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Daniel Dennett (1984). Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of AI.

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  1.  22
    Knowledge and the Permissibility of Action.N. Ángel Pinillos - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    I argue in favor of a certain connection between knowledge and the permissibility of action. On this approach, we do not think of the relation between those notions as reflecting a universal epistemic principle. Instead, we think of it as something resembling a platitude from folk psychology. With the help of some elementary tools from the logic of normativity and counterfactuals, I attempt to establish the connection by deriving it from more elementary principles. The new formulation involves a ceteris paribus (...)
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  2.  4
    Attention Norms in Siegel’s The Rationality of Perception.Zachary C. Irving - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):84-91.
    Can we be responsible for our attention? Can attention be epistemically good or bad? Siegel tackles these under‐explored questions in “Selection Effects”, a pathbreaking chapter of The Rationality of Perception. In this chapter, Siegel develops one of the first philosophical accounts of attention norms. Her account is inferential: patterns of attention are often controlled by inferences and therefore subject to rational epistemic norms that govern any other form of inference. Although Siegel’s account is explanatorily powerful, it cannot capture a core (...)
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  3.  22
    From Computer Metaphor to Computational Modeling: The Evolution of Computationalism.Marcin Miłkowski - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (3):515-541.
    In this paper, I argue that computationalism is a progressive research tradition. Its metaphysical assumptions are that nervous systems are computational, and that information processing is necessary for cognition to occur. First, the primary reasons why information processing should explain cognition are reviewed. Then I argue that early formulations of these reasons are outdated. However, by relying on the mechanistic account of physical computation, they can be recast in a compelling way. Next, I contrast two computational models of working memory (...)
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  4.  41
    A Normative Framework for Argument Quality: Argumentation Schemes with a Bayesian Foundation.Ulrike Hahn & Jos Hornikx - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1833-1873.
    In this paper, it is argued that the most fruitful approach to developing normative models of argument quality is one that combines the argumentation scheme approach with Bayesian argumentation. Three sample argumentation schemes from the literature are discussed: the argument from sign, the argument from expert opinion, and the appeal to popular opinion. Limitations of the scheme-based treatment of these argument forms are identified and it is shown how a Bayesian perspective may help to overcome these. At the same time, (...)
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  5.  49
    Autonomous Weapons Systems, the Frame Problem and Computer Security.Michał Klincewicz - 2015 - Journal of Military Ethics 14 (2):162-176.
    Unlike human soldiers, autonomous weapons systems are unaffected by psychological factors that would cause them to act outside the chain of command. This is a compelling moral justification for their development and eventual deployment in war. To achieve this level of sophistication, the software that runs AWS will have to first solve two problems: the frame problem and the representation problem. Solutions to these problems will inevitably involve complex software. Complex software will create security risks and will make AWS critically (...)
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  6.  96
    Linguistic Competence and Expertise.Mark Addis - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (2):327-336.
    Questions about the relationship between linguistic competence and expertise will be examined in the paper. Harry Collins and others distinguish between ubiquitous and esoteric expertise. Collins places considerable weight on the argument that ordinary linguistic competence and related phenomena exhibit a high degree of expertise. His position and ones which share close affinities are methodologically problematic. These difficulties matter because there is continued and systematic disagreement over appropriate methodologies for the empirical study of expertise. Against Collins, it will be argued (...)
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  7. What's the Problem with the Frame Problem?Sheldon J. Chow - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):309-331.
    The frame problem was originally a problem for Artificial Intelligence, but philosophers have interpreted it as an epistemological problem for human cognition. As a result of this reinterpretation, however, specifying the frame problem has become a difficult task. To get a better idea of what the frame problem is, how it gives rise to more general problems of relevance, and how deep these problems run, I expound six guises of the frame problem. I then assess some proposed heuristic solutions to (...)
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  8.  78
    Searching for General Principles in Cognitive Performance: Reply to Commentators.Damian G. Stephen & Guy van Orden - 2012 - Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):94-102.
    The commentators expressed concerns regarding the relevance and value of non-computational non-symbolic explanations of cognitive performance. But what counts as an “explanation” depends on the pre-theoretical assumptions behind the scenes of empirical science regarding the kinds of variables and relationships that are sought out in the first place, and some of the present disagreements stem from incommensurate assumptions. Traditional cognitive science presumes cognition to be a decomposable system of components interacting according to computational rules to generate cognitive performances (i.e., component-dominant (...)
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  9.  90
    Phenomenology and Artificial Life: Toward a Technological Supplementation of Phenomenological Methodology.Tom Froese & Shaun Gallagher - 2010 - Husserl Studies 26 (2):83-106.
    The invention of the computer has revolutionized science. With respect to finding the essential structures of life, for example, it has enabled scientists not only to investigate empirical examples, but also to create and study novel hypothetical variations by means of simulation: ‘life as it could be’. We argue that this kind of research in the field of artificial life, namely the specification, implementation and evaluation of artificial systems, is akin to Husserl’s method of free imaginative variation as applied to (...)
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  10.  60
    Hume and the Enactive Approach to Mind.Tom Froese - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):95-133.
    An important part of David Hume’s work is his attempt to put the natural sciences on a firmer foundation by introducing the scientific method into the study of human nature. This investigation resulted in a novel understanding of the mind, which in turn informed Hume’s critical evaluation of the scope and limits of the scientific method as such. However, while these latter reflections continue to influence today’s philosophy of science, his theory of mind is nowadays mainly of interest in terms (...)
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  11.  29
    Innovations, Stakeholders & Entrepreneurship.Nicholas Dew & Saras D. Sarasvathy - 2007 - Journal of Business Ethics 74 (3):267-283.
    In modern societies entrepreneurship and innovation are widely seen as key sources of economic growth and welfare increases. Yet entrepreneurial innovation has also meant losses and hardships for some members of society: it is destructive of some stakeholders’ wellbeing even as it creates new wellbeing among other stakeholders. Both the positive benefits and negative externalities of innovation are problematic because entrepreneurs initiate new ventures before their private profitability and/or social costs can be fully recognized. In this paper we consider three (...)
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  12. Evolutionary Psychology Versus Fodor: Arguments for and Against the Massive Modularity Hypothesis.Willem E. Frankenhuis & Annemie Ploeger - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):687 – 710.
    Evolutionary psychologists tend to view the mind as a large collection of evolved, functionally specialized mechanisms, or modules. Cosmides and Tooby (1994) have presented four arguments in favor of this model of the mind: the engineering argument, the error argument, the poverty of the stimulus argument, and combinatorial explosion. Fodor (2000) has discussed each of these four arguments and rejected them all. In the present paper, we present and discuss the arguments for and against the massive modularity hypothesis. We conclude (...)
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  13. A Psycho-Ontological Analysis of Genesis 2-6.Jordan B. Peterson - 2007 - Archive for the Psychology of Religion 29 (1):87-125.
    Individuals operating within the scientific paradigm presume that the world is made of matter. Although the perspective engendered by this presupposition is very powerful, it excludes value and subjective experience from its fundamental ontology. In addition, it provides very little guidance with regards to the fundamentals of ethical action. Individuals within the religious paradigm, by contrast, presume that the world is made out of what matters. From such a perspective, the phenomenon of meaning is the primary reality. This meaning is (...)
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  14.  36
    The Next Step, or a Misstep?Jon Opie - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):144-145.
    Reviews the book, Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step by Michael Wheeler (2005). In this ambitious book, the author considers afresh the conceptual foundations of cognitive science, with the aim of carving out a place for what he calls 'embodied-embedded cognitive science'- a rival and successor, to orthodox computational approaches. The central argument of the book is that the embodied-embedded framework promises to resolve the frame problem that famously plagues cognitive science- the problem of explaining how intelligent agents rapidly (...)
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  15.  93
    Applying Global Workspace Theory to the Frame Problem.Murray Shanahan & Bernard J. Baars - 2005 - Cognition 98 (2):157-176.
  16. Cognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma, and How to Avoid It.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):269-86.
    When it comes to applying computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive scientists appear to face a dilemma. The only strategy that seems to be available is one that explains consciousness in terms of special kinds of computational processes. But such theories, while they dominate the field, have counter-intuitive consequences; in particular, they force one to accept that phenomenal experience is composed of information processing effects. For cognitive scientists, therefore, it seems to come down to a choice between (...)
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  17.  91
    A Complex Systems Theory of Teleology.Wayne Christensen - 1996 - Biology and Philosophy 11 (3):301-320.
    Part I [sections 2–4] draws out the conceptual links between modern conceptions of teleology and their Aristotelian predecessor, briefly outlines the mode of functional analysis employed to explicate teleology, and develops the notion of cybernetic organisation in order to distinguish teleonomic and teleomatic systems. Part II is concerned with arriving at a coherent notion of intentional control. Section 5 argues that intentionality is to be understood in terms of the representational properties of cybernetic systems. Following from this, section 6 argues (...)
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  18.  30
    Cognition Poised at the Edge of Chaos: A Complex Alternative to a Symbolic Mind.James W. Garson - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):301-22.
    This paper explores a line of argument against the classical paradigm in cognitive science that is based upon properties of non-linear dynamical systems, especially in their chaotic and near-chaotic behavior. Systems of this kind are capable of generating information-rich macro behavior that could be useful to cognition. I argue that a brain operating at the edge of chaos could generate high-complexity cognition in this way. If this hypothesis is correct, then the symbolic processing methodology in cognitive science faces serious obstacles. (...)
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  19.  77
    Chaos and Free Will.James W. Garson - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):365-74.
    This paper explores the possibility that chaos theory might be helpful in explaining free will. I will argue that chaos has little to offer if we construe its role as to resolve the apparent conflict between determinism and freedom. However, I contend that the fundamental problem of freedom is to find a way to preserve intuitions about rational action in a physical brain. New work on dynamic computation provides a framework for viewing free choice as a process that is sensitive (...)
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  20. Buddhism and Cognitivism: A Postmodern Appraisal.John Pickering - 1995 - Asian Philosophy 5 (1):23 – 38.
    Abstract Cognitivism, presently the major paradigm of psychology, presents a scientific account of mental life. Buddhism also presents an account of mental life, but one which is integral with its wider ethical and transcendental concerns. The postmodern appraisal of science provides a framework within which these two accounts may be compared without inheriting many of the assumed oppositions between science and religion. It is concluded that cognitivism and Buddhism will have complementary roles in the development of a more pluralist psychological (...)
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  21.  94
    Tacit Beliefs and Other Doxastic Attitudes.Pat A. Manfredi - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (1-2):95-117.
  22. Explanation and the Language of Thought.David Braddon-Mitchell & J. Fitzpatrick - 1990 - Synthese 83 (1):3-29.
    In this paper we argue that the insistence by Fodor et. al. that the Language of Thought hypothesis must be true rests on mistakes about the kinds of explanations that must be provided of cognitive phenomena. After examining the canonical arguments for the LOT, we identify a weak version of the LOT hypothesis which we think accounts for some of the intuitions that there must be a LOT. We then consider what kinds of explanation cognitive phenomena require, and conclude that (...)
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  23.  22
    Evolutionary Conceptions of Adaptation and Brain Design.Jay Schulkin - 1989 - World Futures 27 (1):1-15.
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  24.  74
    Fodor's Nativism.Kim Sterelny - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (February):119-41.
  25.  3
    Darwin, Deceit, and Metacommunication.Stuart A. Altmann - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):244.
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  26.  16
    Logical Adaptationism.Ron Amundson - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):505.
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  27.  2
    Learning How to Deceive.John D. Baldwin - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):245.
  28.  5
    Thoughts About Thoughts.Jonathan Bennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):246.
  29.  10
    Metaphor, Cognitive Belief, and Science.Irwin S. Bernstein - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):247.
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  30.  1
    Anecdotes and Critical Anthropomorphism.Gordon M. Burghardt - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):248.
  31.  20
    Toward the Next Generation in Data Quality: A New Survey of Primate Tactical Deception.R. W. Byrne & A. Whiten - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):267.
  32.  11
    Another “Just So” Story: How the Leopardguarders Spot.Dorothy Cheney & Robert Seyfarth - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):506.
  33.  4
    Classification of Deceptive Behavior According to Levels of Cognitive Complexity.Suzanne Chevalier-Skolnikoff - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):249.
  34.  21
    The Ontological Status of Intentional States: Nailing Folk Psychology to its Perch.Paul M. Churchland - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):507.
  35.  12
    Dennett's Realisation Theory of the Relation Between Folk and Scientific Psychology.Adrian Cussins - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):508.
  36.  3
    Deception and Explanatory Economy.Arthur C. Danto - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):252.
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  37.  20
    The Notional World of D. C. Dennett.Arthur C. Danto - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):509.
  38.  2
    Emotional Control.Frans B. M. de Waal - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):254.
  39.  19
    Why Creative Intelligence is Hard to Find.Daniel Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):253.
  40.  81
    Precis of the Intentional Stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):495-505.
    The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other states to systems and predicts future behavior from what it would be rational for an agent to do, given those beliefs and desires. Any system whose performance can be thus predicted and explained is an intentional system, whatever its innards. The strategy of treating parts of the world as intentional systems is the foundation of but is also exploited in artificial intelligence and cognitive science (...)
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  41.  17
    Science, Philosophy, and Interpretation.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):535.
  42.  21
    The Stance Stance.Fred Dretske - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):511.
  43.  21
    Dennett on Belief.Michael Dummett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):512.
  44.  3
    How to Break Moulds.R. I. M. Dunbar - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):254.
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  45. Toward a Taxonomy of Mind in Primates.Gordon G. Gallup - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):255.
  46.  21
    Derived Intentionality?Alvin I. Goldman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):514.
  47.  11
    Real Intentions?Donald R. Griffin - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):514.
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  48.  10
    Subjective Reality.Donald R. Griffin - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):256.
  49.  25
    What is the Intentional Stance?Gilbert Harman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.
  50.  4
    The Distant Blast of Lloyd Morgan's Canon.Cecilia Heyes - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):256.
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