The Stoics, who advocated the extirpation of the passions, the sufficiency of virtue for happiness, and the equality of sins, embodied their radical doctrines in the figure of the sage, provoking both ancient and modern critics of Stoicism to dismiss this exemplar as an impracticable and unappealing ideal. This paper attempts to add depth and richness to an understanding of the sage by highlighting the sage's more human qualities and by examining how the Stoics’ idealized paradigm derives from, or maps (...) onto, the figure of Socrates, with special attention paid to the iconic philosopher's characteristic irony and erotic playfulness. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 3, Page 768-776, May 2022.

When we think about Kantian virtue, what often comes to mind is the notion of respect. Respect is due to all persons merely in virtue of their status as rational agents. Indeed, on the Kantian view, specific virtues, such as duties of beneficence, gratitude, or self-perfection, are so many ways of respecting persons as free rational agents. To preserve and promote rational agency, to protect individuals from threats against rational agency, i.e., to respect persons, is at the core of virtue. (...) No doubt, part of the appeal of the Kantian notion of respect is that it offers an intuitive way of talking about the wrongness of manipulation and coercion, and in general, the wrongness of unfairly taking advantage of another. For to respect persons is to take seriously their status as persons, and to forswear, at some level, actions and attitudes that would compromise their dignity. Talking about respect has become shorthand for signaling deontological concerns. More formally, within recent Kantian exegesis, respect is viewed as yielding a more accessible and less contrived account of the Categorical Imperative than the more traditional criterion of universalizability and the contradictions tests applied to it. Within the Kantianinspired political theory of John Rawls, respect is also a core notion, representing a pervasive good, the bases of which, just states have an obligation to distribute to their members. Yet, for all its appeal, respect is an odd feature of Kantian ethics. For it is an emotion in a theory that prides itself in grounding morality in principles of reason alone. In this essay, I draw attention to the importance of respect in Kant's account in order to show just how he makes room for the emotions. Indeed, I shall argue that on Kant's account of full moral agency, we are emotional as well as rational creatures. Although Kant often portrays respect as an abstract emotional attitude mysteriously connected to our rationality, I argue that on a suitable revision, respect can be transformed into a more concrete attitude, cultivated and expressed alongside other emotions requisite for full virtue. (shrink)

This paper argues that Synesios’ De regno is a mirror for princes and a splendid example of Neoplatonic political philosophy. It is based on Plato’s Politeia and its model of philosopher-kingship. Synesios makes his audience compare the current political reality with the ideal of the philosopher-kings, who are the image of the transcendent god in the political realm. In doing so he recommends political virtue in general, especially phronesis and sophrosyne. Particularly he argues for reforming the recruitment of military and (...) civil officials with reference to Plato’s concept of friendship in the Politeia. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant was possibly both the most influential racist and the most influential moral philosopher of modern, Western thought. So far, authors have either interpreted Kant as an “inconsistent egalitarian” or as a “consistent inegalitarian.” On the former view, Kant failed to draw the necessary conclusions about persons from his own moral philosophy; on the latter view, Kant did not consider non‐White people as persons at all. However, both standard interpretations face significant textual difficulties; instead, I argue that Kant's moral (...) egalitarianism is so thin as to remain almost entirely useless as an antidote to racism. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 1 - 39 Through a novel set of texts drawn from Plato, Porphyry, Plotinus, Ps. Julian, Proclus, Hermeias, Synesius and Damascius, I explore how anagogic _erōs_ in master-disciple relationships in Neoplatonism contributed to the attainment of self-knowledge and to the transmission of knowledge, authority and inspired insights within and outside the _diadochia_. I view anagogic _erōs_ as one of the most important channels of non-discursive pedagogy and argue for the mediating power of anagogic (...) _erōs_ in the attainment of the main goal of the Platonist: reorienting desire from sensible to intelligible beauty and changing one’s ontological status to become like god and attain union with the divine. After considering the problematic nature of Socratic _erōs_, its skeptics and detractors, I discuss the dynamics of philosopher-disciple relationships and the experience of anagogic _erōs_ in the following: the attack on Porphyry and defense by Plotinus following Porphyry’s recital of an ecstatic poem on _Hieros Gamos_, the concealment of anagogic _erōs_ behind the authoritative façade of an oracle, the intensely devotional private letters of Ps. Julian to the aged Iamblichus and of Synesius to his female master Hypatia; the identification of anagogic _erōs_ with theurgic ascent in Syrianus’s school according to Proclus and Hermeias and the experiences of anagogic _erōs_ outside the _diadochia_ in Damascius’ _Philosophical History_. I conclude that the true and correct practice of philosophy had much, if not everything to do with the anagogic _erōs_ between the true philosopher, the bacchant and the philosopher in training, aspiring to become transformed from thyrsus-bearer into bacchant. The privileged and exalted status given to the divine lover ensured the transmission of the philosophical tradition in all its richness, preserving both its discursive and non-discursive aspects as a system of thought, as a way of life and as a way of being and loving. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 3, pp 293 - 350 It is widely agreed that there is a gap between the personal and the social ethics of the Stoics due to the difficulty of harmonizing personal and social _oikeiōsis_. By reconstructing Epictetus’ theory of _oikeiōsis_, this paper aims to show that, in his ethics, there is no such gap, and this for two reasons: first, his account of social _oikeiōsis_ is not meant to ground his social ethics; second, his theory (...) of personal _oikeiōsis_ is a philosophical construct designed to provide a naturalistic justification to the utopian social project of the cosmopolis rather than to ground his personal ethics. (shrink)

The article reviews the uses of the term ‘oikonomia’ in Greek-speaking antiquity and illustrates how the term was used in all spheres of human existence and in various arts and sciences, usually denoting the prudent dispensation of the field resources. In this era the arts and sciences also received their own economies, and the term oikonomia, designating in most cases the prudent management of resources, appears in political theory, military strategy, law, finance, medicine, literary criticism, architecture, music, history and rhetoric. (...) Among all the spheres, arts and sciences that were economized, the story of oikonomia in the field of rhetoric is at the center of this article’s attention. As shown, the concept of oikonomia took an intermediate form between the realm of thought – that is, the domain of philosophy – and the realm of public speech – the domain of politics. (shrink)

For Seneca, the firmness of the Wise is shown in his ability to remain calm against attacks, as he explains in his treatise of that name. Attacks can come in the form of injustice, iniuria, and disparagement, contumelia; Seneca proves that neither of them affects the wise man. Contumelia is linked to contemptus in definition and conceptualization so that the remarks on how to deal with disparagement contain clues as to what contemptus means for Seneca. The article argues that Seneca (...) understands the term in a double sense: First, contemptus denotes a reprehensible attitude. Second, it designates a kind of indifference which is to be understood in the context of Stoic apatheia. (shrink)

The position of Socrates in Plato’s earlier dialogues is often seen as an anticipation of contemporary political theories. This article takes issue with the claim that Socrates anticipated modern theories of deliberative democracy. It examines three early Platonic dialogues and argues that the Socrates presented in the dialogues is actually far more dogmatic in ethical as well as religious matters than such annexations of Socrates can acknowledge. Furthermore, Socrates does not develop a theory that would support Athenian democracy. Although politically (...) inactive within the Athenian political framework, Socrates is nonetheless depicted in the Gorgias as formulating an “ethical” view of politics. According to this conception, true politics is always virtue‑ oriented. It is a matter of improving the characters of one’s fellow citizens, and is detached from the question of how political power should be distributed. Socrates’ political outlook is echoed in several Hellenistic philosophical schools, the Stoics in particular. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this article, I explore the complex and unappreciated relationship between the moral and political thought of Cicero and Adam Smith. Cicero’s views about justice, propriety, and the selfish love of praise find new expression in Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. I illustrate the important ways in which Smith adopts – often without attribution – Cicero’s precepts and moral judgments. I then go on to demonstrate how Smith strips those Ciceronian conclusions from their original justifying grounds in teleology and natural (...) law. In their place, Smith injects his own psychology based in sentiments as a new account of why it is that we prefer virtue and justice to their opposites. By exploring this relationship, I hope to shed light on an important dynamic whereby modern thought has creatively adapted classical moral and political concepts. (shrink)

This thesis examines the Platonic brand in utopian fiction. It looks at Plato's dialogues, H. G Wells' A Modern Utopia and Aldous Huxley's Brave New World. The modern texts provide opportunities to observe the effects of ideas found in the dialogues, helping illustrate their implications for the Platonic utopia. Understanding the implications of Plato's textual criticism found in his dialogues is indispensable in understanding how his dialogues are to be understood and what may be understood to be his utopia. This (...) thesis is divided into four chapters; the first two chapters are further divided into sub-headings to assist with navigation of the argument. The first chapter isolates meaning from vocabulary and sets out Socrates' understanding of the relationship between the two entities. The second chapter proceeds to set out Socrates understanding of the hermeneutic effect on the interplay of his dialectic and interlocutors. The third chapter sets out how Socrates seeks to mitigate the distortion of articulated ideas. The fourth chapter concludes the argument stating that Plato's dialogues can only be understood as a unity, that his utopia cannot have a finality, instead it is fluid, free, continuing, Socratic, dialectic. (shrink)

The article discusses the polysemous Byzantine concept πολιτεία, considering it from the viewpoint of conceptual history. Based on an overview of contemporary scholarship that places the Byzantine state in relation to the history of society and history of culture, I suggest a new approach to the Byzantine conceptual apparatus combining elements of the traditional history of concepts and Hans Blumenberg’s metaphorology. I also advance the hypothesis that the distinctive semiotic regime, in which Byzantine concepts operated, resulted from a reorganization — (...) and partial reduction — of the system of classical knowledge. In Graeco-Roman antiquity, the world was conceived of as comprising four levels, each demanding distinct approach: the universe, human community existing within the structures of the polis, the household, and the individual’s character. These levels corresponded to four domains of knowledge. Cosmogony studied the interaction of the cosmic elements. Politics occupied itself with community. Economy was approached mostly on practical terms. Human character was investigated by ethics. A new configuration of concepts established in the classical period emerged in Byzantium, these concepts shifted from one level to another, or simultaneously occupied several levels. The understanding of these processes demands attention to the two following factors; first, the meaning of specialized concepts was safeguarded by the continuity linking the Byzantine culture to the classical philosophical paradigm; second, Christian universalism invited the construction of homologous conceptual structures, thus contributing to their incessant metaphorization. (shrink)