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  1. In the Mental Fiction, Mental Fictionalism is Fictitious.T. Parent - 2013 - The Monist 96 (4):605-621.
    Here I explore the prospects for fictionalism about the mental, modeled after fictionalism about possible worlds. Mental fictionalism holds that the mental states posited by folk psychology do not exist, yet that some sentences of folk psychological discourse are true. This is accomplished by construing truths of folk psychology as “truths according to the mentalistic fiction.” After formulating the view, I identify five ways that the view appears self-refuting. Moreover, I argue that this cannot be fixed by semantic ascent or (...)
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  • A Note On Truth, Deflationism And Irrealism.Pierluigi Miraglia - 1995 - Sorites 3:48-63.
    The paper deals with a problem about irrealist doctrines of content, according to which there are no real properties answering to content-attributing expressions. The central claim of the paper is that the distinction between factual and non-factual discourse is independent from particular conceptions of truth, and is thus compatible with a deflationary conception. This claim is sustained by an examination of what I take to be significant aspects of the deflationary conception. I argue therefore directly against Paul Boghossian's paper «The (...)
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  • Saving Eliminativism.Rod Bertolet - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):87-100.
    This paper contests Lynne Rudder Baker's claim to have shown that eliminative materialism is bound to fail on purely conceptual grounds. It is argued that Baker's position depends on knowing that certain developments in science cannot occur, and that we cannot know that this is so. Consequently, the sort of argument Baker provides is question-begging. For similar reasons, the confidence that the proponents of eliminative materialism have in it is misplaced.
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  • How Not to Refute Eliminative Materialism.Kenneth A. Taylor - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):101-125.
    This paper examines and rejects some purported refutations of eliminative materialism in the philosophy of mind: a quasi-transcendental argument due to Jackson and Pettit (1990) to the effect that folk psychology is “peculiarly unlikely” to be radically revised or eliminated in light of the developments of cognitive science and neuroscience; and (b) certain straight-out transcendental arguments to the effect that eliminativism is somehow incoherent (Baker, 1987; Boghossian, 1990). It begins by clarifying the exact topology of the dialectical space in which (...)
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  • The Neurocomputational Mind Meets Normative Epistemology.Kenneth R. Livingston - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):33-59.
    The rapid development of connectionist models in computer science and of powerful computational tools in neuroscience has encouraged eliminativist materialist philosophers to propose specific alternatives to traditional mentalistic theories of mind. One of the problems associated with such a move is that elimination of the mental would seem to remove access to ideas like truth as the foundations of normative epistemology. Thus, a successful elimination of propositional or sentential theories of mind must not only replace them for purposes of our (...)
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  • Unreasonable Cartesian Doubt.David Alexander - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):503-522.
    In this paper I argue that Cartesian skepticism about the external world is self-defeating. The Cartesian skeptic holds that we are not justified in believing claims about the external world on the grounds that we cannot rule out the possibility of our being in a radical skeptical scenario. My argument against this position builds upon a critique of Wilson in Analysis, 72, 668–673. Wilson argues that the Cartesian’s skeptical reasoning commits him to mental state skepticism and that this undermines his (...)
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  • Refuting Eliminative Materialism on the Cheap?Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):306-15.
  • Minimalist Truth: A Critical Notice of Paul Horwich's Truth.Michael Devitt - 1991 - Mind and Language 6 (3):273-283.