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Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1992). Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain.

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  1.  6
    Replies to Barrett, Corris and Chemero, and Hutto.Shaun Gallagher - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):839-851.
    In this essay, I respond to the critical remarks of Louise Barrett, Amanda Corris and Anthony Chemero, and Daniel Hutto on my book Enactivist Interventions. In doing so, I consider whether behaviorism can make a contribution to enactivist theory, whether synergies are the same as dynamical gestalts, and whether the brain can add anything to mathematical reasoning.
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  2.  9
    Perceptual Experience and Aspect.Sebastián Sanhueza Rodríguez - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):103-120.
    A number of contemporary philosophers of mind have brought considerations from the study of aspect to bear on the ontological question how perceptual experiences persist over time. But, apart from rare exceptions, relatively little attention has been devoted to assess whether the way we talk about perceptual occurrences is of any relevance for discussions of ontological matters in general, let alone discussions about the ontological nature of perception. This piece examines whether considerations derived from the study of lexical aspect have (...)
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  3. Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):146-173.
    Austere relationism rejects the orthodox analysis of hallucinations and illusions as incorrect perceptual representations. In this article, I argue that illusions of optimal motion present a serious challenge for this view. First, I submit that austere-relationist accounts of misleading experiences cannot be adapted to account for IOMs. Second, I show that any attempt at elucidating IOMs within an austere-relationist framework undermines the claim that perceptual experiences fundamentally involve relations to mind-independent objects. Third, I develop a representationalist model of IOMs. The (...)
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  4.  3
    The Logic of Appearance: Dennett, Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis.Feyaerts Jasper & Vanheule Stijn - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  5.  13
    How to Solve the Problem of Phenomenal Unity: Finding Alternatives to the Single State Conception.Wanja Wiese - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (5):811-836.
    The problem of phenomenal unity consists in providing a phenomenological characterization of the difference between phenomenally unified and disunified conscious experiences. Potential solutions to PPU are faced with an important challenge. I show that this challenge can be conceived as a phenomenological dual to what is known as Bradley’s regress. This perspective facilitates progress on PPU by finding duals to possible solutions to Bradley’s regress and makes it intelligible why many characterize phenomenal unity in terms of the existence of a (...)
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    Common Currencies, Multiple Systems and Risk Cognition: Evolutionary Trade-Offs and the Problem of Efficient Choices.David Spurrett - 2016 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 16 (5):436-457.
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  7.  8
    Defense of the Brain Time View.Valtteri Arstila - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  8.  5
    Perceptual Asynchrony for Motion.Yu Tung Lo & Semir Zeki - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
  9.  14
    Individual Differences in Attributional Style but Not in Interoceptive Sensitivity, Predict Subjective Estimates of Action Intention.Tegan Penton, Guillaume L. Thierry & Nick J. Davis - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
  10.  87
    On Explaining Why Time Seems to Pass.Natalja Deng - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):367-382.
    Usually, the B-theory of time is taken to involve the claim that time does not, in reality, pass; after all, on the B-theory, nothing really becomes present and then more and more past, times do not come into existence successively, and which facts obtain does not change. For this reason, many B-theorists have recently tried to explain away one or more aspect(s) of experience that they and their opponents take to constitute an experience of time as passing. In this paper, (...)
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  11. Silencing the Experience of Change.Sebastian Watzl - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1009-1032.
    Perceptual illusions have often served as an important tool in the study of perceptual experience. In this paper I argue that a recently discovered set of visual illusions sheds new light on the nature of time consciousness. I suggest the study of these silencing illusions as a tool kit for any philosopher interested in the experience of time and show how to better understand time consciousness by combining detailed empirical investigations with a detailed philosophical analysis. In addition, and more specifically, (...)
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  12.  74
    Time for Consciousness: Intention and Introspection. [REVIEW]Komarine Romdenh-Romluc - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):369-376.
    We assume that we can act—in at least some cases—by consciously intending to do so. Wegner (2002) appeals to empirical research carried out by Libet et al. (1983) to challenge this assumption. I argue that his conclusion presupposes a particular view of conscious intention. But there is an alternative model available, which has been developed by various writers in the phenomenological tradition, and most recently defended by Moran (2001). If we adopt this alternative account of conscious intention, Wegner’s argument no (...)
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  13.  10
    Subjective Reports of Stimulus, Response, and Decision Times in Speeded Tasks: How Accurate Are Decision Time Reports?Jeff Miller, Paula Vieweg, Nicolas Kruize & Belinda McLea - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1013-1036.
    Four experiments examined how accurately participants can report the times of their own decisions. Within an auditory reaction time task, participants reported the time at which the tone was presented, they decided on the response, or the response key was pressed. Decision time reports were checked for plausibility against the actual RTs, and we compared the effects of experimental manipulations on these two measures to see whether the reported decision times showed appropriate effects. In addition, we estimated the amount of (...)
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  14.  20
    New Models for Language Understanding and the Cognitive Approach to Legal Metaphors.Lucia Morra - 2010 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 23 (4):387-405.
    The essay deals with the mechanism of interpretation for legal metaphorical expressions. Firstly, it points out the perspective the cognitive approach induced about legal metaphors; then it suggests that this perspective gains in plausibility when a new bilateral model of language understanding is endorsed. A possible sketch of the meaning-making procedure for legal metaphors, compatible with this new model, is then proposed, and illustrated with some examples built on concepts belonging to the Italian Civil Code. The insights the bilateral model (...)
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  15.  17
    Prior-Entry: A Review.Charles Spence & Cesare Parise - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):364-379.
    The law of prior entry was one of E.B. Titchener’s seven fundamental laws of attention. According to Titchener : “the object of attention comes to consciousness more quickly than the objects which we are not attending to.” Although researchers have been studying prior entry for more than a century now, progress in understanding the effect has been hindered by the many methodological confounds present in early research. As a consequence, it is unclear whether the behavioral effects reported in the majority (...)
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  16.  25
    On the Signals Underlying Conscious Awareness of Action.Sukhvinder S. Obhi, Peggy J. Planetta & Jordan Scantlebury - 2009 - Cognition 110 (1):65-73.
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  17.  61
    Robin le Poidevin the Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation.Ian B. Phillips - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):439-446.
  18.  19
    Identifying Phenomenal Consciousness.Elizabeth Schier - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):216-222.
    This paper examines the possibility of finding evidence that phenomenal consciousness is independent of access. The suggestion reviewed is that we should look for isomorphisms between phenomenal and neural activation spaces. It is argued that the fact that phenomenal spaces are mapped via verbal report is no problem for this methodology. The fact that activation and phenomenal space are mapped via different means does not mean that they cannot be identified. The paper finishes by examining how data addressing this theoretical (...)
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  19.  63
    A Difference That Makes a Difference: Passing Through Dennett's Stalinesque/Orwellian Impasse.Steven J. Todd - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):497-520.
    visual masking provides a clear illustration that ‘there is really only a verbal difference’ between two versions of the Cartesian Theater model of the mind. This alleged lack of a distinction is both the crucial premise of their main argument against the Cartesian Theater and a motivator for accepting their own Multiple Drafts model. I argue that metacontrast reveals a difference between the two versions of the Cartesian Theater that meets criteria found in (Dennett and Kinsbourne [1992]) for determining such (...)
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  20. The Common Now.Craig Callender - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):339-361.
    The manifest image is teeming with activity. Objects are booming and buzzing by, changing their locations and properties, vivid perceptions are replaced, and we seem to be inexorably slipping into the future. Time—or at least our experience in time— seems a very turbulent sort of thing. By contrast, time in the scientist image seems very still. The fundamental laws of physics don’t differentiate between past and future, nor do they pick out a present moment that flows. Except for a minus (...)
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  21.  64
    The Scientific Untraceability of Phenomenal Consciousness.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (4):509-529.
    It is a common conviction among philosophers who hold that phenomenal properties, qualia, are distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional properties, that it is possible to trace the neural correlates of these properties. The main purpose of this paper is to present a challenge to this view, and to show that if “non-cognitive” phenomenal properties exist at all, they lie beyond the reach of neuroscience. In the final section it will be suggested that they also lie beyond the reach (...)
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  22. Consciousness in a Space-Time World.Geoffrey Lee - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):341–374.
  23. Content and the Stream of Consciousness.Matthew Soteriou - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):543–568.
  24.  49
    The Attentional Spotlight.Joanna J. Bryson - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (1):21-28.
    One of the interesting and occasionally controversial aspects of Dennett’s career is his direct involvement in the scientific process. This article describes some of Dennett’s participation on one particular project conducted at MIT, the building of the humanoid robot named Cog. One of the intentions of this project, not to date fully realized, was to test Dennett’s multiple drafts theory of consciousness. I describe Dennett’s involvement and impact on Cog from the perspective of a graduate student. I also describe the (...)
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  25.  69
    Unmasking Multiple Drafts.Steven J. Todd - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):477-494.
    Any theoretician constructing a serious model of consciousness should carefully assess the details of empirical data generated in the neurosciences and psychology. A failure to account for those details may cast doubt on the adequacy of that model. This paper presents a case in point. Dennett and Kinsbourne's (Dennett, D., & Kinsbourne, M. (1992). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15, 183-243) assault on the materialist version of the Cartesian (...)
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  26. Animals and Humans, Thinking and Nature.David Morris - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):49-72.
    Studies that compare human and animal behaviour suspend prejudices about mind, body and their relation, by approaching thinking in terms of behaviour. Yet comparative approaches typically engage another prejudice, motivated by human social and bodily experience: taking the lone animal as the unit of comparison. This prejudice informs Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s comparative studies, and conceals something important: that animals moving as a group in an environment can develop new sorts of “sense.” The study of animal group-life suggests a new way (...)
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  27.  99
    On the Alleged Illusion of Conscious Will.Marc van Duijn & Sacha Bem - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):699-714.
    The belief that conscious will is merely "an illusion created by the brain" appears to be gaining in popularity among cognitive neuroscientists. Its main adherents usually refer to the classic, but controversial 'Libet-experiments', as the empirical evidence that vindicates this illusion-claim. However, based on recent work that provides other interpretations of the Libet-experiments, we argue that the illusion-claim is not only empirically invalid, but also theoretically incoherent, as it is rooted in a category mistake; namely, the presupposition that neuronal activity (...)
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  28.  64
    Could the Stream of Consciousness Flow Through the Brain.T. J. Bittner - 2004 - Philosophia 31 (3-4):449-473.
  29.  66
    The Myth of Self-Deception.Steffen Borge - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-28.
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  30. Toward an Ontological Interpretation of Dennett's Theory of Consciousness.Michael V. Antony - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):343-369.
    While "Consciousness Explained" has received an enormous amount of attention since its publication, there is still little agreement on what Dennett’s account of consciousness is. Most interpreters treat his view as an instance of one or another of the standard ontological positions (functionalism, behaviorism, eliminativism, instrumentalism). I believe a different metaphysical account underlies Dennett’s view, one that is important though ill-understood. In the paper I attempt to point in the direction of a proper characterization of that account through the use (...)
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  31.  49
    Causality and the Perception of Time.David M. Eagleman & Alex O. Holcombe - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (8):323-325.
  32.  11
    Real Latencies and Facilitation.Chakravarthi Ramakrishna - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):300-303.
  33.  84
    Attention Metaphors: How Metaphors Guide the Cognitive Psychology of Attention.Diego Fernandez-Duque & Mark Johnson - 1999 - Cognitive Science 23 (1):83-116.
  34.  22
    Cortical Conversations: A Review Essay on Cognition, Computation and Consciousness. [REVIEW]Stuart Silvers - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (4):525 – 534.
    The question is, How does the brain make its mind? In Cognition, computation and consciousness [Ito et al. (Eds) (1997) Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press], a variety of noted theoreticians from the fields of cognitive psychology, computer science, and philosophy postulate answer-blueprints rather than full-blown explanatory solutions to this most nettlesome question. Coming to the problem from quite different starting points and perspectives, they nevertheless succeed in reaching consensus on the idea that the contingencies of the brain's evolution (...)
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  35. Lost the Plot? Reconstructing Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness.Kathleen Akins - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (1):1-43.
    : In Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett presents the Multiple Drafts Theory of consciousness, a very brief, largely empirical theory of brain function. From these premises, he draws a number of quite radical conclusions—for example, the conclusion that conscious events have no determinate time of occurrence. The problem, as many readers have pointed out, is that there is little discernible route from the empirical premises to the philosophical conclusions. In this article, I try to reconstruct Dennett's argument, providing both the philosophical (...)
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  36.  68
    Interdiscourse or Supervenience Relations: The Primacy of the Manifest Image.J. Brakel - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):253 - 297.
    Amidst the progress being made in the various (sub-)disciplines of the behavioural and brain sciences a somewhat neglected subject is the problem of how everything fits into one world and, derivatively, how the relation between different levels of discourse should be understood and to what extent different levels, domains, approaches, or disciplines are autonomous or dependent. In this paper I critically review the most recent proposals to specify the nature of interdiscourse relations, focusing on the concept of supervenience. Ideally supervenience (...)
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  37.  8
    Brain Waves and Bridges: Comments on Hardcastle's “Discovering the Moment of Consciousness?“.H. Looren de Jong - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):197 – 209.
    In this comment, a picture of ERP research is sketched that is slightly different from Hardcastle's account, in that it emphasises the functional characterisation of ERP components rather than the neurophysiological connections. It is suggested that selection pressure of ERP work on cognitive and neurophysiological theories and vice versa is a more apt metaphor for intertheoretical relations in this field than explanatory extension. Secondly, it is argued that the temporal characteristics of ERP components do not support Hardcastle's claim that they (...)
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  38.  5
    Discovering the Moment of Consciousness? I: Bridging Techniques at Work, & II.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):149-96.
    Abstract Connectionist views in psychology and neuroscience give the impression that there is no one place in the brain into which all information funnels. If these impression are accurate, then we will have great difficulty picking out a point in neuronal or psychological time at which phenomena become conscious. If so, pointing to one place in which we are conscious of a particular event and expecting a psychophysical correlation between qualitative and neural events seems hopeless. In response to this worry, (...)
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  39.  3
    Discovering the Moment of Consciousness? I: Bridging Techniques at Work.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):149 – 166.
    Connectionist views in psychology and neuroscience give the impression that there is no one place in the brain into which all information funnels. If these impression are accurate, then we will have great difficulty picking out a point in neuronal or psychological time at which phenomena become conscious. If so, pointing to one place in which we are conscious of a particular event and expecting a psychophysical correlation between qualitative and neural events seems hopeless. In response to this worry, I (...)
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  40.  15
    Perception-Consciousness and Action-Consciousness?D. M. Armstrong - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):247.
  41.  47
    Consciousness Without Conflation.Anthony P. Atkinson & Martin Davies - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):248-249.
    Although information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of the relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.
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  42.  28
    Evidence That Phenomenal Consciousness is the Same as Access Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):249.
  43.  10
    More Empirical Cases to Break the Accord of Phenomenal and Access-Consciousness.Talis Bachmann - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):249.
  44.  53
    How Many Concepts of Consciousness?Ned Block - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):272.
  45.  34
    Fallacies or Analyses?Jennifer Church - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):251--2.
    To demonstrate that a fallacy is committed, Block needs to convince us of two things: first, that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is distinct from that of access consciousness, and second, that it picks out a different property from that of access consciousness. I raise doubt about both of these claims, suggesting that the concept of a phenomenal property is the concept of a property to which we have a special sort of access.
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  46.  5
    Segmentalized Consciousness in Schizophrenia.Andrew Crider - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):676.
  47.  64
    Overworking the Hippocampus.Daniel C. Dennett - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):677-678.
    Gray mistakenly thinks I have rejected the sort of theoretical enterprise he is undertaking, because, according to him, I think that "more data" is all that is needed to resolve all the issues. Not at all. My stalking horse was the bizarre (often pathetic) claim that no amount of empirical, "third-person point-of-view" science (data plus theory) could ever reduce the residue of mystery about consciousness to zero. This "New Mysterianism" (Flanagan, 1991) is one that he should want to combat as (...)
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  48.  78
    The Path Not Taken.Daniel C. Dennett - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):252-253.
    The differences Block attempts to capture with his putative distinction between P-consciousness and A-consciousness are more directly and perspicuously handled in terms of differences in richness of content and degree of influence. Block's critiques, based on his misbegotten distinction, evaporate on closer inspection.
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  49.  13
    Possible Roles for a Predictor Plus Comparator Mechanism in Human Episodic Recognition Memory and Imitative Learning.Simon Dennis & Michael Humphreys - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):678.
  50.  18
    Hunting for Consciousness in the Brain: What is the Game?José-Luis Díaz - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):679.
1 — 50 / 209