I argue that Kierkegaard has an account of thought experiment. While his contemporary Ørsted’s contributions to the early history of the concept of ‘thought experiment’ have been recently acknowledged, Kierkegaard’s contributions remain largely unrecognized. I argue that Kierkegaard’s method of ‘imaginary construction’ [Tanke-Experiment] aims at identifying underlying invariants in objects of experience. I outline similarities between Ørsted’s pursuit of invariants in the sciences and Kierkegaard’s fictional variations in Repetition. One implication is that Kierkegaard’s view is more scientific and methodological than (...) is standardly thought by Kierkegaard scholars, who more commonly treat imaginary construction as a literary device. A further implication is that Kierkegaard, like Ørsted, is interested in the success or failure of mental acts, rather than (or in addition to) practical action, as is more standardly associated with Kierkegaard. One original development, beyond what Kierkegaard inherits from Ørsted, is the role of thought experiments as exceptions. An exception is a case that falls outside a rule without breaking it. Exceptions can neither establish a rule nor refute its necessity; however, they turn attention to relevant principles and further determine their content. I highlight similarities between Ørsted’s account of thought experiments and Kierkegaard’s as a method of variation. (shrink)

By way of an interaction with Kierkegaard’s Point of View, this paper attempts to show the extent to which Kierkegaard’s Repetition was a poetic repetition of his own life. By comparing several of his published texts with journal entries and letters to friends, this paper traces the extent and degree of Kierkegaard’s poetic reflection and corresponding lack of existential immediacy. At its most extreme, this paper argues that Kierkegaard did not really exist in the typical sense of the term; or, (...) more precisely, that he only existed as a poetic repetition, an apotheosized ideal. Kierkegaard lived only insofar as he wrote himself into poetry. (shrink)

Aborda os três estádios da vida humana tal como propostos por Kierkegaard. Foca na possibilidade de transição entre os estágios e as aplicabilidades teológicas de cada posicionamento descrito. Analisa o caráter existencial e antissistemático do pensamento kierkegaardiano; considera esses aspectos como relevantes em uma defesa do cristianismo ante à filosofia. Argumenta que o estádio religioso é o ápice da existência humana provisionado pelo salto de fé, ainda que conectado com os demais estádios existenciais, independentemente de qual estágio um homem se (...) encontre. A transição e variação entre os estádios são tomadas como um resultado da existência: é algo possível e comum ao homem, não sendo impossibilitadas segundo o atual estágio de vivência. Não incapacitam a simultânea e mútua intersecção entre os estádios, algo factível segundo a perspectiva teológica kierkegaardiana. Conclui que o estágio religioso é o desígnio existencial máximo após o salto de fé. (shrink)