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  1. The Evolution of Misbelief.Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493.
    From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in (...)
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  • The Mismeasure of Machine: Synthetic Biology and the Trouble with Engineering Metaphors.Maarten Boudry & Massimo Pigliucci - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (4):660-668.
    The scientific study of living organisms is permeated by machine and design metaphors. Genes are thought of as the ‘‘blueprint’’ of an organism, organisms are ‘‘reverse engineered’’ to discover their func- tionality, and living cells are compared to biochemical factories, complete with assembly lines, transport systems, messenger circuits, etc. Although the notion of design is indispensable to think about adapta- tions, and engineering analogies have considerable heuristic value (e.g., optimality assumptions), we argue they are limited in several important respects. In (...)
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  • Mysticism and Mind: Using Cognitive Science to Explore Religious Experience.Ryan G. Hornbeck & Robert E. Sears - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (2):59--80.
    This article derives from a paper presented at the Philosophy of Religion and Mysticism Conference hosted by the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, May 22-24, 2014. That paper introduced theories and methods drawn from the ”cognitive science of religion’ and suggested future avenues of research connecting CSR and scholarship on mysticism. Towards these same ends, the present article proceeds in three parts. Part I outlines the origins, aims, and basic tenets of CSR research. Part II discusses one specific causal (...)
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  • Artifacts and Fiat Objects: Two Families Apart?Massimiliano Carrara - 2019 - In Richard Davies (ed.), Natural and Artifactual Objects in Contemporary Metaphysics. Exercises in Analytic Ontology. Londra, Regno Unito: pp. 141-155.
    Fiat objects may come into existence by intentional explicit defnition and convention or they can be the result of some spontaneous and unintentional activity resulting in tracing fat spatial boundaries. Artifacts and fiat objects seem intuitively to be correlated: both artifacts and fiat objects depend for their existence on agents and their intentions. Is it possible to consider fiat objects as artifacts and to what extent? Or else can we conceive at least some artifacts as fiat objects? In order to (...)
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  • The Design Stance and its Artefacts.Pieter E. Vermaas, Massimiliano Carrara, Stefano Borgo & Pawel Garbacz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1131-1152.
    In this paper we disambiguate the design stance as proposed by Daniel C. Dennett, focusing on its application to technical artefacts. Analysing Dennett’s work and developing his approach towards interpreting entities, we show that there are two ways of spelling out the design stance, one that presuppose also adopting Dennett’s intentional stance for describing a designing agent, and a second that does not. We argue against taking one of these ways as giving the correct formulation of the design stance in (...)
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  • False Beliefs and Naive Beliefs: They Can Be Good for You.Roberto Casati & Marco Bertamini - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):512-513.
    Naive physics beliefs can be systematically mistaken. They provide a useful test-bed because they are common, and also because their existence must rely on some adaptive advantage, within a given context. In the second part of the commentary we also ask questions about when a whole family of misbeliefs should be considered together as a single phenomenon.
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  • Educating the Design Stance: Issues of Coherence and Transgression. Commentary on Bullot & Reber.Norman H. Freeman & Melissa L. Allen - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
  • Darwin’s Analogy Between Artificial and Natural Selection: How Does It Go?Susan G. Sterrett - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 33 (1):151-168.
    View/download or read postprint via a streaming viewer with the turning page feature in SOAR, or click on the DOI link to access the publisher's copy of this article.
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  • Darwin's Analogy Between Artificial and Natural Selection: How Does It Go?Susan G. Sterrett - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 33 (1):151-168.
    The analogy Darwin drew between artificial and natural selection in "On the Origin of Species" has a detailed structure that has not been appreciated. In Darwin’s analogy, the kind of artificial selection called Methodical selection is analogous to the principle of divergence in nature, and the kind of artificial selection called Unconscious selection is analogous to the principle of extinction in nature. This paper argues that it is the analogy between these two different principles familiar from his studies of artificial (...)
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  • The Content and Acquisition of Lexical Concepts.Richard Horsey - manuscript
    This thesis aims to develop a psychologically plausible account of concepts by integrating key insights from philosophy (on the metaphysical basis for concept possession) and psychology (on the mechanisms underlying concept acquisition). I adopt an approach known as informational atomism, developed by Jerry Fodor. Informational atomism is the conjunction of two theses: (i) informational semantics, according to which conceptual content is constituted exhaustively by nomological mind–world relations; and (ii) conceptual atomism, according to which (lexical) concepts have no internal structure. I (...)
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  • Scientific Naturalism and the Neurology of Religious Experience.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2003 - Religious Studies 39 (3):323-345.
    In this paper, I consider V. S. Ramachandran's in-principle agnosticism concerning whether neurological studies of religious experience can be taken as support for the claim that God really does communicate with people during religious experiences. Contra Ramachandran, I argue that it is by no means obvious that agnosticism is the proper scientific attitude to adopt in relation to this claim. I go on to show how the questions of whether it is (1) a scientifically testable claim and (2) a plausible (...)
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  • Cognitive Traits as Sexually Selected Fitness Indicators.John Klasios - 2013 - Review of General Psychology 17 (4):428-442.
    The evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller has argued that various features of human psychology have been sculpted, at least in part, by the evolutionary process of sexual selection via mate choice. This paper specifically examines the central claim of Miller’s account, namely that certain cognitive traits have evolved to function as good genes fitness indicators. First, I expound on and clarify key foundational concepts comprising the focal hypothesis, especially condition-dependence, mutation target size, and mutation-selection balance. Second, I proceed to highlight some (...)
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  • On Imagining the Afterlife.K. Mitch Hodge - 2011 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 11 (3-4):367-389.
    The author argues for three interconnected theses which provide a cognitive account for why humans intuitively believe that others survive death. The first thesis, from which the second and third theses follow, is that the acceptance of afterlife beliefs is predisposed by a specific, and already well-documented, imaginative process - the offline social reasoning process. The second thesis is that afterlife beliefs are social in nature. The third thesis is that the living imagine the deceased as socially embodied in such (...)
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  • Artefacts, Non-Particulars and Model Particulars1.Karel Thein - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (4):510-528.
    The paper comments and elaborates upon five pages of P. F. Strawson’s Individuals , together with his ‘Entity and Identity’ and ‘Universals’. The focus is on Strawson’s understanding of individual non-particulars as types or universals, and on his contention that the most obvious non-particular entities are the broadly conceived artefacts including the works of art. The narrow focus is on the implications of Strawson’s suggestion that ‘an appropriate model for non-particulars of these kinds is that of a model particular - (...)
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  • Reverse engineering and cognition panglossian memories?Jonathan Echeverri Álvarez & Liliana Chaves Castaño - 2014 - Ideas Y Valores 63 (155):145-170.
    Daniel C. Dennett ha dedicado una parte considerable de su obra a concebir una aplicación de la ingeniería inversa y el adaptacionismo para explicar la evolución de la mente humana. Dennet considera esta perspectiva como una posibilidad prometedora en el desarrollo de una psicología científica, en contraposición al "materialismo eliminacionista" de la neurociencia. En este artículo se expone una aproximación conceptual y se examina un antecedente filosófico en las discusiones sobre el adaptacionismo en biología y psicología evolutiva: la intencionalidad o (...)
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  • On the Adaptive Advantage of Always Being Right (Even When One is Not).Nathalia L. Gjersoe & Bruce M. Hood - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):521-522.
    We propose another positive illusion that fits with McKay & Dennett's (M&D's) criteria for adaptive misbeliefs. This illusion is pervasive in adult reasoning but we focus on its prevalence in children's developing theories. It is a strongly held conviction arising from normal functioning of the doxastic system that confers adaptive advantage on the individual.
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  • Phenomenology and Fiction in Dennett.David Carr - 1998 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (3):331-344.
    In Consciousness Explained and other works, Daniel Dennett uses the concept of phenomenology (along with his variant, called heterophenomenology) in almost complete disregard of the work of Husserl and his successors in German and French philosophy. Yet it can be argued that many of the most important ideas of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and others (and not just the idea of intentionality) reappear in Dennett's work in only slightly altered form. In this article I try to show this in two ways, first (...)
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  • Artifact and Tool Categorization.Sara Dellantonio, Claudio Mulatti & Remo Job - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):407-418.
    This study addresses the issue of artifact kinds from a psychological and cognitive perspective. The primary interest of the investigation lies in understanding how artifacts are categorized and what are the properties people rely on for their identification. According to a classical philosophical definition artifacts form an autonomous class of instances including all and only those objects that do not exist in nature, but are artificial, in the sense that they are made by an artĭfex. This definition suggests that artifacts (...)
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  • The Proper Function of Artifacts: Intentions, Conventions and Causal Inferences.Sergio E. Chaigneau & Guillermo Puebla - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):391-406.
    Designers’ intentions are important for determining an artifact’s proper function (i.e., its perceived real function). However, there are disagreements regarding why. In one view, people reason causally about artifacts’ functional outcomes, and designers’ intended functions become important to the extent that they allow inferring outcomes. In another view, people use knowledge of designers’ intentions to determine proper functions, but this is unrelated to causal reasoning, having perhaps to do with intentional or social forms of reasoning (e.g., authority). Regarding these latter (...)
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  • Artifact Categorization. Trends and Problems.Massimiliano Carrara & Daria Mingardo - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):351-373.
    The general question (G) How do we categorize artifacts? can be subject to three different readings: an ontological, an epistemic and a semantic one. According to the ontological reading, asking (G) is equivalent to asking in virtue of what properties, if any, a certain artifact is an instance of some artifact kind: (O) What is it for an artifact a to belong to kind K? According to the epistemic reading, when we ask (G) we are investigating what properties of the (...)
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  • The Conceptual Elusiveness of Engineering Functions:: A Philosophical Analysis.Pieter E. Vermaas, Dingmar van Eck & Peter Kroes - 2013 - Philosophy and Technology 26 (2):159-185.
    In this paper, we describe the conceptual elusiveness of the notion of function as used in engineering practice. We argue that it should be accepted as an ambiguous notion, and then review philosophical argumentations in which engineering functions occur in order to identify the consequences of this ambiguity. Function is a key notion in engineering, yet is used by engineers systematically in a variety of meanings. First, we demonstrate that this ambiguous use is rational for engineers by considering the role (...)
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  • Visualizing the Phronetic Organization: The Case of Photographs in CSR Reports. [REVIEW]Hans Rämö - 2011 - Journal of Business Ethics 104 (3):371-387.
    Aspects of phronetic social science and phronetic organization research have been much debated over the recent years. So far, the visual aspects of communicating phronesis have gained little attention. Still organizations try to convey a desirable image of respectability and success, both internally and externally to the public. A channel for such information is corporate reporting, and particularly CSR reporting embrace values like fairness, goodness, and sustainability. This study explores how visual portrayals of supposedly wise and discerning values (phronesis) are (...)
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  • Real Realization: Dennett’s Real Patterns Versus Putnam’s Ubiquitous Automata. [REVIEW]David Joslin - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (1):29-41.
    Both Putnam and Searle have argued that that every abstract automaton is realized by every physical system, a claim that leads to a reductio argument against Cognitivism or Strong AI: if it is possible for a computer to be conscious by virtue of realizing some abstract automaton, then by Putnam’s theorem every physical system also realizes that automaton, and so every physical system is conscious—a conclusion few supporters of Strong AI would be willing to accept. Dennett has suggested a criterion (...)
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  • The Conceptual Elusiveness of Engineering Functions. [REVIEW]Pieter E. Vermaas, Dingmar Eck & Peter Kroes - 2013 - Philosophy and Technology 26 (2):159-185.
    In this paper, we describe the conceptual elusiveness of the notion of function as used in engineering practice. We argue that it should be accepted as an ambiguous notion, and then review philosophical argumentations in which engineering functions occur in order to identify the consequences of this ambiguity. Function is a key notion in engineering, yet is used by engineers systematically in a variety of meanings. First, we demonstrate that this ambiguous use is rational for engineers by considering the role (...)
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  • Adaptationism and Engineering.Tim Lewens - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (1):1-31.
    The rights and wrongs of adaptationism areoften discussed by appeal to what I call theartefact model. Anti-adaptationistscomplain that the use of optimality modelling,reverse engineering and other techniques areindicative of a mistaken and outmoded beliefthat organisms are like well-designedartefacts. Adaptationists (e.g. Dennett 1995)respond with the assertion that viewingorganisms as though they were well designed isa fruitful, perhaps necessary research strategyin evolutionary biology. Anti-adaptationistsare right when they say that techniques likereverse engineering are liable to mislead. This fact does not undermine the artefact (...)
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  • Evolution, Teleology, Intentionality.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):89-391.
    No response that was not as long and intricate as the two commentaries combined could do justice to their details, so what follows will satisfy nobody, myself included. I will concentrate on one issue discussed by both commentators: the relationship between evolution and teleological (or intentional) explanation. My response, in its brevity, may have just one virtue: it will confirm some of the hunches (or should I say suspicions) that these and other writers have entertained about my views. For more (...)
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  • The Mismeasure of Machine: Synthetic Biology and the Trouble with Engineering Metaphors.Maarten Boudry & Massimo Pigliucci - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (4):660-668.
    The scientific study of living organisms is permeated by machine and design metaphors. Genes are thought of as the ‘‘blueprint’’ of an organism, organisms are ‘‘reverse engineered’’ to discover their functionality, and living cells are compared to biochemical factories, complete with assembly lines, transport systems, messenger circuits, etc. Although the notion of design is indispensable to think about adaptations, and engineering analogies have considerable heuristic value (e.g., optimality assumptions), we argue they are limited in several important respects. In particular, the (...)
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  • The Artful Mind Meets Art History: Toward a Psycho-Historical Framework for the Science of Art Appreciation.Nicolas J. Bullot & Rolf Reber - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (2):123-137.
    Research seeking a scientific foundation for the theory of art appreciation has raised controversies at the intersection of the social and cognitive sciences. Though equally relevant to a scientific inquiry into art appreciation, psychological and historical approaches to art developed independently and lack a common core of theoretical principles. Historicists argue that psychological and brain sciences ignore the fact that artworks are artifacts produced and appreciated in the context of unique historical situations and artistic intentions. After revealing flaws in the (...)
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  • Function is Not the Sum of an Object’s Parts.Krista Casler - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (3):300-323.
    Prior research shows adults believe objects exist for specialised purposes. This “one tool, one function” cognitive bias promotes efficient mastery of artefact function but could mean indiv...
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  • Comments on Dennett From a Cautious Ally.Jonathan Bennett - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):381-385.
    In these notes, unadorned page numbers under 350 refer to Dennett (1987) - The Intentional Stance, hereafter referred to as Stance - and ones over 495 refer to Dennett (1988) - mostly to material by him but occasionally to remarks of his critics. Since the notes will focus on disagreements, I should say now that I am in Dennett’s camp and am deeply in debt to his work in the philosophy of mind, which I think is wider, deeper, more various (...)
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  • Educating the Design Stance: Issues of Coherence and Transgression.Norman H. Freeman & Melissa L. Allen - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (2):141 - 142.
    Bullot & Reber (B&R) put forth a design stance to fuse psychological and art historical accounts of visual thinking into a single theory. We argue that this aspect of their proposal needs further fine-tuning. Issues of transgression and coherence are necessary to provide stability to the design stance. We advocate looking to Art Education for such fundamentals of picture understanding.
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  • Patterns and Descriptions.D. E. Bradshaw - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 27 (3):181-202.
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  • Dennett's Intentions and Darwin's Legacy.Jon Ringen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):386-389.
  • Young Children Are Sensitive to How an Object Was Created When Deciding What to Name It.Paul Bloom - 2000 - Cognition 76 (2):91-103.
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  • Common-Law Judicial Reasoning and Analogy.Adam Rigoni - 2014 - Legal Theory 20 (2):133-156.
    Proponents of strict rule-based theories of judicial reasoning in common-law systems have offered a number of criticisms of analogical alternatives. I explain these criticisms and show that at best they apply equally well to rule-based theories. Further, I show how the analogical theories explain a feature of judicial common-law reasoningthat rule-based theories ignore. Finally, I show that reason-based, analogical theories of common-law judicial reasoning, such as those offered by John Horty and Grant Lamond, offer especially strong rejoinders to the rule-theorist (...)
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  • Artefactos y textos: algunas aporías en la "hermenéutica artefactual" de Dennett.Diego Parente - 2008 - Scientiae Studia 6 (3):345-357.
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  • Do We Adopt the Intentional Stance Toward Humanoid Robots?Serena Marchesi, Davide Ghiglino, Francesca Ciardo, Jairo Perez-Osorio, Ebru Baykara & Agnieszka Wykowska - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  • The Role of Historical Intuitions in Children's and Adults' Naming of Artifacts.Grant Gutheil, Paul Bloom, Nohemy Valderrama & Rebecca Freedman - 2004 - Cognition 91 (1):23-42.
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  • The Functional Bias of the Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts Program.Krist Vaesen - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):190-197.
    In 2006, in a special issue of this journal, several authors explored what they called the dual nature of artefacts. The core idea is simple, but attractive: to make sense of an artefact, one needs to consider both its physical nature—its being a material object—and its intentional nature—its being an entity designed to further human ends and needs. The authors construe the intentional component quite narrowly, though: it just refers to the artefact’s function, its being a means to realize a (...)
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  • Realism and Human Kinds.Amie L. Thomasson - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):580–609.
    It is often noted that institutional objects and artifacts depend on human beliefs and intentions and so fail to meet the realist paradigm of mind-independent objects. In this paper I draw out exactly in what ways the thesis of mind-independence fails, and show that it has some surprising consequences. For the specific forms of mind-dependence involved entail that we have certain forms of epistemic privilege with regard to our own institutional and artifactual kinds, protecting us from certain possibilities of ignorance (...)
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  • Why Immortality Alone Will Not Get Me to the Afterlife.K. Mitch Hodge - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):395 - 410.
    Recent research in the cognitive science of religion suggests that humans intuitively believe that others survive death. In response to this finding, three cognitive theories have been offered to explain this: the simulation constraint theory (Bering, 2002); the imaginative obstacle theory (Nichols, 2007); and terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Rothschild, & Abdollahi, 2008). First, I provide a critical analysis of each of these theories. Second, I argue that these theories, while perhaps explaining why one would believe in his own personal immortality, (...)
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  • Species of Emergence.Gregory R. Peterson - 2006 - Zygon 41 (3):689-712.
  • Patterns and Descriptions.Denny E. Bradshaw - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 27 (3):181-202.
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  • Ingeniería inversa y cognición: ¿algunas remembranzas panglossianas?Jonathan Echeverri & Liliana Chaves - 2014 - Ideas Y Valores 63 (155):145-170.
    Daniel C. Dennett ha dedicado una parte considerable de su obra a concebir una aplicación de la ingeniería inversa y el adaptacionismo para explicar la evolución de la mente humana. Dennet considera esta perspectiva como una posibilidad prometedora en el desarrollo de una psicología científica, en contraposición al “materialismo eliminacionista” de la neurociencia. En este artículo se expone una aproximación conceptual y se examina un antecedente filosófico en las discusiones sobre el adaptacionismo en biología y psicología evolutiva: la intencionalidad o (...)
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  • Preliminaries to a Logic of Malfunction.Massimiliano Carrara - 2015 - In Pavel Arazim Michal Dancak (ed.), The Logica Yearbook. College Publications. pp. 33-47.
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  • What Capabilities for the Animal?Dominique Lestel - 2011 - Biosemiotics 4 (1):83-102.