Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Desire-Satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal.Dale Dorsey - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):151-171.
    Welfare is at least occasionally a temporal phenomenon: welfare benefits befall me at certain times. But this fact seems to present a problem for a desire-satisfaction view. Assume that I desire, at 10am, January 12th, 2010, to climb Mount Everest sometime during 2012. Also assume, however, that during 2011, my desires undergo a shift: I no longer desire to climb Mount Everest during 2012. In fact, I develop an aversion to so doing. Imagine, however, that despite my aversion, I am (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Adaptation, Autonomy, and Authority.Dale Dorsey - 2013 - In Juha Räikkä & Jukka Varelius (eds.), Adaptation and Autonomy: Adaptive Preferences in Enhancing and Ending Life. Springer. pp. 27--47.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Subjectivism Without Desire.D. Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):407-442.
    Subjectivism about well-being holds that ϕ is intrinsically good for x if and only if, and to the extent that, ϕ is valued, under the proper conditions, by x. Given this statement of the view, there is room for intramural dissent among subjectivists. One important source of dispute is the phrase “under the proper conditions”: Should the proper conditions of valuing be actual or idealized? What sort of idealization is appropriate? And so forth. Though these concerns are of the first (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • The Reversal Test, Status Quo Bias, and Opposition to Human Cognitive Enhancement.Steve Clarke - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):369-386.
    Bostrom and Ord’s reversal test has been appealed to by many philosophers to substantiate the charge that preferences for status quo options are motivated by status quo bias. I argue that their characterization of the reversal test needs to be modified, and that their description of the burden of proof it imposes needs to be clarified. I then argue that there is a way to meet that burden of proof which Bostrom and Ord fail to recognize. I also argue that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Adaptive Preferences: Merging Political Accounts and Well-Being Accounts.Rosa Terlazzo - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):179-196.
    Accounts of adaptive preferences are of two kinds: well-being accounts fully theorized for their own sake and political accounts theorized to facilitate the political project of reducing oppression and marginalization. Given their practical role, the latter are often less fully theorized, and are therefore less robust to theoretical criticism. In this paper, I first draw on well-being accounts to identify the well-theorized elements that political accounts should want to adopt in order to strengthen their project and avoid common criticisms. Second, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Status Quo Bias, Rationality, and Conservatism About Value.Jacob M. Nebel - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):449-476.
    Many economists and philosophers assume that status quo bias is necessarily irrational. I argue that, in some cases, status quo bias is fully rational. I discuss the rationality of status quo bias on both subjective and objective theories of the rationality of preferences. I argue that subjective theories cannot plausibly condemn this bias as irrational. I then discuss one kind of objective theory, which holds that a conservative bias toward existing things of value is rational. This account can fruitfully explain (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Against Welfare Subjectivism.Eden Lin - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):354-377.
    Subjectivism about welfare is the view that something is basically good for you if and only if, and to the extent that, you have the right kind of favorable attitude toward it under the right conditions. I make a presumptive case for the falsity of subjectivism by arguing against nearly every extant version of the view. My arguments share a common theme: theories of welfare should be tested for what they imply about newborn infants. Even if a theory is intended (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Adaptive Preferences Are a Red Herring.Dale Dorsey - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (4):465-484.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Still Lives for Headaches: A Reply to Dorsey and Voorhoeve.Julius Schönherr - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (2):209-218.
    There is no large number of very small bads that is worse than a small number of very large bads – or so, some maintain, it seems plausible to say. In this article, I criticize and reject two recently proposed vindications of the above intuition put forth by Dale Dorsey and Alex Voorhoeve. Dorsey advocates for a threshold marked by the interference with a person's global life projects: any bad that interferes with the satisfaction of a life project is worse (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation