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  1. The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 2.Keith DeRose - 2017 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Keith DeRose presents, develops, and defends original solutions to two of the stickiest problems in epistemology: skeptical hypotheses and the lottery problem. He deploys a powerful version of contextualism, the view that the epistemic standards for the attribution of knowledge vary with context.
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  • On the Knowability of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. Montminy and W. Skolits.Wolfgang Freitag - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):335-342.
    It has been frequently suggested that epistemic contextualists violate the knowledge norm of assertion; by its own lights contextualism cannot be known and hence not be knowingly stated. I have defended contextualists against this objection by showing that it rests on a misunderstanding of their commitments. In M. Montminy's and W. Skolits' recent contribution to this journal, their criticism of my solution forms the background against which the authors develop their own. The present reply ventures to demonstrate that their objections (...)
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  • Epistemic Contextualism: An Inconsistent Account for the Semantics of “Know”?Stefano Leardi & Nicla Vassallo - forthcoming - In Henning Christiansen, Isidora Stojanovic & George A. Papadopoulos (eds.), Modeling and Using Context. 9th International and Interdisciplinary Conference, Context 2015. Springer. pp. 302-315.
    The contextualistic account for the semantic behaviour of the term “know” - a position labelled as “epistemic contextualism” - combined with the widely accepted idea that “know” is a factive verb seems to lead to a very unpleasant conclusion: epistemic contextualism is inconsistent. In section 1 we first examine some aspects of the epistemological meaning of the contextualist semantics of “know”, then in section 2 we sketch the problem which leads to the supposed inconsistency of epistemic contextualism and in section (...)
     
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