and impervious to counterargument. Delusions are theoretically, affectively, and behaviorally circumscribed: delusional individuals often do not act on their delusions and often do not update beliefs on the basis of their delusions. Delusional individuals are occasionally able to distinguish their delusions from other beliefs, sometimes speaking of their “delusional reality.” To explain these features, I offer a model according to which, contrary to (...)
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  8.  75
    Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness.Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):103-127.
    It’s a familiar fact that there is something it is like to see red, eat chocolate or feel pain. More recently philosophers have insisted that in addition to this objectual phenomenology there is something it is like for me to eat chocolate, and this for-me-ness is no less there than the chocolatishness. Recognizing this subjective feature of consciousness helps shape certain theories of consciousness, introspection and the self. Though it does this heavy philosophical work, and it is supposed to be (...)
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  9.  51
    What Are Cognitive Processes? An Example-Based Approach.Albert Newen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4251-4268.
    The question “What are cognitive processes?” can be understood variously as meaning “What is the nature of cognitive processes?”, “Can we distinguish epistemically cognitive processes from physical and biochemical processes on the one hand, and from mental or conscious processes on the other?”, and “Can we establish a fruitful notion of cognitive process?” The present aim is to deliver a positive answer to the last question by developing criteria for what would count as a paradigmatic exemplar of a cognitive process, (...)
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  10. What Makes Delusions Pathological?Valentina Petrolini - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):1-22.
    Bortolotti argues that we cannot distinguish delusions from other irrational beliefs in virtue of their epistemic features alone. Although her arguments are convincing, her analysis leaves an important question unanswered: What makes delusions pathological? In this paper I set out to answer this question by arguing that the pathological character of delusions arises from an executive dysfunction in a subject’s ability to detect relevance in the environment. I further suggest that this dysfunction derives from an underlying emotional imbalance—one that leads (...)
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  11. Filosofía de la Mente y Psiquiatría Alcances y Límites de Una Perspectiva Naturalista Para El Estudio de Los Delirios.Emilia Vilatta - 2017 - Co-herencia 14 (27):159-180.
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  12.  63
    Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia.Lisa Bortolotti - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3):879-900.
    In this article I ask whether elaborated and systematized delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. Cognitions are epistemically innocent if they have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time, and if alternative cognitions delivering the same epistemic benefit are unavailable to that agent at that time. Elaborated (...)
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  13.  9
    Schizophrenia and the Place of Egodystonic States in the Aetiology of Thought Insertion.Pablo López-Silva - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):577-594.
    Despite the diagnostic relevance of thought insertion for disorders such as schizophrenia, the debates about its aetiology are far from resolved. This paper claims that in paying exclusive attention to the perceptual and cognitive impairments leading to delusional experiences in general, current deficit approaches overlook the role that affective disturbances might play in giving rise to cases of thought insertion. In the context of psychosis, affective impairments are often characterized as a consequence of the stress and anxiety caused by delusional (...)
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  14.  15
    Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities.Matthew Parrott - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):271-296.
    The Capgras delusion is a condition in which a person believes that an imposter has replaced some close friend or relative. Recent theorists have appealed to Bayesianism to help explain both why a subject with the Capgras delusion adopts this delusional belief and why it persists despite counter-evidence. The Bayesian approach is useful for addressing these questions; however, the main proposal of this essay is that Capgras subjects also have a delusional conception of epistemic possibility, more specifically, they think more (...)
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  15.  22
    The Phenomenology of Hypo- and Hyperreality in Psychopathology.Zeno Van Duppen - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):423-441.
    Contemporary perspectives on delusions offer valuable neuropsychiatric, psychoanalytic, and philosophical explanations of the formation and persistence of delusional phenomena. However, two problems arise. Firstly, these different perspectives offer us an explanation “from the outside”. They pay little attention to the actual personal experiences, and implicitly assume their incomprehensibility. This implicates a questionable validity. Secondly, these perspectives fail to account for two complex phenomena that are inherent to certain delusions, namely double book-keeping and the primary delusional experience. The purpose of this (...)
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  16.  14
    A Mental Files Approach to Delusional Misidentification.Sam Wilkinson - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):389-404.
    I suggest that we can think of delusional misidentification in terms of systematic errors in the management of mental files. I begin by sketching the orthodox “bottom-up” aetiology of delusional misidentification. I suggest that the orthodox aetiology can be given a descriptivist or a singularist interpretation. I present three cases that a descriptivist interpretation needs to account for. I then introduce a singularist approach, one that is based on mental files, and show how it opens the way for different and (...)
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  17. Why Are We Certain That We Exist?Alexandre Billon - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):723-759.
    Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of (...)
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  18. The Epistemic Innocence of Motivated Delusions.Lisa Bortolotti - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition (33):490-499.
    Delusions are defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological benefits. One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low self-esteem by allowing motivational influences on belief formation. In this paper I focus on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions) and argue that some of their psychological benefits can convert into epistemic ones. Notwithstanding their epistemic costs, (...)
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  19.  9
    The Virtual Bodily Self: Mentalisation of the Body as Revealed in Anosognosia for Hemiplegia.Aikaterini Fotopoulou - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:500-510.
  20.  20
    Delusions as Harmful Malfunctioning Beliefs.Kengo Miyazono - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:561-573.
    Delusional beliefs are typically pathological. Being pathological is clearly distinguished from being false or being irrational. Anna might falsely believe that his husband is having an affair but it might just be a simple mistake. Again, Sam might irrationally believe, without good evidence, that he is smarter than his colleagues, but it might just be a healthy self-deceptive belief. On the other hand, when a patient with brain damage caused by a car accident believes that his father was replaced by (...)
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  21.  40
    Delusions, Dreams, and the Nature of Identification.Sam Wilkinson - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):203-226.
    Delusional misidentification is commonly understood as the product of an inference on the basis of evidence present in the subject's experience. For example, in the Capgras delusion, the patient sees someone who looks like a loved one, but who feels unfamiliar, so they infer that they must not be the loved one. I question this by presenting a distinction between “recognition” and “identification.” Identification does not always require recognition for its epistemic justification, nor does it need recognition for its psychological (...)
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  22.  3
    A Cognitive Account of Belief: A Tentative Road Map.Michael H. Connors & Peter W. Halligan - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  23. Addiction as a Disorder of Belief.Neil Levy - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (3):337-355.
    Addiction is almost universally held to be characterized by a loss of control over drug-seeking and consuming behavior. But the actions of addicts, even of those who seem to want to abstain from drugs, seem to be guided by reasons. In this paper, I argue that we can explain this fact, consistent with continuing to maintain that addiction involves a loss of control, by understanding addiction as involving an oscillation between conflicting judgments. I argue that the dysfunction of the mesolimbic (...)
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  24. Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities.Matthew Parrott - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1):axu036.
    The Capgras delusion is a condition in which a person believes that an imposter has replaced some close friend or relative. Recent theorists have appealed to Bayesianism to help explain both why a subject with the Capgras delusion adopts this delusional belief and why it persists despite counter-evidence. The Bayesian approach is useful for addressing these questions; however, the main proposal of this essay is that Capgras subjects also have a delusional conception of epistemic possibility, more specifically, they think more (...)
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  25.  47
    Making Sense of an Endorsement Model of Thought‐Insertion.Michael Sollberger - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):590-612.
    Experiences of thought-insertion are a first-rank, diagnostically central symptom of schizophrenia. Schizophrenic patients who undergo such delusional mental states report being first-personally aware of an occurrent conscious thought which is not theirs, but which belongs to an external cognitive agent. Patients seem to be right about what they are thinking but mistaken about who is doing the thinking. It is notoriously difficult to make sense of such delusions. One general approach to explaining the etiology of monothematic delusions has come to (...)
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  26.  23
    Authorship and Control Over Thoughts.Gottfried Vosgerau & Martin Voss - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):534-565.
    The ‘mineness’ of thoughts has often been accepted as indubitable in philosophy. However, the symptom of thought insertion in schizophrenia seems to be an empirical counterexample to the dictum that every introspected thought is one's own. We present a thorough conceptual analysis of mineness of thought, distinguishing between ownership and authorship . We argue that it is indeed a conceptual truth that introspected thoughts are owned by the introspector. However, there are everyday and pathological cases of thoughts, for which we (...)
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  27.  24
    On the Distinction Between Monothematic and Polythematic Delusions.Max Coltheart - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):103-112.
    Some delusional patients exhibit only a single delusional belief (or several delusional beliefs concerning a single theme): this is monothematic delusion. It contrasts with polythematic delusion, where the patient exhibits a variety of delusions concerning a variety of different themes. The neuropsychological bases of various monothematic delusions are rather well understood, and there is a well-worked-out general neuropsychological theory of monothematic delusion, the two-factor theory. Whether polythematic delusion might be explained in a similar way is an open question: I sketch (...)
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  28.  40
    Egocentric and Encyclopedic Doxastic States in Delusions of Misidentification.Sam Wilkinson - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):219-234.
    A recent debate in the literature on delusions centers on the question of whether delusions are beliefs or not. In this paper, an overlooked distinction between egocentric and encyclopedic doxastic states is introduced and brought to bear on this debate, in particular with regard to delusions of misidentification. The result is that a more accurate characterization of the delusional subject’s doxastic point of view is made available. The patient has a genuine egocentric belief (“This man is not my father”), but (...)
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  29.  62
    Can We Recreate Delusions in the Laboratory?Lisa Bortolotti, Rochelle Cox & Amanda Barnier - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):109 - 131.
    Clinical delusions are difficult to investigate in the laboratory because they co-occur with other symptoms and with intellectual impairment. Partly for these reasons, researchers have recently begun to use hypnosis with neurologically intact people in order to model clinical delusions. In this paper we describe striking analogies between the behavior of patients with a clinical delusion of mirrored self misidentification, and the behavior of highly hypnotizable subjects who receive a hypnotic suggestion to see a stranger when they look in the (...)
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  30.  76
    Explaining Delusions of Control: The Comparator Model 20years On.Chris Frith - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):52-54.
    Over the last 20 years the comparator model for delusions of control has received considerable support in terms of empirical studies. However, the original version clearly needs to be replaced by a model with a much greater degree of sophistication and specificity. Future developments are likely to involve the specification of the role of dopamine in the model and a generalisation of its explanatory power to the whole range of positive symptoms. However, we will still need to explain why symptoms (...)
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  31.  45
    Dream Experience and a Revisionist Account of Delusions of Misidentification.Philip Gerrans - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):217-227.
    Standard accounts of delusion explain them as responses to experience. Cognitive models of feature binding in the face recognition systems explain how experiences of mismatch between feelings of "familiarity" and faces can arise. Similar mismatches arise in phenomena such as déjà and jamais vu in which places and scenes are mismatched to feelings of familiarity. These cognitive models also explain similarities between the phenomenology of these delusions and some dream states which involve mismatch between faces, feelings of familiarity and identities. (...)
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  32.  20
    Delusional Inference.Ryan Mckay - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (3):330-355.
    Does the formation of delusions involve abnormal reasoning? According to the prominent ‘two-factor’ theory of delusions (e.g. Coltheart, 2007), the answer is yes. The second factor in this theory is supposed to affect a deluded individual's ability to evaluate candidates for belief. However, most published accounts of the two-factor theory have not said much about the nature of this second factor. In an effort to remedy this shortcoming, Coltheart, Menzies and Sutton (2010) recently put forward a Bayesian account of inference (...)
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  33.  1
    Vorhersagefehler und Gehirnverletzungen. Zwei-Faktoren-Theorien über Wahnvorstellungen.Jennifer Radden - 2012 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60 (6):903-918.
    This paper explores the two-factor theoretical model currently widely used to provide an explanatory analysis of the delusions that regularly accompany neurological disease or damage. The model hypothesizes a combination of an experiential factor – a strange or untoward experience – and a cognitive factor, such as an impairment of reasoning. The two-factor model has been devised for monothematic delusions that are usually manifested in a single, implausible idea. These have to be distinguished from the more elaborated, polythematic delusions that (...)
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  34.  25
    A Measure of My Agency?Hong Yu Wong - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):48-51.
  35.  6
    Neuropathologies of the Self: Clinical and Anatomical Features.Todd E. Feinberg - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):75-81.
    The neuropathologies of the self are disorders of the self and identity that occur in association with neuropathology and include perturbations of the bodily, relational, and narrative self. Right, especially medial-frontal and orbitofrontal lesions, are associated with these conditions. The ego disequilibrium theory proposes this brain pathology causes a disturbance of ego boundaries and functions and the emergence of developmentally immature styles of thought, ego functioning, and psychological defenses including denial, projection, splitting, and fantasy that the NPS patient has in (...)
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  36. Warrant and Action.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):529-547.
    I develop an approach to action and practical deliberation according to which the degree of epistemic warrant required for practical rationality varies with practical context. In some contexts of practical deliberation, very strong warrant is called for. In others, less will do. I set forth a warrant account, (WA), that captures this idea. I develop and defend (WA) by arguing that it is more promising than a competing knowledge account of action due to John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley. I argue (...)
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  37.  69
    The Legal Self: Executive Processes and Legal Theory.William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):151-176.
    When laws or legal principles mention mental states such as intentions to form a contract, knowledge of risk, or purposely causing a death, what parts of the brain are they speaking about? We argue here that these principles are tacitly directed at our prefrontal executive processes. Our current best theories of consciousness portray it as a workspace in which executive processes operate, but what is important to the law is what is done with the workspace content rather than the content (...)
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  38.  40
    Beliefs, Experiences and Misplaced Being: An Interactionist Account of Delusional Misidentification. [REVIEW]Garry Young - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):195-215.
    This paper contrasts an interactionist account of delusional misidentification with more traditional one- and two-stage models. Unlike the unidirectional nature of these more traditional models, in which the aetiology of the disorder is said to progress from a neurological disruption via an anomalous experience to a delusional belief, the interactionist account posits the interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes to better explain the maintenance of the delusional belief. In addition, it places a greater emphasis on the patient’s underlying phenomenal experience (...)
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  39. A Disjunctive Theory of Introspection: A Reflection on Zombies and Anton's Syndrome.Fiona Macpherson - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):226-265.
    Reflection on skeptical scenarios in the philosophy of perception, made vivid in the arguments from illusion and hallucination, have led to the formulation of theories of the metaphysical and epistemological nature of perceptual experience. In recent times, the locus of the debate concerning the nature of perceptual experience has been the dispute between disjunctivists and common-kind theorists. Disjunctivists have held that there are substantial dissimilarities (either metaphysical or epistemological or both) between veridical perceptual experiences occurring when one perceives and perceptual (...)
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  40.  28
    The Experience of Altered States of Consciousness in Shamanic Ritual: The Role of Pre-Existing Beliefs and Affective Factors.Vince Polito, Robyn Langdon & Jac Brown - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):918--925.
    Much attention has been paid recently to the role of anomalous experiences in the aetiology of certain types of psychopathology, e.g. in the formation of delusions. We examine, instead, the top-down influence of pre-existing beliefs and affective factors in shaping an individual’s characterisation of anomalous sensory experiences. Specifically we investigated the effects of paranormal beliefs and alexithymia in determining the intensity and quality of an altered state of consciousness . Fifty five participants took part in a sweat lodge ceremony, a (...)
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  41.  45
    Effort Awareness and Sense of Volition in Schizophrenia.Gilles Lafargue & Nicolas Franck - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):277-289.
    Contemporary experimental research has emphasised the role of centrally generated signals arising from premotor areas in voluntary muscular force perception. It is therefore generally accepted that judgements of force are based on a central sense, known as the sense of effort, rather than on a sense of intra-muscular tension. Interestingly, the concept of effort is also present in the classical philosophy: to the French philosopher Maine de Biran [Maine de Biran . Mémoire sur la décomposition de la pensée , Vrin, (...)
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  42.  12
    Pathological and Non-Pathological Factors in Delusional Misbelief.Robyn Langdon - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):527-528.
    In their pursuit of adaptively biased misbelief-making systems, McKay & Dennett (M&D) describe a putative doxastic shear-pin system which enables misbeliefs to form in situations of extreme psychological stress. Rather than discussing their argument, I consider how this shear-pin system might combine with both pathological belief-making ( breakdowns caused by neuropathy) and normal belief-making to explain a spectrum of delusions.
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  43.  83
    The Evolution of Misbelief.Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493.
    From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in (...)
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  44.  36
    Anosognosia in Alzheimer's Disease – The Petrified Self.Daniel C. Mograbi, Richard G. Brown & Robin G. Morris - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):989-1003.
    This paper reviews the literature concerning the neural correlates of the self, the relationship between self and memory and the profile of memory impairments in Alzheimer’s disease and explores the relationship between the preservation of the self and anosognosia in this condition. It concludes that a potential explanation for anosognosia in AD is a lack of updating of personal information due to the memory impairments characteristic of this disease. We put forward the hypothesis that anosognosia is due in part to (...)
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  45.  56
    Is the Impostor Hypothesis Really so Preposterous? Understanding the Capgras Experience.Marga Reimer - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):669 – 686.
    In his classic paper, “Delusional thinking and perceptual disorder,” Brendan Maher (1974) argues that psychiatric delusions are hypotheses designed to explain anomalous experiences, and are “developed through the operation of normal cognitive processes.” Consider, for instance, the Capgras delusion. Patients suffering from this particular delusion believe that someone close to them—such as a spouse, a sibling, a parent, or a child—has been replaced by an impostor: by someone who bears a striking resemblance to the “original” and who (for reasons unknown) (...)
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  46. The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
    The phenomenology of agency has, until recently, been rather neglected, overlooked by both philosophers of action and philosophers of consciousness alike. Thankfully, all that has changed, and of late there has been an explosion of interest in what it is like to be an agent. 1 This burgeoning field crosses the traditional boundaries between disciplines: philosophers of psychopathology are speculating about the role that unusual experiences of agency might play in accounting for disorders of thought and action; cognitive scientists are (...)
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  47. Types of Body Representation and the Sense of Embodiment.Glenn Carruthers - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1316.
    The sense of embodiment is vital for self recognition. An examination of anosognosia for hemiplegia—the inability to recognise that one is paralysed down one side of one’s body—suggests the existence of ‘online’ and ‘offline’ representations of the body. Online representations of the body are representations of the body as it is currently, are newly constructed moment by moment and are directly “plugged into” current perception of the body. In contrast, offline representations of the body are representations of what the body (...)
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    The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2008 - Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):195-216.
    This paper draws on studies of the Capgras delusion in order to illuminate the phenomenological role of affect in interpersonal recognition. People with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been replaced by impostors. It is generally agreed that the delusion involves an anomalous experience, arising due to loss of affect. However, quite what this experience consists of remains unclear. I argue that recent accounts of the Capgras delusion incorporate an impoverished conception of experience, which fails to accommodate (...)
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  49.  95
    Beyond the Comparator Model: A Multi-Factorial Two-Step Account of Agency.M. Synofzik, G. Vosgerau & A. Newen - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.
    There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the ‘‘comparator model’’. In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency. By analyzing recent empirical studies, we show that the comparator model is not able (...)
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  50. I Move, Therefore I Am: A New Theoretical Framework to Investigate Agency and Ownership.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):411-424.
    The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology and philosophy. We provide a new systematic account of two of its main features, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, demonstrating that although both features appear as phenomenally uniform, they each in fact are complex crossmodal phenomena of largely heterogeneous functional and representational levels. These levels can be arranged within a gradually (...)
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