Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Consciousness: Individuated Information in Action.J. Jonkisz - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness – the main aim of this article –into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system), and useful in action (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Two Senses for 'Givenness of Consciousness'.Dorothée Legrand - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):89-94.
    The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree, however about (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Perceiving Subjectivity in Bodily Movement: The Case of Dancers. [REVIEW]Dorothée Legrand & Susanne Ravn - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):389-408.
    This paper is about one of the puzzles of bodily self-consciousness: can an experience be both and at the same time an experience of one′s physicality and of one′s subjectivity ? We will answer this question positively by determining a form of experience where the body′s physicality is experienced in a non-reifying manner. We will consider a form of experience of oneself as bodily which is different from both “prenoetic embodiment” and “pre-reflective bodily consciousness” and rather corresponds to a form (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Selves: Subpersonal, Immersed, and Participating.Christian Coseru - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):1083-1088.
    This book marks the beginning of a new phase in the philosophical investigation of classical and contemporary accounts of the self: canonical boundaries have been crossed and doctrinal justification abandoned in favor of a cosmopolitan ideal of syncretic, theoretically perspicuous, and historically informed systematic reflection. That such reflection bears on so central a concept as the self is only fitting given its implications for a broad range of questions concerning agency, the mind-body problem, and self-knowledge that are now pursued across (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Missing Pieces in the Scientific Study of Bodily Awareness.Kühle Lana - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (5):571-593.
    Research on bodily awareness has focused on body illusions with an aim to explore the possible dissociation of our bodily awareness from our own body. It has provided insights into how our sensory modalities shape our sense of embodiment, and it has raised important questions regarding the malleability of our sense of ownership over our own body. The issue, however, is that this research fails to consider an important distinction in how we experience our body. There are indeed two ways (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Personal Identity and Cosmopolitan Philosophy.Christian Coseru - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (7):1749-1760.
    Jonardon Ganeri’s The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance is a trailblazing study in cross-cultural philosophy of mind. Its liberal conception of naturalism makes room for a rich analytic taxonomy of conceptions of personal identity that go well beyond the standard models of Cartesianism, Physicalism, and Reductionism. But this naturalistically respectable model of the self must contend with the fact that the findings of the cognitive sciences are also compatible with ontological antirealism about the self. And while the book (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • I Move, Therefore I Am: A New Theoretical Framework to Investigate Agency and Ownership.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):411-424.
    The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology and philosophy. We provide a new systematic account of two of its main features, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, demonstrating that although both features appear as phenomenally uniform, they each in fact are complex crossmodal phenomena of largely heterogeneous functional and representational levels. These levels can be arranged within a gradually (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • William James and the Embodied Mind.Lana Kühle - 2017 - Contemporary Pragmatism 14 (1):51-75.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • If Waking and Dreaming Consciousness Became de-Differentiated, Would Schizophrenia Result?Sue Llewellyn - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1059-1083.
    If both waking and dreaming consciousness are functional, their de-differentiation would be doubly detrimental. Differentiation between waking and dreaming is achieved through neuromodulation. During dreaming, without external sensory data and with mesolimbic dopaminergic input, hyper-cholinergic input almost totally suppresses the aminergic system. During waking, with sensory gates open, aminergic modulation inhibits cholinergic and mesocortical dopaminergic suppresses mesolimbic. These neuromodulatory systems are reciprocally interactive and self-organizing. As a consequence of neuromodulatory reciprocity, phenomenologically, the self and the world that appear during dreaming (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Book Review of Lawrence Shapiro's Embodied Cognition. [REVIEW]Kristian Martiny - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):297-305.
  • Effects of Ownership Expressed by the First-Person Possessive Pronoun.Zhan Shi, Aibao Zhou, Wei Han & Peiru Liu - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):951-955.
    The present study examined the behavioral effects of the first-person possessive pronoun. In each trial, a noun was presented to participants after visual presentation of a possessive pronoun “wo de” or “ta de” , which formed ownership. Half participants were assigned to contextual encoding condition in which they were required to judge whether they liked the item expressed by a noun from the first or third-person perspective. The rest were assigned to perceptual encoding condition in which they were asked to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Body and Self in Dolphins.Louis M. Herman - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):526-545.
    In keeping with recent views of consciousness of self as represented in the body in action, empirical studies are reviewed that demonstrate a bottlenose dolphin’s conscious awareness of its own body and body parts, implying a representational “body image” system. Additional work reviewed demonstrates an advanced capability of dolphins for motor imitation of self-produced behaviors and of behaviors of others, including imitation of human actions, supporting hypotheses that dolphins have a sense of agency and ownership of their actions and may (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Naturalizing the Acting Self: Subjective Vs. Anonymous Agency.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):457 – 478.
    This paper considers critically the enterprise of naturalizing the subjective experience of acting intentionally. I specifically expose the limits of the model that conceives of agency as composed of two stages. The first stage consists in experiencing an anonymous intention without being conscious of it as anybody's in particular. The second stage disambiguates this anonymous experience thanks to a mechanism of identification and attribution answering the question: "who is intending to act?" On the basis of phenomenological, clinical, methodological and empirical (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Iris van Rooij, Christina Behme, Liane Gabora & Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):659 – 680.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Progressive Embodiment Within Cyberspace: Considering the Psychological Impact of the Supermorphic Persona.Garry Young & Monica Whitty - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (4):537 - 560.
    This paper is premised on the idea that cyberspace permits the user a degree of somatic flexibility?a means of transcending the physical body but not, importantly, embodiment. Set within a framework of progressive embodiment (the assumption that individuals seek to exploit somatic flexibility so as to extend the boundaries of their own embodiment?what we call the supermorphic persona), we examine the manner of this progression. Specifically, to what extent do components of embodiment?the self-as-object, the phenomenal self, and the body-schema?find authentic (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark