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Principal Values and Weak Expectations

Mind 123 (490):517-531 (2014)

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  1. Unexpected Expectations.Alan Hájek - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):533-567.
    A decade ago, Harris Nover and I introduced the Pasadena game, which we argued gives rise to a new paradox in decision theory even more troubling than the St Petersburg paradox. Gwiazda's and Smith's articles in this volume both offer revisionist solutions. I critically engage with both articles. They invite reflections on a number of deep issues in the foundations of decision theory, which I hope to bring out. These issues include: some ways in which orthodox decision theory might be (...)
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  • Decision Theory Without Finite Standard Expected Value.Luc Lauwers & Peter Vallentyne - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-25.