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Causation and Universals

Routledge (1990)

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  1. Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  • Dispositional Essentialism.Brian Ellis & Caroline Lierse - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):27 – 45.
  • A Novel Interpretation of Plato’s Theory of Forms.P. X. Monaghan - 2010 - Metaphysica 11 (1):63-78.
    In several recent issues of this journal, I argued for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. While this account has stuck some as being highly idiosyncratic in nature, it is not entirely something new under the sun, since as I will argue in this paper, it turns out to have a historic precedent in Plato⠀™ s theory of forms. Indeed, the purpose of this paper is twofold. The first is to show that my account of property (...)
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  • Symposium on Explanations and Social Ontology 2: Explanatory Ecumenism and Economics Imperialism.Uskali Mäki - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (2):235-257.
    In a series of insightful publications, Philip Pettit and Frank Jackson have argued for an explanatory ecumenism that is designed to justify a variety of types of social scientific explanation of different , including structural and rational choice explanations. Their arguments are put in terms of different kinds of explanatory information; the distinction between causal efficacy, causal relevance and explanatory relevance within their program model of explanation; and virtual reality and resilience explanation. The arguments are here assessed from the point (...)
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  • The Powerlessness of Necessity.Markus Schrenk - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):725-739.
    This paper concerns anti-Humean intuitions about connections in nature. It argues for the existence of a de re link that is not necessity.Some anti-Humeans tacitly assume that metaphysical necessity can be used for all sorts of anti-Humean desires. Metaphysical necessity is thought to stick together whatever would be loose and separate in a Hume world, as if it were a kind of universal superglue.I argue that this is not feasible. Metaphysical necessity might connect synchronically co-existent properties—kinds and their essential features, (...)
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  • Hic Rhodos, Hic Salta: From Reductionist Semantics to a Realist Ontology of Forceful Dispositions.Markus Schrenk - 2009 - In G. Damschen, K. Stueber & R. Schnepf (eds.), Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. De Gruyter. pp. 143-167.
    It is widely believed that at least two developments in the last third of the 20th century have given dispositionalism—the view that powers, capacities, potencies, etc. are irreducible real properties—new credibility: (i) the many counterexamples launched against reductive analyses of dispositional predicates in terms of counterfactual conditionals and (ii) a new anti-Humean faith in necessary connections in nature which, it is said, owes a lot to Kripke’s arguments surrounding metaphysical necessity. I aim to show in this paper that necessity is, (...)
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  • Knowing Children's Minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.
  • Special Access Lies Down with Theory-Theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.
  • Disenshrining the Cartesian Self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.
  • On Leaving Your Children Wrapped in Thought.James Russell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):76-77.
  • Qualities and Relations in Folk Theories of Mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.
  • Why Presume Analyses Are on-Line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.
  • Theories of Mind: Some Methodological/Conceptual Problems and an Alternative Approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.
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  • Theory-Theory Theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.
  • Matching and Mental-State Ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.
  • Representational Development and Theory-of-Mind Computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.
  • Limitations on First-Person Experience: Implications of the “Extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.
  • First-Person Authority and Beliefs as Representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.
  • A Plea for the Second Functionalist Model and the Insufficiency of Simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.
  • The Role of Concepts in Perception and Inference.David R. Olson & Janet Wilde Astington - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):65-66.
  • Developmental Evidence and Introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64-65.
  • Heuristics and Counterfactual Self-Knowledge.Adam Morton - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):63-64.
  • Mismatching Categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62-63.
  • Knowledge of the Psychological States of Self and Others is Not Only Theory-Laden but Also Data-Driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.
  • Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.
  • The Fallibility of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60-60.
  • Functionalism Can Explain Self-Ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.
  • Three Inferential Temptations.Alexander Levine & Georg Schwarz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):57-58.
  • Even a Theory-Theory Needs Information Processing: ToMM, an Alternative Theory-Theory of the Child's Theory of Mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56-57.
  • Self-Attributions Help Constitute Mental Types.Bernard W. Kobes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-56.
  • Common Sense and Adult Theory of Communication.Boaz Keysar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-54.
  • “Good Developmental Sequence” and the Paradoxes of Children's Skills.Brian D. Josephson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):53-54.
  • Gopnik's Invention of Intentionality.Carl N. Johnson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-53.
  • Qualia for Propositional Attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.
  • Analytic Functionalism Without Representational Functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.
  • Qualitative Characteristics, Type Materialism and the Circularity of Analytic Functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.
  • Unraveling Introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.
  • First-Person Current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.
  • Know My Own Mind? I Should Be so Lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.
  • On Behalf of Phenomenological Parity for the Attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.
  • Self-Ascription of Belief and Desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.
  • Theories and Qualities.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):44-45.
  • Competing Accounts of Belief-Task Performance.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):43-44.
  • Goldman has Not Defeated Folk Functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42-43.
  • Recall or Regeneration of Past Mental States: Toward an Account in Terms of Cognitive Processes.K. Anders Ericsson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):41-42.
  • The Anthropology of Folk Psychology.Steven Daniel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):38-39.
  • How Directly Do We Know Our Minds?Maria Czyzewska & Pawel Lewicki - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-38.
  • Categorization, Theories and Folk Psychology.Nick Chater - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-37.
  • The Naked Truth About First-Person Knowledge.Michael Chandler & Jeremy Carpendale - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):36-37.
  • Self-Ascription Without Qualia: A Case Study.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.
    In Section 5 of his interesting article, Goldman suggests that the consideration of imaginary cases can be valuable in the analysis of our psychological concepts. In particular, he argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations. Whether or not such a being is empirically possible, it certainly seems to be logically possible, or conceptually coherent. Goldman argues from this possibility to (...)
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