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John M. Doris (2009). Skepticism About Persons.

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  1.  3
    Simplicity and the Meaning of Mental Association.Mike Dacey - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Some thoughts just come to mind together. This is usually thought to happen because they are connected by associations, which the mind follows. Such an explanation assumes that there is a particular kind of simple psychological process responsible. This view has encountered criticism recently. In response, this paper aims to characterize a general understanding of associative simplicity, which might support the distinction between associative processing and alternatives. I argue that there are two kinds of simplicity that are treated as characteristic (...)
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  2.  11
    The Tangled Web of Agency.Alain Pe-Curto, Julien A. Deonna & David Sander - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
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  3.  34
    Defining Agency After Implicit Bias.Alderson Naomi - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (5):645-656.
    Recent findings in empirical psychology show that implicit biases can affect behavior in ways that are difficult to control deliberatively. Doris argues that findings like these constitute a threat to agency, if agency is defined as the ability to reflectively, deliberatively direct one’s actions. I argue, however, that implicit biases pose no fundamental threat to agency since they can be brought under indirect deliberative control, whereby deliberative, reflective actions put in place automatic processes that automatically inhibit unwanted biases. Since automatic (...)
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  4. Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Moral Consequence of Consistency.Jason D'Cruz - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):467-484.
    Situationists such as John Doris, Gilbert Harman, and Maria Merritt suppose that appeal to reliable behavioral dispositions can be dispensed with without radical revision to morality as we know it. This paper challenges this supposition, arguing that abandoning hope in reliable dispositions rules out genuine trust and forces us to suspend core reactive attitudes of gratitude and resentment, esteem and indignation. By examining situationism through the lens of trust we learn something about situationism (in particular, the radically revisionary moral implications (...)
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  5.  28
    Performance, Self-Explanation, and Agency.Ron Mallon - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2777-2798.
    Social constructionist explanations of human thought and behavior hold that our representations produce and regulate the categories, thoughts, and behaviors of those they represent. Performative versions of constructionist accounts explain these thoughts and behaviors as part of an intentional, strategic performance that is elicited and regulated by our representations of ourselves. This paper has four aims. First, I sketch a causal model of performative social constructionist claims. Second, I articulate a puzzling feature of performative claims that makes them seem especially (...)
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  6.  28
    Automatic Behavior and Moral Agency: Defending the Concept of Personhood From Empirically Based Skepticism.C. D. Meyers - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (2):193-209.
    Empirical evidence indicates that much of human behavior is unconscious and automatic. This has led some philosophers to be skeptical of responsible agency or personhood in the moral sense. I present two arguments defending agency from these skeptical concerns. My first argument, the “margin of error” argument, is that the empirical evidence is consistent with the possibility that our automatic behavior deviates only slightly from what we would do if we were in full conscious control. Responsible agency requires only that (...)
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  7.  55
    Situationism, Going Mental, and Modal Akrasia.Dylan Murray - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):711-736.
    Virtue ethics prescribes cultivating global and behaviorally efficacious character traits, but John Doris and others argue that situationist social psychology shows this to be infeasible. Here, I show how certain versions of virtue ethics that ‘go mental’ can withstand this challenge as well as Doris’ further objections. The defense turns on an account of which psychological materials constitute character traits and which the situationist research shows to be problematically variable. Many situationist results may be driven by impulsive akrasia produced by (...)
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    Response to Open Peer Commentaries on “Ban the Sunset? Nonpropositional Content and Regulation of Pharmaceutical Advertising”.Paul Biegler & Patrick Vargas - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (5):W1 - W5.
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  9. Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism.Joshua May - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):341-359.
    Moral skeptics maintain that we do not have moral knowledge. Traditionally they haven’t argued via skeptical hypotheses like those provided by perceptual skeptics about the external world, such as Descartes’ deceiving demon. But some believe this can be done by appealing to hypotheses like moral nihilism. Moreover, some claim that skeptical hypotheses have special force in the moral case. But I argue that skeptics have failed to specify an adequate skeptical scenario, which reveals a general lesson: such arguments are not (...)
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  10.  44
    In Defense of Reflection.Valerie Tiberius - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):223-243.
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  11. Character, Attitude and Disposition.Jonathan Webber - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):1082-1096.
    Recent debate over the empirical psychological presuppositions of virtue ethics has focused on reactive behavioural dispositions. But there are many character traits that cannot be understood properly in this way. Such traits are well described by attitude psychology. Moreover, the findings of attitude psychology support virtue ethics in three ways. First, they confirm the role of habituation in the development of character. Further, they show virtue ethics to be compatible with the situation manipulation experiments at the heart of the recent (...)
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  12. The Role of Practical Reason in an Empirically Informed Moral Theory.Lorraine Besser-Jones - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):203-220.
    Empirical research paints a dismal portrayal of the role of reason in morality. It suggests that reason plays no substantive role in how we make moral judgments or are motivated to act on them. This paper explores how it is that an empirically oriented philosopher, committed to methodological naturalism, ought to respond to the skeptical challenge presented by this research. While many think taking this challenge seriously requires revising, sometimes dramatically, how we think about moral agency, this paper will defend (...)
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  13. Extended Cognition, Personal Responsibility, and Relational Autonomy.Mason Cash - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):645-671.
    The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC)—that many cognitive processes are carried out by a hybrid coalition of neural, bodily and environmental factors—entails that the intentional states that are reasons for action might best be ascribed to wider entities of which individual persons are only parts. I look at different kinds of extended cognition and agency, exploring their consequences for concerns about the moral agency and personal responsibility of such extended entities. Can extended entities be moral agents and bear responsibility for (...)
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  14. Heated Agreement: Lack of Character as Being for the Good.John M. Doris - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):135-146.
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