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Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet?

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  1.  51
    The Nature of Intuitions and Their Role in Material Object Metaphysics.Andrew Higgins - manuscript
    I argue for three central theses: ‘intuition’ is ambiguous, in material object metaphysics ‘intuition’ refers to pre-theoretical beliefs, and these pre-theoretical beliefs are generated by an innate physical reasoning system. I begin by outlining the relevant background discussions on the nature of intuitions and their role in philosophy to motivate the need for a more careful investigation of the meaning of ‘intuition’ and the role of intuitions in specific sub-disciplines of philosophy. In chapters one and two I argue that ‘intuition’ (...)
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  2.  2
    Phillips on Unconscious Perception and Overflow.Nicholas D’Aloisio-Montilla - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-14.
    Phillips argues that Block faces a “serious internal challenge” in defending the claim that unconscious perception is of the same fundamental kind as conscious perception. This challenge is said to result from Block’s commitment to phenomenal overflow. However, in this paper, I demonstrate that Phillips’ rejection of overflow likewise renders his view on unconscious perception “internally challenged” and therefore equally problematic.
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  3.  52
    Neural Synchrony and the Causal Efficacy of Consciousness.David Yates - forthcoming - Topoi:1-16.
    The purpose of this paper is to address a well-known dilemma for physicalism. If mental properties are type identical to physical properties, then their causal efficacy is secure, but at the cost of ruling out mentality in creatures very different to ourselves. On the other hand, if mental properties are multiply realizable, then all kinds of creatures can instantiate them, but then they seem to be causally redundant. The causal exclusion problem depends on the widely held principle that realized properties (...)
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  4.  5
    The Experience-Dependent Dynamics of Human Consciousness.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2018 - Open Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):116-143.
    By reviewing most of the neurobiology of consciousness, this article highlights some major reasons why a successful emulation of the dynamics of human consciousness by artificial intelligence is unlikely. The analysis provided leads to conclude that human consciousness is epigenetically determined, experience, and context-dependent at the individual level. It is subject to changes in time that are essentially unpredictable. If cracking the code to human consciousness were possible, the result would most likely have to consist of a temporal pattern code (...)
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  5.  1
    The Confluence of Perceiving and Thinking in Consciousness Phenomenology.Johannes Wagemann - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  6.  21
    Of, for, and by the People: The Legal Lacuna of Synthetic Persons.Joanna J. Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis & Thomas D. Grant - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3):273-291.
    Conferring legal personhood on purely synthetic entities is a very real legal possibility, one under consideration presently by the European Union. We show here that such legislative action would be morally unnecessary and legally troublesome. While AI legal personhood may have some emotional or economic appeal, so do many superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us. We review the utility and history of legal fictions of personhood, discussing salient precedents where such fictions resulted in abuse or incoherence. We (...)
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  7.  83
    Block's Overflow Argument.Peter Carruthers - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:65-70.
    This article challenges Block's ‘overflow argument’ for the conclusion that phenomenal consciousness and access-consciousness are distinct. It shows that the data can be explained just as well in terms of a distinction between contents that are made globally accessible through bottom–up sensory stimulation and those that are sustained and made available in working memory through top-down attention.
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  8.  42
    Imagery and Overflow: We See More Than We Report.Nicholas D’Aloisio-Montilla - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (5):545-570.
    The question of whether our conscious experience is rich or sparse remains an enduring controversy in philosophy. The “overflow” account argues that perceptual consciousness is far richer than cognitive access: when perceiving a complex scene, subjects see more than they can report. This paper draws on aphantasia to propose a new argument in favor of overflow. First, it shows that opponents of overflow explain subjects’ performance in a change detection paradigm by appealing to a type of “internal imagery.” Second, it (...)
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  9.  44
    At the Core of Our Capacity to Act for a Reason: The Affective System and Evaluative Model-Based Learning and Control.Peter Railton - 2017 - Emotion Review 9 (4):335-342.
    Recent decades have witnessed a sea change in thinking about emotion, which has gone from being seen as a disruptive force in human thought and action to being seen as an important source of situation- and goal-relevant information and evaluation, continuous with perception and cognition. Here I argue on philosophical and empirical grounds that the role of emotion in contributing to our ability to respond to reasons for action runs deeper still: The affective system is at the core of the (...)
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  10. A Role for Consciousness in Action Selection.Joanna J. Bryson - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (2):471-482.
  11. The Switch Model of Split-Brain Consciousness.Elizabeth Schechter - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):203 - 226.
    The attempt to model the structure of consciousness in split-brain subjects is ongoing. This paper concerns the recently proposed ?switch model? of split-brain consciousness, according to which a split-brain subject possesses only a single stream of consciousness, unified at and across time, that shifts from one hemisphere to the other from moment to moment. The paper argues that while the central explanatory element of the switch model may account for some aspects of split-brain consciousness, the best general picture of split-brain (...)
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  12.  63
    Self in Time and Language.Erica Cosentino - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):777-783.
    Time has been considered a crucial factor in distinguishing between two levels of self-awareness: the “core,” or “minimal self,” and the “extended,” or “narrative self.” Herein, I focus on this last concept of the self and, in particular, on the relationship between the narrative self and language. In opposition to the claim that the narrative self is a linguistic construction, my idea is that it is created by the functioning of mental time travel, that is, the faculty of human beings (...)
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  13.  46
    A Computational Model of Machine Consciousness.Janusz A. Starzyk & Dilip K. Prasad - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (02):255-281.
  14. Consciousness is Computational: The Lida Model of Global Workspace Theory.Bernard J. Baars & Stan Franklin - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):23-32.
  15. Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Prescission Instead of Reification.Marc Champagne - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):145-183.
    ABSTRACT: This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the “explanatory gap” that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel’s revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block’s controversial claim that we should countenance a “phenomenal-consciousness” which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy (...)
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  16.  44
    The Dynamic Architecture of Emotion: Evidence for the Component Process Model.Klaus R. Scherer - 2009 - Cognition and Emotion 23 (7):1307-1351.
  17.  19
    Identifying Phenomenal Consciousness.Elizabeth Schier - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):216-222.
    This paper examines the possibility of finding evidence that phenomenal consciousness is independent of access. The suggestion reviewed is that we should look for isomorphisms between phenomenal and neural activation spaces. It is argued that the fact that phenomenal spaces are mapped via verbal report is no problem for this methodology. The fact that activation and phenomenal space are mapped via different means does not mean that they cannot be identified. The paper finishes by examining how data addressing this theoretical (...)
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  18. Consciousness and Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317.
    This article concerns the interplay between two issues that involve both philosophy and neuroscience: whether the content of phenomenal consciousness is 'rich' or 'sparse', whether phenomenal consciousness goes beyond cognitive access, and how it would be possible for there to be evidence one way or the other.
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  19.  39
    Formalisation of Damasio’s Theory of Emotion, Feeling and Core Consciousness.Tibor Bosse, Catholijn M. Jonker & Jan Treur - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):94-113.
    This paper contributes an analysis and formalisation of Damasio’s theory on core consciousness. Three important concepts in this theory are ‘emotion’, ‘feeling’ and ‘feeling a feeling’ . In particular, a simulation model is described of the dynamics of basic mechanisms leading via emotion and feeling to core consciousness, and dynamic properties are formally specified that hold for these dynamics at a more global level. These properties have been automatically checked for the simulation model. Moreover, a formal analysis is made of (...)
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  20.  27
    Keeping Track of Invisible Individuals While Exploring a Spatial Layout with Partial Cues: Location-Based and Deictic Direction-Based Strategies.Nicolas Bullot - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):15-46.
    In contrast to Constructivist Views, which construe perceptual cognition as an essentially reconstructive process, this article recommends the Deictic View, which grounds perception in perceptual-demonstrative reference and the use of deictic tracking strategies for acquiring and updating knowledge about individuals. The view raises the problem of how sensory-motor tracking connects to epistemic and integrated forms of tracking. To study the strategies used to solve this problem, we report a study of the ability to track distal individuals when only their directions (...)
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  21.  72
    Neuroimaging and Disorders of Consciousness: Envisioning an Ethical Research Agenda.Joseph J. Fins, Judy Illes, James L. Bernat, Joy Hirsch, Steven Laureys & Emily Murphy - 2008 - American Journal of Bioethics 8 (9):3 – 12.
    The application of neuroimaging technology to the study of the injured brain has transformed how neuroscientists understand disorders of consciousness, such as the vegetative and minimally conscious states, and deepened our understanding of mechanisms of recovery. This scientific progress, and its potential clinical translation, provides an opportunity for ethical reflection. It was against this scientific backdrop that we convened a conference of leading investigators in neuroimaging, disorders of consciousness and neuroethics. Our goal was to develop an ethical frame to move (...)
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  22. On the Irrationality of Emotion and the Rationality of Awareness☆.John A. Lambie - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):946-971.
    It is argued that one answer to the question of the rationality of emotion hinges on the different roles in action selection played by emotions when one is aware of them versus when one is not aware of them . When unaware of one’s emotions, they are: not able to enter into one’s deliberations about what to do, and more likely to be automatically acted out. This is a problem for rationality because emotional action urges are often “false positives”. In (...)
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  23. Same Old, Same Old: The Same-Order Representational Theory of Consciousness and the Division of Phenomenal Labor.Josh Weisberg - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):161-181.
    The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them--the theory 'divides the phenomenal labor' in an illicit fashion. This 'failure of intimacy' is exposed by the possibility (...)
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  24. Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...)
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  25. The Search for Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):461–474.
    Most consciousness researchers, almost no matter what their views of the metaphysics of consciousness, can agree that the first step in a science of consciousness is the search for the neural correlate of consciousness (the NCC). The reason for this agreement is that the notion of ‘correlation’ doesn’t by itself commit one to any particular metaphysical view about the relation between (neural) matter and consciousness. For example, some might treat the correlates as causally related, while others might view the correlation (...)
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  26.  75
    First- and Third-Person Approaches in Implicit Learning Research.Vinciane Gaillard, Muriel Vandenberghe, Arnaud Destrebecqz & Axel Cleeremans - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):709-722.
    How do we find out whether someone is conscious of some information or not? A simple answer is “We just ask them”! However, things are not so simple. Here, we review recent developments in the use of subjective and objective methods in implicit learning research and discuss the highly complex methodological problems that their use raises in the domain.
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  27. The Function of Phenomenal States: Supramodular Interaction Theory.Ezequiel Morsella - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (4):1000-1021.
  28. Criteria for an Effective Theory of Consciousness and Some Preliminary Attempts.Ron Sun - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):268-301.
    In the physical sciences a rigorous theory is a hierarchy of descriptions in which causal relationships between many general types of entity at a phenomenological level can be derived from causal relationships between smaller numbers of simpler entities at more detailed levels. The hierarchy of descriptions resembles the modular hierarchy created in electronic systems in order to be able to modify a complex functionality without excessive side effects. Such a hierarchy would make it possible to establish a rigorous scientific theory (...)
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  29. Neurological Disorders and the Structure of Human Consciousness.Jeffrey W. Cooney & Michael S. Gazzaniga - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):161-165.
  30.  5
    Neurophenomenology and the Spontaneity of Consciousness.Robert Hanna & Evan Thompson - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):133-162.
    Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. My reading of the situation is that our inability to come up with an intelligible conception of the relation between mind and body is a sign of the inadequacy of our present concepts, and that some development is needed. Mind itself is a spatiotemporal pattern that molds the metastable dynamic patterns of the brain.
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  31.  4
    Task Unrelated Thought: The Role of Distributed Processing.J. Smallwood - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2):169-189.
    Task unrelated thought refers to thought directed away from the current situation; for example, a day dream. Encapsulated models of cognition propose that qualitative changes in consciousness, i.e., the production of TUT, can be explained in terms of changes in the quantity of resources deployed for task completion. In contrast, distributed models of cognition emphasize the importance of holistic processes in the generation and maintenance of task focus and are consistent with the effects of higher order variables such as schemata. (...)
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  32.  12
    Task Unrelated Thought Whilst Encoding Information.J. M. Smallwood, S. F. Baracaia, M. Lowe & M. Obonsawin - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):452-484.
    Task unrelated thought (TUT) refers to thought directed away from the current situation, for example a daydream. Three experiments were conducted on healthy participants, with two broad aims. First, to contrast distributed and encapsulated views of cognition by comparing the encoding of categorical and random lists of words (Experiments One and Two). Second, to examine the consequences of experiencing TUT during study on the subsequent retrieval of information (Experiments One, Two, and Three). Experiments One and Two demonstrated lower levels of (...)
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  33.  7
    Mental Ballistics Or The Involuntariness Of Spontaneity.Gale Strawson - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):227-256.
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  34. What is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience?Galen J. Strawson - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):279-315.
    This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008) I take 'content' in a natural internalist way to refer to occurrent mental content. I introduce a 'thin' or ‘live’ notion of the subject according to which a subject of experience cannot exist unless there is an experience for it to be the subject of. I then argue, first, that in the case of a particular experience E, (...)
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  35. The Conscious Access Hypothesis: Origins and Recent Evidence.Bernard J. Baars - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (1):47-52.