Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Frege, the Self-Consciousness of Judgement, and the Indefinability of Truth.Colin Johnston - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (6):1124-1143.
    ABSTRACT Frege characterizes judgement as the acknowledgement of the truth of a thought, appearing thereby to rule out false judgement. First in this paper I explain Frege’s characterization so that it does not have this consequence. Frege is not saying that for a subject S to judge that p is for S to acknowledge the truth of the thought that p. Rather, he is articulating judgement’s nature within self-consciousness. From within, to judge means to acknowledge a truth. Second, I suggest (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Dretske & McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge, Conclusive Reasons, and Epistemological Disjunctivism.Peter J. Graham & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):148-166.
    Philosophical Issues, Volume 30, Issue 1, Page 148-166, October 2020.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Empirical Reason: Questions for Gupta, McDowell, and Siegel.Bill Brewer - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):311-323.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Comments on Brewer, Gupta, and Siegel.John McDowell - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):338-347.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Responses to Brewer, Gupta, and Siegel.John McDowell - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):390-402.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Experience and its Rational Significance I: Contributions to a Debate.Anil Gupta - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):324-337.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Value of Presence.David de Bruijn - forthcoming - Episteme:1-18.
    Epistemological disjunctivists make two strong claims about perceptual experience's epistemic value: experience guarantees the knowledgeable character of perceptual beliefs; experience's epistemic value is “reflectively accessible”. In this paper I develop a form of disjunctivism grounded in a presentational view of experience, on which the epistemic benefits of experience consist in the way perception presents the subject with aspects of her environment. I show that presentational disjunctivism has both dialectical and philosophically fundamental advantages over more traditional expositions. Dialectically, presentational disjunctivism resolves (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark