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  1. Institutional Investors, Political Connections, and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud.Wenfeng Wu, Sofia A. Johan & Oliver M. Rui - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 134 (4):709-726.
    We investigate two under-explored factors in mitigating the risk of corporate fraud and regulatory enforcement against fraud, namely institutional investors and political connections. The role of institutional investors in the effective monitoring of a firm’s management is well established in the literature. We further observe that firms that have a large proportion of their shares held by institutional investors have a lower incidence of enforcement actions against corporate fraud. The importance of political connections for enterprises, whether in a developed market (...)
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  • Mutual Fund Activism and Market Regulation During the Pre-IFRS Period: The Case of Earnings Informativeness in China From an Ethical Perspective.Shujun Ding, Chunxin Jia & Zhenyu Wu - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 138 (4):765-785.
    This paper investigates the emerging effect of mutual fund involvement on the agency problem between majority and minority shareholders during the pre-IFRS period in China indicated by earnings informativeness from an ethical perspective. We find that the presence of mutual fund hampers earnings informativeness implying that mutual funds in general, at their early stage in China, are not yet capable of serving as an effective monitor. This finding is in sharp contrast to the role of institutional investors in mature markets (...)
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  • The Role of Corruption, Culture, and Law in Investment Fund Manager Fees.Sofia A. Johan & Dorra Najar - 2010 - Journal of Business Ethics 95 (S2):147 - 172.
    This article considers an international sample of venture capital and private equity funds to assess the role of law, corruption, and culture in setting fund manager fees. With better legal conditions, fixed fees are lower, carried interest fees are higher, clawbacks are less likely, and share distributions are more likely. Countries with lower levels of corruption have lower fixed fees and higher performance fees, and are less likely to have clawbacks and cash-only distributions. Hofstede's measure of power distance is negatively (...)
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  • Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China.Martin J. Conyon & Lerong He - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 134 (4):669-691.
    This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We document a significantly negative correlation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud using data on publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2010. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms penalize CEOs for fraud by lowering their pay. We also find that CEO compensation is lower in firms that commit more severe frauds. Panel data fixed effects and propensity score methods are used to demonstrate these effects. (...)
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  • The Effectiveness of Public Enforcement: Evidence From the Resolution of Tunneling in China.Lars Helge Haß, Sofia Johan & Maximilian André Müller - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 134 (4):649-668.
    This paper examines the effectiveness of public enforcement by studying the effects of regulatory intervention to curb tunneling through intercorporate loans in China. Specifically, we explore whether public enforcement efforts in 2006 resulted in less tunneling, and ultimately in increased performance for tunneling firms. We show that tunneling is among the dominant factors increasing the likelihood of becoming blacklisted. We also find that firms’ tunneling mechanisms decreased significantly after the regulatory shock, and that their performance increased significantly compared to non-tunneling (...)
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  • Player and Referee Roles Held Jointly: The Effect of State Ownership on China’s Regulatory Enforcement Against Fraud.Wenxuan Hou & Geoff Moore - 2010 - Journal of Business Ethics 95 (S2):317-335.
    This article examines the impact of the prevailing state ownership in the Chinese stock market on corporate governance and the financial regulatory system, respectively, as the internal and external monitoring mechanisms to deter corporate fraud and protect investors. In line with the literature that state ownership exaggerates the agency problem, we find that the retained state ownership in privatised firms increases the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud. For the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), however, larger state ownership is associated with a (...)
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  • Family Ownership and Corporate Misconduct in U.S. Small Firms.Shujun Ding & Zhenyu Wu - 2014 - Journal of Business Ethics 123 (2):183-195.