Citations of work:

Daniel C. Dennett (1981). True Believers : The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works.

38 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

Search for work by author name and title
Add directly by record ID

  1. Representation in Cognitive Science.Nicholas Shea - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    How can we think about things in the outside world? There is still no widely accepted theory of how mental representations get their meaning. In light of pioneering research, Nicholas Shea develops a naturalistic account of the nature of mental representation with a firm focus on the subpersonal representations that pervade the cognitive sciences.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. On the Proper Domain of Psychological Predicates.Carrie Figdor - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4289-4310.
    One question of the bounds of cognition is that of which things have it. A scientifically relevant debate on this question must explain the persistent and selective use of psychological predicates to report findings throughout biology: for example, that neurons prefer, fruit flies and plants decide, and bacteria communicate linguistically. This paper argues that these claims should enjoy default literal interpretation. An epistemic consequence is that these findings can contribute directly to understanding the nature of psychological capacities.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  58
    The Problem of Confirmation in the Everett Interpretation.Emily Adlam - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 47:21-32.
    I argue that the Oxford school Everett interpretation is internally incoherent, because we cannot claim that in an Everettian universe the kinds of reasoning we have used to arrive at our beliefs about quantum mechanics would lead us to form true beliefs. I show that in an Everettian context, the experimental evidence that we have available could not provide empirical confirmation for quantum mechanics, and moreover that we would not even be able to establish reference to the theoretical entities of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. In Defense of Epiphenomenalism.Jack C. Lyons - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):76-794.
    Recent worries about possible epiphenomenalist consequences of nonreductive materialism are misplaced, not, as many have argued, because nonreductive materialism does not have epiphenomenalist implications but because the epiphenomenalist implications are actually virtues of the theory, rather than vices. It is only by showing how certain kinds of mental properties are causally impotent that cognitive scientific explanations of mentality as we know them are possible.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. The Phenomenal Stance.Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):59-85.
    Cognitive science is shamelessly materialistic. It maintains that human beings are nothing more than complex physical systems, ultimately and completely explicable in mechanistic terms. But this conception of humanity does not ?t well with common sense. To think of the creatures we spend much of our day loving, hating, admiring, resenting, comparing ourselves to, trying to understand, blaming, and thanking -- to think of them as mere mechanisms seems at best counterintuitive and unhelpful. More often it may strike us as (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  6.  30
    Tarski's Theory of Truth and Field's Solution to the Problem of Intentionality.Peter Weatherall - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (3):291 – 304.
  7.  13
    Rational Animal?Simon Blackburn - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):331.
  8.  25
    Are There Any a Priori Constraints on the Study of Rationality?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):359.
  9. Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.
    The object of this paper is to show why recent research in the psychology of deductive and probabilistic reasoning does not have.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   355 citations  
  10.  8
    Status of the Rationality Assumption in Psychology.Marvin S. Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):332-333.
  11.  13
    The Persistence of Cognitive Illusions.Persi Diaconis & David Freedman - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):333-334.
  12.  13
    Rationality and the Sanctity of Competence.Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):334.
  13.  10
    On Defining Rationality Unreasonably.J. St B. T. Evans & P. Pollard - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):335-336.
  14.  6
    Can Any Statements About Human Behavior Be Empirically Validated?Baruch Fischoff - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):336-337.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  4
    Can Children's Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?Sam Glucksberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):337.
  16.  6
    Human Reasoning: Can We Judge Before We Understand?Richard A. Griggs - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):338.
  17.  7
    Another Vote for Rationality.Mary Henle - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):339-339.
  18.  16
    Who Shall Be the Arbiter of Our Intuitions?Daniel Kahneman - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):339-340.
  19.  5
    Improvements in Human Reasoning and an Error in L. J. Cohen's.David H. Krantz - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):340.
  20.  7
    Intuition, Competence, and Performance.Henry E. Kyburg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):341.
  21.  12
    Should Bayesians Sometimes Neglect Base Rates?Isaac Levi - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):342.
  22.  13
    Performing Competently.Lola L. Lopes - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):343-344.
  23.  9
    “Is” and “Ought” in Cognitive Science.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):344.
  24.  7
    Propensity, Evidence, and Diagnosis.J. L. Mackie - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):345.
  25.  17
    The Irrational, the Unreasonable, and the Wrong.Avishai Margalit & Maya Bar-Hillel - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):346.
  26.  15
    L. J. Cohen Versus Bayesianism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-349.
  27.  7
    Lay Arbitration of Rules of Inference.Richard E. Nisbett - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349.
  28.  6
    Human Rationality: Misleading Linguistic Analogies.Geoffrey Sampson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):350.
  29.  13
    Conditional Probability, Taxicabs, and Martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351.
  30.  10
    Rationality is a Necessary Presupposition in Psychology.Jan Smedslund - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352.
  31.  6
    Some Questions Regarding the Rationality of a Demonstration of Human Rationality.Robert J. Sternberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-353.
  32.  9
    Inferential Competence: Right You Are, If You Think You Are.Stephen P. Stich - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):353.
  33.  6
    L. J. Cohen, Again: On the Evaluation of Inductive Intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.
  34.  4
    Independent Forebrain and Brainstem Controls for Arousal and Sleep.Jaime R. Villablanca - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):494.
  35.  11
    The Importance of Cognitive Illusions.Peter Wason - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-356.
  36.  25
    Competence, Performance, and Ignorance.Robert W. Weisberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-358.
  37.  4
    Cohen on Contraposition.N. E. Wetherick - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38.  9
    Unphilosophical Probability.Sandy L. Zabell - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-359.