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  1. Permissive Consent: A Robust Reason-Changing Account.Neil C. Manson - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3317-3334.
    There is an ongoing debate about the “ontology” of consent. Some argue that it is a mental act, some that it is a “hybrid” of a mental act plus behaviour that signifies that act; others argue that consent is a performative, akin to promising or commanding. Here it is argued that all these views are mistaken—though some more so than others. We begin with the question whether a normatively efficacious act of consent can be completed in the mind alone. Standard (...)
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  • Authority in Relationships.Jörg Löschke - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (2):187-204.
    Authority consists in having standing to make a claim on another person’s actions. Authority comes in degrees: persons have the authority to make moral demands on each other, but if they participate in close relationships, such as friendships or love relationships, their authority over each other is greater, compared to the authority of strangers to make demands, as participants in personal relationships can demand more from each other than can strangers. This paper discusses the phenomenon of a relationship-dependent greater authority (...)
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  • Coordination Cannot Establish Political Authority.Matthias Brinkmann - 2018 - Ratio Juris 31 (1):49-69.
    One of the most common arguments in favour of the state's authority is that without the coordinating hand of political institutions, we could not achieve important moral benefits. I argue that if we understand authority correctly, then coordination cannot even in principle establish that coordinators have political authority.
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  • How to Be an Ex-Post Egalitarian and an Ex-Ante Paretian.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):550-558.
    It is well known that there is a conflict between three intuitive principles for the evaluation of risky prospects in distributional contexts, Ex-Post Egalitarianism, Ex-Ante Pareto and Dominance. In this paper, I return to Peter Diamond’s suggestion that we reject Dominance as a principle of rationality in distributional contexts and present a new argument in support of this position. The argument is based on an observation regarding the right way for a distributor to weigh reasons for actions. In some cases, (...)
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  • Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens.Joshua Schechter & David Enoch - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):687 - 715.
    In virtue of what are we justified in employing the rule of inference Modus Ponens? One tempting approach to answering this question is to claim that we are justified in employing Modus Ponens purely in virtue of facts concerning meaning or concept-possession. In this paper, we argue that such meaning-based accounts cannot be accepted as the fundamental account of our justification.
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  • The Medical Surrogate as Fiduciary Agent.Dana Howard - 2017 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 45 (3):402-420.
    Within bioethics, two prevailing approaches structure how we think about the role of medical surrogates and the decisions that they must make on behalf of incompetent patients. One approach views the surrogate primarily as the patient's agent, obediently enacting the patient's predetermined will. The second approach views the surrogate as the patient's custodian, judging for herself how to best safeguard the patient's interests. This paper argues that both of these approaches idealize away some of the ethically relevant features of advance (...)
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  • Relationships as Indirect Intensifiers: Solving the Puzzle of Partiality.Jörg Löschke - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):390-410.
    Two intuitions are important to commonsense morality: the claim that all persons have equal moral worth and the claim that persons have associative duties. These intuitions seem to contradict each other, and there has been extensive discussion concerning their reconciliation. The most widely held view claims that associative duties arise because relationships generate moral reasons to benefit our loved ones. However, such a view cannot account for the phenomenon that some acts are supererogatory when performed on behalf of a stranger (...)
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  • Political Legitimacy Without a (Claim-) Right to Rule.Merten Reglitz - 2015 - Res Publica 21 (3): 291-307.
    In the contemporary philosophical literature, political legitimacy is often identified with a right to rule. However, this term is problematic. First, if we accept an interest theory of rights, it often remains unclear whose interests justify a right to rule : either the interest of the holders of this right to rule or the interests of those subject to the authority. And second, if we analyse the right to rule in terms of Wesley Hohfeld’s characterization of rights, we find disagreement (...)
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  • Occam’s Razor and Non-Voluntarist Accounts of Political Authority.Luke Maring - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (1):159-173.
    Certain non-voluntarists have recently defended political authority by advancing two-part views. First, they argue that the state, or the law, is best (or uniquely) capable of accomplishing something important. Second, they defend a substantive normative principle on which being so situated is sufficient for de jure authority. This paper uses widely accepted tenets to show that all such defenses of authority fail.
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  • Revising Republican Liberty: What is the Difference Between a Disinterested Gentle Giant and a Deterred Criminal?Nikolas Kirby - 2016 - Res Publica 22 (4):369-386.
    This paper assesses the most well thought out contemporary conception of republican liberty put forward by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner. I demonstrate that it is incoherent: at least insofar as it seeks to pick out a form of unfreedom not captured by the negative conception of liberty. This incoherence arises because Pettit and Skinner cannot both hold that republican unfreedom is defined by one agent’s mere capacity to interfere arbitrarily with another agent and, at the same time, claim that (...)
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  • Political Authority and Unjust Wars.Massimo Renzo - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Just war theory is currently dominated by two positions. According to the orthodox view, provided that jus in bello principles are respected, combatants have an equal right to fight, regardless of the justice of the cause pursued by their state. According to “revisionists” whenever combatants lack reasons to believe that the war they are ordered to fight is just, their duty is to disobey. I argue that when members of a legitimate state acting in good faith are ordered to fight, (...)
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  • II—What’s Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action.David Enoch - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (1):21-48.
  • Practical Reason and Legality: Instrumental Political Authority Without Exclusion.Anthony R. Reeves - 2015 - Law and Philosophy 34 (3):257-298.
    In a morally non-ideal legal system, how can law bind its subjects? How can the fact of a norm’s legality make it the case that practical reason is bound by that norm? Moreover, in such circumstances, what is the extent and character of law’s bindingness? I defend here an answer to these questions. I present a non-ideal theory of legality’s ability to produce binding reasons for action. It is not a descriptive account of law and its claims, it is a (...)
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  • Understanding Standing: Permission to Deflect Reasons.Ori Herstein - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3109-3132.
    Standing is a peculiar norm, allowing for deflecting that is rejecting offhand and without deliberation interventions such as directives. Directives are speech acts that aim to give directive-reasons, which are reason to do as the directive directs because of the directive. Standing norms, therefore, provide for deflecting directives regardless of validity or the normative weight of the rejected directive. The logic of the normativity of standing is, therefore, not the logic of invalidating directives or of competing with directive-reasons but of (...)
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  • Skeptical Challenges to International Law.Carmen E. Pavel & David Lefkowitz - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (8):e12511.
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