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  1. On the Difference Between Realistic and Fantastic Imagining.Christopher Gauker - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1563-1582.
    When we imaginatively picture what might happen, we may take what we imagine to be either realistic or fantastic. A wine glass falling to the floor and shattering is realistic. A wine glass falling and morphing into a bird and flying away is fantastic. What does the distinction consist in? Two important necessary conditions are here defined. The first is a condition on the realistic representation of spatial configuration, grounded in an account of the imagistic representation of spatial configuration. The (...)
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  • Beyond the Icon: Core Cognition and the Bounds of Perception.Sam Clarke - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (1):94-113.
    This paper refines a controversial proposal: that core systems belong to a perceptual kind, marked out by the format of its representational outputs. Following Susan Carey, this proposal has been understood in terms of core representations having an iconic format, like certain paradigmatically perceptual outputs. I argue that they don’t, but suggest that the proposal may be better formulated in terms of a broader analogue format type. Formulated in this way, the proposal accommodates the existence of genuine icons in perception, (...)
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  • Object Individuation by Iconic Content: How is Numerosity Represented in Iconic Representation?Athanasios Raftopoulos - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1):42-70.
    : Fodor argues that perceptual representations are a subset of iconic representations, which are distinguished from symbolic/discursive representations. Iconic representations are nonconceptual and they do not support the abilities afforded by concepts. Iconic representations, for example, cannot support object individuation. If someone thinks that perception or some of its parts has imagistic NCC, they face the following dilemma. Either they will have to accept that this NCC does not allow for object individuation, but it represents instead conglomerations of properties and (...)
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