Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Two Fallacies in Proofs of the Liar Paradox.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):947-966.
    At some step in proving the Liar Paradox in natural language, a sentence is derived that seems overdetermined with respect to its semantic value. This is complemented by Tarski’s Theorem that a formal language cannot consistently contain a naive truth predicate given the laws of logic used in proving the Liar paradox. I argue that proofs of the Eubulidean Liar either use a principle of truth with non-canonical names in a fallacious way or make a fallacious use of substitution of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • In Search of Modal Hypodoxes using Paradox Hypodox Duality.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (5):2457-2476.
    The concept of hypodox is dual to the concept of paradox. Whereas a paradox is incompatibly overdetermined, a hypodox is underdetermined. Indeed, many particular paradoxes have dual hypodoxes. So, naively the dual of Russell’s Paradox is whether the set of all sets that are members of themselves is self-membered. The dual of the Liar Paradox is the Truth-teller, and a hypodoxical dual of the Heterological paradox is whether ‘autological’ is autological. I provide some analysis of the duality and I search (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark