In this paper, I study the conceptual origin and objective of the ethical community in Religion within the boundaries of mere reason, with the aim of understanding its role concerning Kant’s theory of radical evil and the highest good and its relationship with the political community. I will first show that radical evil makes the ethical community necessary. Secondly, I will argue that the aim all the members of the ethical community share is the highest good. Third, I will show (...) that the highest social good of Religion is not the highest good of the First Critique. Lastly, I will enumerate some differences between the ethical and the political communities respectively and some conclusions regarding the political analogy. (shrink)

En este trabajo me propongo contribuir a comprender el paralelo ético-jurídico trazado en Religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón. Analizaré las semejanzas, las diferencias y la analogía entre el estado de naturaleza, el exeundum y la comunidad éticos, por un lado, y el estado de naturaleza, el exeundum y la comunidad jurídico-políticos, por el otro. Argumentaré que el progreso moral, entendido como superación del mal radical, requiere un complemento entre el dominio ético y el jurídico-político, dado que (...) cada dominio aporta un abordaje y una solución comunitaria diferente dentro de la misma esfera pública. (shrink)

This paper explores the implications of Manfred Kuehn’s observation that Kant’s claim in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason that the ethical community must be a community under God seems “a bit strained.” After clarifying Kant’s train of thought that results in his conception of the ethical community in the form of the “visible church,” the paper argues that the seemingly strong religious dimension may be misleading. If we understand the ethical community to be the development of the kingdom (...) of ends in the Groundwork, it becomes apparent that Kant’s notion of God’s “sovereignty” over the ethical community is a shared sovereignty lodged in rationality and not in God’s own will. The “strain” that Kuehn senses thus suggests the potentially gratuitous nature of Kant’s references to God’s sovereignty over the ethical community. Despite the initial appearances, Kant’s account of the ethical community in the form of the visible church is, over the long term, closer to a secularizing move than to a robustly religious one. (shrink)

Kant frequently employs the German term Bestimmung in his mature work, and depending on context, this term can signify the Latin determinatio, vocatio, or destinatio. These three senses of Bestimmung are interconnected within Kant’s system of moral teleology. Bestimmung as determination expresses our wills as formed and regulated by the moral law, via the categorical imperative. Bestimmung as vocation guides us toward a determination of willing by rational principles based on the moral law, and this “call” is inseparable from our (...) capacity to will and act autonomously under phenomenal and historical conditions. Bestimmung as “destination” conveys the ends toward which moral cultivation is directed, both individually and collectively. Understanding the three integrated uses of Bestimmung provides a clearer picture of the scope of Kantian ethics encapsulating the long-term goals toward which we are directed individually, as members of communities, and as human beings. (shrink)

Review of: Wood, Allen W., Kant and Religion, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 2020, 250 pp. ISBN: 978-0521799980.