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  1. Introduction.[author unknown] - forthcoming - Introduction 2 (23):153-160.
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  • Intentionality, Normativity, and Community.Pascal Engel - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (1):25-49.
    Against the view that the normativity of mental content is social content, I argue that it is not, examining the views of Wittgenstein, Davidson, Brandom and Pettit.
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  • The Norms of Thought: Are They Social?Pascal Engel - 2001 - Mind and Society 2 (3):129-148.
    A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of views according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations, Davidson’s triangulation argument, and Brandom’s inferential pragmatics, and criticises each. It is argued that (...)
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  • Norms for Emotions: Biological Functions and Representational Contents.Matteo Mameli - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (1):101-121.
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  • Norms for Emotions: Biological Functions and Representational Contents.Matteo Mameli - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (1):101-121.
    Normative standards are often applied to emotions. Are there normative standards that apply to emotions in virtue solely of facts about their nature? I will argue that the answer is no. The psychological, behavioural, and neurological evidence suggests that emotions are representational brain states with various kinds of biological functions. Facts about biological functions are not (and do not by themselves entail) normative facts. Hence, there are no nor- mative standards that apply to emotions just in virtue of their having (...)
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