Switch to: References

Citations of:

The two senses of desire

Philosophical Studies 45 (2):181-195 (1984)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. On preferring.Kyle Blumberg - 2022 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (6):1315-1344.
    In this paper, I draw attention to comparative preference claims, i.e. sentences of the form \S prefers p to q\. I show that preference claims exhibit interesting patterns, and try to develop a semantics that captures them. Then I use my account of preference to provide an analysis of desire. The resulting entry for desire ascriptions is independently motivated, and finds support from a wide range of phenomena.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Explaining Synchronic Self-Control.Jing Zhu - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):475-492.
  • Non-contingent reasons.Crystal Thorpe - 2004 - Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (2):159-169.
    We have a reason to pursue good patterns of reasoning in the determination of the means to the satisfaction of our desires. To deny this, it seems, would be to turn our backs on rationality. Furthermore, we would agree that we all have the same reason to do so. Is this reason internal or external? If external reasons are incoherent, as Bernard Williams claims, what choice do we have but to assume that it is internal? ;If we assume that it (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Appetitive besires and the fuss about fit.Steven Swartzer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):975-988.
    Some motivational cognitivists believe that there are besires—cognitive mental states (typically moral beliefs) that share the key feature of desire (typically desire’s ‘direction of fit’) in virtue of which they are capable of being directly motivational. Besires have been criticized by Humeans and cognitivists alike as philosophically extravagant, incoherent, ad hoc, and incompatible with folk psychology. I provide a response to these standard objections to besires—one motivated independently of common anti-Humean intuitions about the motivational efficacy of moral judgments. I proceed (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Moral courage in the workplace: Moving to and from the desire and decision to act.Leslie E. Sekerka & Richard P. Bagozzi - 2007 - Business Ethics, the Environment and Responsibility 16 (2):132–149.
  • Moral courage in the workplace: moving to and from the desire and decision to act.Leslie E. Sekerka & Richard P. Bagozzi - 2007 - Business Ethics: A European Review 16 (2):132-149.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • The Causal Map and Moral Psychology.Timothy Schroeder - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):347-369.
    Some philosophers hold that the neuroscience of action is, in practice or in principle, incapable of touching debates in action theory and moral psychology. The role of desires in action, the existence of basic actions, and the like are topics that must be sorted out by philosophers alone: at least at present, and perhaps by the very nature of the questions. This paper examines both philosophical and empirical arguments against the relevance of neuroscience to such questions and argues that neither (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Desire and Serendipity.Ronald Sousa - 1998 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):120-134.
  • What does decision theory have to do with wanting?Milo Phillips-Brown - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):413-437.
    Decision theory and folk psychology both purport to represent the same phenomena: our belief-like and desire- and preference-like states. They also purport to do the same work with these representations: explain and predict our actions. But they do so with different sets of concepts. There's much at stake in whether one of these two sets of concepts can be accounted for with the other. Without such an account, we'd have two competing representations and systems of prediction and explanation, a dubious (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Desires.Kris McDaniel & Ben Bradley - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):267-302.
    We argue that desire is an attitude that relates a person not to one proposition but rather to two, the first of which we call the object of the desire and the second of which we call the condition of the desire. This view of desire is initially motivated by puzzles about conditional desires. It is not at all obvious how best to draw the distinction between conditional and unconditional desires. In this paper we examine extant attempts to analyse conditional (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Toward a theory of moods.Eric Lormand - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (May):385-407.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Preference‐Conditioned Necessities: Detachment and Practical Reasoning.Sven Lauer & Cleo Condoravdi - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):584-621.
    This article is about conditionalized modal statements whose antecedents concern a preferential attitude of an agent. The focus is on anankastic conditionals or, as they are known in the philosophical literature, hypothetical imperatives. We present a linguistically-motivated analysis of anankastic and related conditionals and use it to address challenges for semantic theories of natural language conditionals motivated by certain philosophical concerns about practical reasoning and the requirements of rationality.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Two Ways to Want?Ethan Jerzak - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (2):65-98.
    I present unexplored and unaccounted for uses of 'wants'. I call them advisory uses, on which information inaccessible to the desirer herself helps determine what she wants. I show that extant theories by Stalnaker, Heim, and Levinson fail to predict these uses. They also fail to predict true indicative conditionals with 'wants' in the consequent. These problems are related: intuitively valid reasoning with modus ponens on the basis of the conditionals in question results in unembedded advisory uses. I consider two (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Which Desires Are Relevant to Well‐Being?Chris Heathwood - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):664-688.
    The desire-satisfaction theory of well-being says, in its simplest form, that a person’s level of welfare is determined by the extent to which their desires are satisfied. A question faced by anyone attracted to such a view is, *Which desires*? This paper proposes a new answer to this question by characterizing a distinction among desires that isn’t much discussed in the well-being literature. This is the distinction between what a person wants in a merely behavioral sense, in that the person (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Happiness and Desire Satisfaction.Chris Heathwood - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):57-83.
    This paper develops and defends a novel version of a relatively neglected category of theory of the nature of happiness: the desire-satisfaction theory. My account is similar in its fundamentals to Wayne Davis’s theory of happiness-as-subjective-desire-satisfaction. After arguing that this is the best general way to proceed for the desire-based approach, I develop an improved version of subjective desire satisfactionism in light of recent arguments in the happiness literature.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Reasoning About Want.Hillary Harner & Sangeet Khemlani - 2022 - Cognitive Science 46 (9):e13170.
    No present theory explains the inferences people draw about the real world when reasoning about “bouletic” relations, that is, predicates that express desires, such as want in “Lee wants to be in love”. Linguistic accounts of want define it in terms of a relation to a desirer's beliefs, and how its complement is deemed desirable. In contrast, we describe a new model-based theory that posits that by default, desire predicates such as want contrast desires against facts. In particular, A wants (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the irreducibility of the will.J. L. A. Garcia - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):349 - 360.
    This paper criticizes the thesis that intending to do something is reducible to some combination of beliefs and desires. Against Audi's recent formulation of such a view I offer as counterexample a case wherein an agent who wants and expects to V has not yet decided whether to V and hence does not yet intend to. I try to show that whereas belief that one will V is not necessary for intending to V, as illustrated in cases of desperate attempts (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Attitudinal strength as distance to withholding.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):963-981.
    How should we understand the relationship between binary belief and degree of belief? To answer this question, we should look to desire. Whatever relationship we think holds between desire and degree of desire should be used as our model for the relationship we think holds between belief and degree of belief. This parity pushes us towards an account that treats the binary attitudes as primary. But if we take binary beliefs as primary, we seem to face a serious problem. Binary (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):261-285.
    I develop and argue for a kind of externalism about certain kinds of non-doxastic attitudes that I call policy externalism. Policy externalism about a given type of attitude is the view that all the reasonable policies for having attitudes of that type will not involve the agent's beliefs that some relevant conditions obtain. My defense primarily involves attitudes like hatred, regret, and admiration, and has two parts: a direct deductive argument and an indirect linguistic argument, an inference to the best (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • The varieties of fear.Wayne A. Davis - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (3):287 - 310.
    I shall conclude with a methodological moral. I have tried to show that there are several fundamentally different kinds of fear. One is a pure propositional attitude, one is partially a bodily state, and one is a relation between a person and a nonpropositional object. Other emotions come in similar varieties, such as hope and happiness, but with significant differences. The state of happiness, for example, does not entail any particular bodily state or feeling. So one lesson is this: it (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Reasons and psychological causes.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
    The causal theory of reasons holds that acting for a reason entails that the agents action was caused by his or her beliefs and desires. While Donald Davidson (1963) and others effectively silenced the first objections to the theory, a new round has emerged. The most important recent attack is presented by Jonathan Dancy in Practical Reality (2000) and subsequent work. This paper will defend the causal theory against Dancy and others, including Schueler (1995), Stoutland (1999, 2001), and Ginet (2002).Dancy (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • A Causal Theory of Experiential Fear.Wayne Davis - 1988 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):459 - 483.
    There is a distinction between being afraid and being afraid that something is the case. Kathy may be afraid that it will rain without being afraid, and may be afraid without being afraid that it will rain. We shall say that the distinction is between experiential and propositional fear. To be afraid is to experience fear, to be in a state of fear. The state takes many forms, such as fright, terror, and dread. To be afraid that something is the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3).
    I develop and argue for a kind of externalism about certain kinds of non-doxastic attitudes that I call policy externalism. Policy externalism about a given type of attitude is the view that all the reasonable policies for having attitudes of that type will not involve the agent's beliefs that some relevant conditions obtain. My defense primarily involves attitudes like hatred, regret, and admiration, and has two parts: a direct deductive argument and an indirect linguistic argument, an inference to the best (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • An Analysis of Prudential Value.Stephen M. Campbell - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (3):334-54.
    This essay introduces and defends a new analysis of prudential value. According to this analysis, what it is for something to be good for you is for that thing to contribute to the appeal or desirability of being in your position. I argue that this proposal fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value and well-being; enables promising analyses of the related concepts of luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice, and paternalism; preserves the relationship between prudential value and the attitudes of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Why Hunger is not a Desire.Patrick Butlin - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (3):617-635.
    This paper presents an account of the nature of desire, informed by psychology and neuroscience, which entails that hunger is not a desire. The account is contrasted with Schroeder’s well-known empirically-informed theory of desire. It is argued that one significant virtue of the present account, in comparison with Schroeder’s theory, is that it draws a sharp distinction between desires and basic drives, such as the drive for food. One reason to draw this distinction is that experiments on incentive learning show (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Transparent introspection of wishes.Wolfgang Barz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):1993-2023.
    The aim of this paper is to lay the groundwork for extending the idea of transparent introspection to wishes. First, I elucidate the notion of transparent introspection and highlight its advantages over rival accounts of self-knowledge. Then I pose several problems that seem to obstruct the extension of transparent introspection to wishes. In order to overcome these problems, I call into question the standard propositional attitude analysis of non-doxastic attitudes. My considerations lead to a non-orthodox account of attitudes in general (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Will as Commitment and Resolve: An Existential Account of Creativity, Love, Virtue, and Happiness.John J. Davenport - 2007 - Fordham University Press.
    In contemporary philosophy, the will is often regarded as a sheer philosophical fiction. In Will as Commitment and Resolve , Davenport argues not only that the will is the central power of human agency that makes decisions and forms intentions but also that it includes the capacity to generate new motivation different in structure from prepurposive desires. The concept of "projective motivation" is the central innovation in Davenport's existential account of the everyday notion of striving will. Beginning with the contrast (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Nature of Temptation and its Role in the Development of Moral Virtue.Kevin Snider - 2021 - Dissertation, Middlesex University
    In the last 70 years there has been an explosion of philosophical and theological work on the nature of virtue and the process of virtue formation. Yet philosophers and theologians have paid little attention to the phenomenon of temptation and its role in developing virtue. Indeed, little analytic work has been done on the nature of temptation. This study aims to fill this gap in moral philosophy and theology by offering an analytic moral conception of temptation and explicating its connection (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Mechanistic and Normative Structure of Agency.Jason Winning - 2019 - Dissertation, University of California San Diego
    I develop an interdisciplinary framework for understanding the nature of agents and agency that is compatible with recent developments in the metaphysics of science and that also does justice to the mechanistic and normative characteristics of agents and agency as they are understood in moral philosophy, social psychology, neuroscience, robotics, and economics. The framework I develop is internal perspectivalist. That is to say, it counts agents as real in a perspective-dependent way, but not in a way that depends on an (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Perspectival Plurality, Relativism, and Multiple Indexing.Dan Zeman - 2018 - In Rob Truswell, Chris Cummins, Caroline Heycock, Brian Rabern & Hannah Rohde (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21, Vol. 2. Semantics Archives. pp. 1353-1370.
    In this paper I focus on a recently discussed phenomenon illustrated by sentences containing predicates of taste: the phenomenon of " perspectival plurality " , whereby sentences containing two or more predicates of taste have readings according to which each predicate pertains to a different perspective. This phenomenon has been shown to be problematic for (at least certain versions of) relativism. My main aim is to further the discussion by showing that the phenomenon extends to other perspectival expressions than predicates (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Desire-Fulfillment Theory.Chris Heathwood - 2016 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge. pp. 135-147.
    Explains the desire-fulfillment theory of well-being, its history, its development, its varieties, its advantages, and its challenges.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations