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  1. Contenido Perceptual, Conceptos y Conciencia Fenoménica.Francisco Pereira Gandarillas - 2011 - Análisis Filosófico 31 (2):165-192.
    Algunos defensores del conceptualismo perceptual intentan bloquear el argumento noconceptualista de la riqueza de contenido afirmando que no hay percepción consciente sin atención. Para justificar esta afirmación los conceptualistas normalmente apelan a experimentos psicológicos, tales como la ceguera al cambio y la ceguera inatencional. En este artículo argumentaré que esta estrategia es insuficiente. Además sostendré, en base a recientes consideraciones teóricas y empíricas, que hay buenas razones para pensar que probablemente hay una forma de conciencia fenoménica visual más allá de (...)
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  • Seeing the Other’s Mind: McDowell and Husserl on Bodily Expressivity and the Problem of Other Minds.Zhida Luo - forthcoming - Human Studies:1-19.
    McDowell motivates a disjunctive conception of experience in the context of other-minds skepticism, but his conception of other minds has been less frequently discussed. In this paper, I focus on McDowell’s perceptual account of others that emphasizes the primitivity of others’ bodily expressivity and his defense of a common-sense understanding of others. And I suggest that Husserl’s subtle analysis of bodily expressivity not only bears fundamental similarities with McDowell’s but also helps to demonstrate the sense in which McDowell’s emphasis on (...)
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  • Experience and Justification: Revisiting McDowell’s Empiricism.Daniel Kalpokas - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):715-738.
    In this paper I try to defend McDowell’s empiricism from a certain objection made by Davidson, Stroud and Glüer. The objection states that experiences cannot be reasons because they are—as McDowell conceives them—inert. I argue that, even though there is something correct in the objection, that is not sufficient for rejecting the epistemological character that McDowell attributes to experiences. My strategy consists basically in showing that experiences involve a constitutive attitude of acceptance of their contents.
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  • Is Perception a Source of Reasons?Santiago Echeverri - 2013 - Theoria 79 (1):22-56.
    It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is trivially true: even if one characterizes perception in purely causal terms, perceptual beliefs originate from the mind's interaction with the world. When philosophers argue for (SR), however, they have a stronger view in mind: they claim that perception provides pre- or non-doxastic reasons for belief. In this article I examine some ways of developing this view and criticize them. (...)
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