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  1. Independent Collective Identity Functions as Voting Rules.José Carlos R. Alcantud & Annick Laruelle - 2020 - Theory and Decision 89 (1):107-119.
    In this paper we study collective identity functions that deal with formation of clubs. Usually the choice offered to individuals is to cast a vote in favor of qualification or not, and the final outcome is qualification or non-qualification. In this context we show that independent collective identity functions are naturally characterized by voting rules, and in particular, consent rules can be represented by one single collection of weighted majorities. In addition, we consider the extended model where voters are allowed (...)
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  • The Possibility of Arrovian Social Choice with the Process of Nomination.Yukinori Iwata - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (4):535-552.
    In this paper, we introduce an Arrovian social choice framework with the process of nomination. We consider a two-stage social choice procedure in which some alternatives are first nominated by aggregating the opinions of nominators, and then the society makes a collective choice from the nominated alternatives by aggregating the preferences of voters. Each nominator’s opinion is a positive, negative, or neutral view as to whether each alternative deserves to be eligible for collective decision making. If a voter is a (...)
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