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  1. Embodied Savoir-Faire: Knowledge-How Requires Motor Representations.Neil Levy - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2).
    I argue that the intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which agents have the knowledge-how to \ in virtue of standing in an appropriate relation to a proposition, is only half right. On the composition view defended here, knowledge-how at least typically requires both propositional knowledge and motor representations. Motor representations are not mere dispositions to behavior because they have representational content, and they play a central role in realizing the intelligence in knowledge-how. But since motor representations are not propositional, (...)
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  • Normative Rechnungslegungsforschung im Abseits? Einige wissenschaftstheoretische Anmerkungen.Rolf Uwe Fülbier & Manuel Weller - 2008 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 39 (2):351-382.
    Normative research has nearly vanished from the academic ‘mainstream’ in accounting. Due to its prescriptive and value-driven approach, normative accounting research has been stigmatized as being unscientific and largely replaced by positive studies. We put this stigma into perspective. We first conceptualize the ‘positive-normative’ distinction and identify this dichotomy in accounting research history. We then challenge the dogmatic confinement of science to descriptive (positive) approaches. Moreover, we debate the basic conditions for normative accounting research and conclude that methodological and epistemological (...)
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  • Philosophy, Early Modern Intellectual History, and the History of Philosophy.Michael Edwards - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (1-2):82-95.
    Historians of philosophy are increasingly likely to emphasize the extent to which their work offers a pay‐off for philosophers of un‐historical or anti‐historical inclinations; but this defence is less familiar, and often seems less than self‐evident, to intellectual historians. This article examines this tendency, arguing that such arguments for the instrumental value of historical scholarship in philosophy are often more problematic than they at first appear. Using the relatively familiar case study of René Descartes' reading of his scholastic and Aristotelian (...)
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