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  1. A Puzzle for Particulars?David S. Brown & Richard Brian Davis - 2008 - Axiomathes 18 (1):49-65.
    In this paper we examine a puzzle recently posed by Aaron Preston for the traditional realist assay of property (quality) instances. Consider Socrates (a red round spot) and red1—Socrates’ redness. For the traditional realist, both of these entities are concrete particulars. Further, both involve redness being `tied to’ the same bare individuator. But then it appears that red1 is duplicated in its ‘thicker’ particular (Socrates), so that it can’t be predicated of Socrates without redundancy. According to Preston, this suggests that (...)
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  • Bare Particulars and Constituent Ontology.Robert K. Garcia - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (2):149-159.
    My general aim in this paper is to shed light on the controversial concept of a bare particular. I do so by arguing that bare particulars are best understood in terms of the individuative work they do within the framework of a realist constituent ontology. I argue that outside such a framework, it is not clear that the notion of a bare particular is either motivated or coherent. This is suggested by reflection on standard objections to bare particulars. However, within (...)
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  • Substrata and Properties: From Bare Particulars to Supersubstantivalism?Matteo Morganti - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (2):183-195.
    An argument to the effect that, under a few reasonable assumptions, the bare particular ontology is best understood in terms of supersubstativalism: objects are identical to regions of space(-time) and properties directly inhere in space(-time) points or region as their bearers.
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  • In Defence of 'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars.Timothy Pickavance - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):155 – 158.
    In a recent article in this journal, Richard Brian Davis argues that 'bare particulars [as defended by J. P. Moreland] face several serious shortcomings'[2003: 547]. I argue that Davis's two principal criticisms fall flat.
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  • No Bare Particulars.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.
    There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, (...)
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  • On Spacetime, Points, and Bare Particulars.Martin Schmidt - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (1):69-77.
    In his paper Bare Particulars, T. Sider claims that one of the most plausible candidates for bare particulars are spacetime points. The aim of this paper is to shed light on Sider’s reasoning and its consequences. There are three concepts of spacetime points that allow their identification with bare particulars. One of them, Moderate structural realism, is considered to be the most adequate due its appropriate approach to spacetime metric and moderate view of mereological simples. However, it pushes the Substratum (...)
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  • Simon Bostock.Property Realism - forthcoming - Metaphysica.
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  • How to Individuate Universals—Or Not.Richard Brian Davis - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (3):551-566.
    In a recent article in this journal, J. P. Moreland extends his theory of individuation to include universals. In this note, I show how Moreland’s novel proposal leads to the unwanted conclusion that every concrete particular exists of necessity and has but a single essential property.
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  • Are Bare Particulars Constituents?Richard Brian Davis - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (4):395-410.
    In this article I examine an as yet unexplored aspect of J.P. Moreland’s defense of so-called bare particularism — the ontological theory according to which ordinary concrete particulars (e.g., Socrates) contain bare particulars as individuating constituents and property ‘hubs.’ I begin with the observation that if there is a constituency relation obtaining between Socrates and his bare particular, it must be an internal relation, in which case the natures of the relata will necessitate the relation. I then distinguish various ways (...)
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