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Donald Davidson (1990). Meaning, Truth and Evidence.

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  1.  99
    Quine’s Pragmatic Solution to Sceptical Doubts.Benjamin Bayer - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):177-204.
    In this paper I examine a series of criticisms that have been levelled against Quine's naturalized epistemology, regarding its response to the problem of scepticism. Barry Stroud and Michael Williams, assuming that Quine wishes to refute scepticism, argue that Quine not only fails to undertake this refutation, but is also committed to theses (such as the inscrutability of reference and the underdetermination of theory by evidence) which imply versions of scepticism of their own. In Quine's defence, Roger Gibson argues that (...)
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  2.  44
    Commonsense Realism and Triangulation.Chris Calvert-Minor - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):67-86.
    Realism about the external world enjoys little philosophical support these days. I rectify this predicament by taking a relatively pragmatist line of thought to defend commonsense realism; I support commonsense realism through an interpretation and application of Donald Davidson’s notion of triangulation, the triangle composed of two communicators coordinating and correcting their responses with a shared causal stimulus. This argument is important because it has a crucial advantage over the often used abductive argument for realism. My argument avoids unwarranted conclusions, (...)
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  3.  77
    Contextual Definition and Ontological Commitment.Dirk Greimann - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):357 – 373.
    In almost all of his writings on ontology, Quine celebrated the discovery of contextual definition as a milestone of the history of philosophy. The philosophical appeal of this tool resides in the hope that it allows us to reduce the ontological commitments of theories in substantial ways. The goal of this paper is to show that contextual definition does not really come up to this hope. It is argued that the material adequacy of such definitions presupposes a very strong context-principle, (...)
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  4.  45
    Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy.Christian Nimtz - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (1):1-28.
    Quine and Davidson employ proxy functions to demonstrate that the use of language (behaviouristically conceived) is compatible with indefinitely many radically different reference relations. They also believe that the use of language (behaviouristically conceived) is all that determines reference. From this they infer that reference is indeterminate, i.e. that there are no facts of the matter as to what singular terms designate and what predicates apply to. Yet referential indeterminacy yields rather dire consequences. One thus does wonder whether one can (...)
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  5. Having It All: Naturalized Normativity in Feminist Science Studies.Sharyn Clough - 2004 - Hypatia 19 (1):102-118.
    : The relationship between facts and values—in particular, naturalism and normativity—poses an ongoing challenge for feminist science studies. Some have argued that the fact/value holism of W.V. Quine's naturalized epistemology holds promise. I argue that Quinean epistemology, while appropriately naturalized, might weaken the normative force of feminist claims. I then show that Quinean epistemic themes are unnecessary for feminist science studies. The empirical nature of our work provides us with all the naturalized normativity we need.
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  6. E Pluribus Unum: Arguments Against Conceptual Schemes and Empirical Content.Nathaniel Goldberg - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):411-438.
    The idea that there are conceptual schemes, relative to which we conceptualize experience, and empirical content, the “raw” data of experience that get conceptualized through our conceptual schemes into beliefs or sentences, is not new. The idea that there are neither conceptual schemes nor empirical content, however, is. Moreover, it is so new, that only four arguments have so far been given against this dualism, with Donald Davidson himself presenting versions of all four. In this paper, I show that in (...)
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  7.  56
    Possibly V. Actually the Case: Davidson's Omniscient Interpreter at Twenty.Nathaniel Goldberg - 2003 - Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):143-160.
    The publication of Davidson 2001, anthologizing articles from the 1980s and 1990s, encourages reconsidering arguments contained in them. One such argument is Davidson's omniscient-interpreter argument ('€˜OIA'€™) in Davidson 1983. The OIA allegedly establishes that it is necessary that most beliefs are true. Thus the omniscient interpreter, revived in 2001 and now 20 years old, was born to answer the skeptic. In Part I of this paper, I consider charges that the OIA establishes only that it is possible that most beliefs (...)
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  8.  29
    Stimulus Meaning Reconsidered.Robert Sinclair - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):395-409.
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  9.  82
    The Given Regained: Reflections on the Sensuous Content of Experience.Richard Schantz - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):167-180.
    The major part of our beliefs and our knowledge of the world is based on, or grounded in, sensory experience. But, how is it that we can have perceptual beliefs that things are thus and so, and, moreover, be justified in having them? What conditions must experience satisfy to rationally warrant, and not merely to cause, our beliefs? Against the currently very popular contention that experience itself already has to be propositionally and conceptually structured, I will rehabilitate the claim that (...)
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  10.  69
    Davidson's Social Externalism.Steven Yalowitz - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (1-2):99-136.
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