Evidence provided by the scientific community strongly suggests that limits should be placed on greenhouse gas emissions. This means that states, firms, and individuals will have to face potentially serious burdens if they are to implement these limits. Which principles of justice should guide a global regime aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions originating from human activities, and most notably from CO2emissions? This is both a crucial and difficult question. Admittedly, perhaps this question is too ambitious, given the uncertainties and (...) complexities characterizing the issue of climate change. Yet, rather than listing them all at this stage, let us address the question in a straightforward manner, introducing some of these complexities as the need arises. (shrink)

Some European countries legally recognise a “right to roam”—a right to freely traverse across land, even if privately owned. Political philosophers have paid little attention to the right, and have often conceptualised property rights to include strong claim-rights to exclude others. I offer an account of the right to roam, and consider whether it can be philosophically justified on a left-liberal account of property. After finding a defence in terms of the interests served by the right lacking, I suggest that (...) the most promising defence of the right to roam is that it serves as a symbolic reminder of a fundamental type of social equality. (shrink)

To whom is egalitarian justice owed? Our fellow citizens, or all of humankind? If the latter, what form might a global brand of egalitarianism take? This paper examines some recent debates about the justification, and content, of global egalitarian justice. It provides an account of some keenly argued controversies about the scope of egalitarian justice, between those who would restrict it to the level of the state and those who would extend it more widely. It also notes the cross-cutting distinction (...) between relationists (whose views on scope are derived from a belief about which relations, practices or institutions give rise to the demands of equality) and non-relationists (who place no such importance on empirical facts about the relations between individuals). Beyond this, it sets out some of the different principles that might flow from a commitment to global egalitarianism. One of the key goals is to highlight the increasing diversity within debates on global justice, so that even those with a shared commitment to global equality may espouse different views about the justifications for equality, as well as the nature of, and proper sites for, egalitarian principles. (shrink)

Cosmopolitans hold that our duties of distributive justice to others do not stop at borders. Darrel Moellendorf is among those who defend the view that principles of distributive justice are applicable beyond borders. He suggests as a principle of international justice the global difference principle, which allows inequalities in the distribution of wealth and resources only if they are to the greatest advantage of the least advantaged individuals. In this paper, I try to indicate that Moellendorf’s argument for the global (...) difference principle is far from sustaining it. Instead, I argue for a minimum floor principle of distributive justice on the basis of the idea that each person ought to have an equal standard of living with respect to the fulfillment of their basic interests. I also propose the principle of contribution backed up by the principle of fair equality of opportunity, aiming to equalize background conditions of a competition for socially favored positions, as the basic principles of a complete account of global distributive justice.Kozmopolitanisti drže da se naše dužnosti distributivne pravednosti prema drugima ne zaustavljaju na granicama. Darrel Moellendorf je među onima koji brane gledište da su načela distributivne pravednosti primjenjiva s onu stranu granica. Kao načelo međunarodne pravednosti on predlaže globalno načelo razlike, koje nejednakosti u raspodjeli bogatstva i resursâ dopušta samo ako su one u najveću korist najlošije stojećih individua. U ovome članku pokušavam pokazati da Moellendorfov argument u prilog globalnog načela razlike to načelo nimalo ne potkrepljuje. Umjesto toga argumentiram u prilog načela distributivne pravednosti minimalne razine na osnovi zamisli da bi svaka osoba trebala imati jednaki standard življenja s obzirom na ispunjenje njezinih osnovnih interesa. Ujedno kao osnovna načela potpunog opisa globalne distributivne pravednosti predlažem načelo doprinosa poduprto načelom pravične jednakosti mogućnosti, koje stremi izjednačavanju pozadinskih uvjeta natjecanja za društveno favorizirane pozicije. (shrink)