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  1. Adaptación y función - El papel de los conceptos funcionales en la teoría de la selección natural darwiniana.Santiago Ginnobili - 2009 - Ludus Vitalis 17 (31):3-24.
    La discusión acerca de funciones es de larga data en filosofía. Normalmente se describe a la revolución científica del siglo XVII como eliminando las causas finales y la teleología de la física. Sin embargo, el lenguaje funcional cumple un papel central en ciertas áreas de la práctica biológica. Esto ha llevado a muchos filósofos a intentar elucidar el concepto de función, en algunos casos para defender la relevancia de estos usos, en otros para mostrar que se trata de meras formas (...)
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  • Die Tripelstruktur der Begriffe.W. Balzer & V. Kuznetsov - 2010 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 41 (1):21 - 43.
    Wir stellen ein präzises Modell der wissenschaftlichen Begriffs-theorie vor, in dem die Beschreibungs-, die Wirklichkeits- und die mengentheoretische Ebene verknüpft werden. Einerseits wird ein allgemeiner Rahmen für die Gesamtheit der Begriffe, andererseits die „lokale” Struktur eines Begriffs beschrieben. Wir spezialisieren diesen Rahmen auf wissenschaftliche Begriffe, wissenschaftliche Theorien, und auf die zugehörigen strukturalistischen, wissenschaftstheoretischen Konstruktionen. We introduce a precise model for the theory of concepts in philosophy of science. In this model we connect the level of description, the level of reality (...)
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  • Who Got What Wrong? Fodor and Piattelli on Darwin: Guiding Principles and Explanatory Models in Natural Selection. [REVIEW]José Díez & Pablo Lorenzano - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):1143-1175.
    The purpose of this paper is to defend, contra Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini (F&PP), that the theory of natural selection (NS) is a perfectly bona fide empirical unified explanatory theory. F&PP claim there is nothing non-truistic, counterfactual-supporting, of an “adaptive” character and common to different explanations of trait evolution. In his debate with Fodor, and in other works, Sober defends NS but claims that, compared with classical mechanics (CM) and other standard theories, NS is peculiar in that its explanatory models are (...)
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  • Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of Genetics.Pablo Lorenzano - 2000 - In Joseph D. Sneed, Wolfgang Balzer & C.-Ulises Moulines (eds.), Structuralist Knowledge Representation: Paradigmatic Examples. Rodopi. pp. 75-251.
    This article presents a reconstruction of the so-called classical, formal or Mendelian genetics, which is intended to be more complete and adequate than existing reconstructions. This reconstruction has been carried out with the instruments, duly modified and extended with respect to the case under consideration, of the structuralist conception of theories. The so-called Mendel’s Laws, as well as linkage genetics and gene mapping are formulated in a precise manner while the global structure of genetics is represented as a theory-net. These (...)
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  • The Epistemology of Measurement: A Model-Based Account.Eran Tal - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    This work develops an epistemology of measurement, that is, an account of the conditions under which measurement and standardization methods produce knowledge as well as the nature, scope, and limits of this knowledge. I focus on three questions: (i) how is it possible to tell whether an instrument measures the quantity it is intended to? (ii) what do claims to measurement accuracy amount to, and how might such claims be justified? (iii) when is disagreement among instruments a sign of error, (...)
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  • Lo a priori constitutivo en la ciencia y las leyes (y teorías) científicas.Pablo Lorenzano - 2008 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 33 (2):21-48.
    The aim of the present paper is to contribute to the discussion on the constitutive a priori in science by linking it with the discussion on scientific laws and theories, in such a way to show how the different senses of the notion of constitutive a priori are not incompatible to each other and that they can be precised in a unified, though differentiated, manner.
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  • Individuating Quantities.Eran Tal - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):853-878.
    When discrepancies are discovered between the outcomes of different measurement procedures, two sorts of explanation are open to scientists. Either some of the outcomes are inaccurate or the procedures are not measuring the same quantity. I argue that, due to the possibility of systematic error, the choice between and is underdetermined in principle by any possible evidence. Consequently, foundationalist criteria of quantity individuation are either empty or circular. I propose a coherentist, model-based account of measurement that avoids the underdetermination problem, (...)
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  • An Internal Answer to the Experimenters’ Regress Through the Analysis of the Semantics of Experimental Results and Their Representational Content.Romina Zuppone - 2017 - Perspectives on Science 25 (1):95-123.
    Despite the fact that reproduction of experiments by peers has traditionally been regarded as of the utmost importance in enabling the intersubjectivity of scientific practice, reproductions may yield discordant results and deciding which result should be favored may not be an easy task. According to Harry Collins, experimental disagreement is resolved by the action of social, political and economic factors, but not by means of epistemic and scientific, or so-called internal reasons. His motivation for such a claim is the presence (...)
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  • Falsificationism and the Structure of Theories: The Popper–Kuhn Controversy About the Rationality of Normal Science.Jose Díez - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (3):543-554.
    Many controversies within philosophy of science have been attempted to be explained in terms of the metaphilosophical prescription/description distinction over the goal of philosophy of science. The aim of this paper is to show that the controversy between Popper and Kuhn about the ir/rationality of Normal Science cannot be fully explained in these terms, not even if we also take the truth/problem-solving distinction over the goal of science into account. It is argued that, to gain full understanding of this controversy, (...)
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  • Scientific W-Explanation as Ampliative, Specialized Embedding: A Neo-Hempelian Account.José Díez - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S8):1413-1443.
    The goal of this paper is to present and defend an empiricist, neo-Hempelian account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding. The proposal aims to preserve what I take to be the core of Hempel’s empiricist account, by weakening it in some respects and strengthening it in others, introducing two new conditions that solve most of Hempel’s problems without abandoning his empiricist strictures. According to this proposal, to explain a phenomenon is to make it expectable by introducing new conceptual/ontological machinery (...)
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  • Are Natural Selection Explanatory Models a Priori?José Díez & Pablo Lorenzano - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (6):787-809.
    The epistemic status of Natural Selection has seemed intriguing to biologists and philosophers since the very beginning of the theory to our present times. One prominent contemporary example is Elliott Sober, who claims that NS, and some other theories in biology, and maybe in economics, are peculiar in including explanatory models/conditionals that are a priori in a sense in which explanatory models/conditionals in Classical Mechanics and most other standard theories are not. Sober’s argument focuses on some “would promote” sentences that (...)
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