Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Seeing Causing.Helen Beebee - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):257-280.
    Singularists about causation often claim that we can have experiences as of causation. This paper argues that regularity theorists need not deny that claim; hence the possibility of causal experience is no objection to regularity theories of causation. The fact that, according to a regularity theorist, causal experience requires background theory does not provide grounds for denying that it is genuine experience. The regularity theorist need not even deny that non-inferential perceptual knowledge of causation is possible, despite the fact that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Laws of Nature.John W. Carroll - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    John Carroll undertakes a careful philosophical examination of laws of nature, causation, and other related topics. He argues that laws of nature are not susceptible to the sort of philosophical treatment preferred by empiricists. Indeed he shows that emperically pure matters of fact need not even determine what the laws are. Similar, even stronger, conclusions are drawn about causation. Replacing the traditional view of laws and causation requiring some kind of foundational legitimacy, the author argues that these phenomena are inextricably (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  • Causation and Laws of Nature : Reductionism.Jonathon Schaffer - 2008 - In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 82-107.
    Causation and the laws of nature are nothing over and above the pattern of events, just like a movie is nothing over and above the sequence of frames. Or so I will argue. The position I will argue for is broadly inspired by Hume and Lewis, and may be expressed in the slogan: what must be, must be grounded in what is.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Nonreductive Physicalism and the Problem of Strong Closure.Sophie Gibb - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):29-42.
    Closure is the central premise in one of the best arguments for physicalism—the argument from causal overdetermination. According to Closure, at every time at which a physical event has a sufficient cause, it has a sufficient physical cause. This principle is standardly defended by appealing to the fact that it enjoys empirical support from numerous confirming cases (and no disconfirming cases) in physics. However, in recent literature on mental causation, attempts have been made to provide a stronger argument for it. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Vzročnost - Očrt Realistične Teorije.Bojan Borstner - 1999 - Filozofski Vestnik 20 (3).
    V prispevku poskušamo izgraditi teorijo, ki bi implicitno definirala pojem vzročnosti. Teorija vzročnosti, ki jo poskušamo opredeliti, mora biti analitično resnična in mora zagotoviti analizo pojma vzročnosti tako, da bo resnična v vseh možnih svetovih in ne zgolj v dejanskem svetu. Naš cilj ni teorija, ki bi bila zgolj kontingentno resnična. V tekstu je vzročnost opredeljena kot relacija, ki je opazljiva in ni zvedljiva na druge lastnosti in relacije med posameznimi dogodki. Nato so na podlagi podmene o singularnem povzročanju definirane (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Theories of Properties and Ontological Theory-Choice: An Essay in Metaontology.Christopher Gibilisco - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
    This dissertation argues that we have no good reason to accept any one theory of properties as correct. To show this, I present three possible bases for theory-choice in the properties debate: coherence, explanatory adequacy, and explanatory value. Then I argue that none of these bases resolve the underdetermination of our choice between theories of properties. First, I argue considerations about coherence cannot resolve the underdetermination, because no traditional theory of properties is obviously incoherent. Second, I argue considerations of explanatory (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Kant and Modern Physics--The Synthetic a Priori and the Distinction Between Modal Function and Entity.D. F. M. Strauss - 2000 - South African Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):26-40.
  • A Defense of the Knowledge Argument.John Martin DePoe - unknown
    Defenders of the Knowledge Argument contend that physicalism is false because knowing all the physical truths is not sufficient to know all the truths about the world. In particular, proponents of the Knowledge Argument claim that physicalism is false because the truths about the character of conscious experience are not knowable from the complete set of physical truths. This dissertation is a defense of the Knowledge Argument. Chapter one characterizes what physicalism is and provides support for the claim that if (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mental Causation and the New Compatibilism.Jens Harbecke - 2013 - Abstracta 7 (1).
    Twenty years ago Stephen Yablo developed his original theory of mental causation, which has drawn much attention ever since. By providing a detailed reconstruction of Yablo’s approach, this paper first demonstrates that a certain line of critique that has repeatedly been brought forward against Yablo over the last two decades misconstrues the core idea of the model. At the same time, the reconstruction reveals that Yablo’s approach is probably the first explicit version of the “new compatibilism” within the philosophy of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Properties and Powers.Alexander J. Kelly - unknown
    This thesis concerns the relation between the fundamental properties and the powers they confer. The views considered are introduced in terms of their acceptance or rejection of the quiddistic thesis. Essentially the quiddistic thesis claims that properties confer the powers they do neither necessarily nor sufficiently. Quidditism is the view that accepts the quiddistic thesis. The other two views to be considered, the pure powers view and the grounded view reject the quiddistic thesis. The pure powers view supports its denial (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Powerlessness of Necessity.Markus Schrenk - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):725-739.
    This paper concerns anti-Humean intuitions about connections in nature. It argues for the existence of a de re link that is not necessity.Some anti-Humeans tacitly assume that metaphysical necessity can be used for all sorts of anti-Humean desires. Metaphysical necessity is thought to stick together whatever would be loose and separate in a Hume world, as if it were a kind of universal superglue.I argue that this is not feasible. Metaphysical necessity might connect synchronically co-existent properties—kinds and their essential features, (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Hic Rhodos, Hic Salta: From Reductionist Semantics to a Realist Ontology of Forceful Dispositions.Markus Schrenk - 2009 - In G. Damschen, K. Stueber & R. Schnepf (eds.), Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. De Gruyter. pp. 143-167.
    It is widely believed that at least two developments in the last third of the 20th century have given dispositionalism—the view that powers, capacities, potencies, etc. are irreducible real properties—new credibility: (i) the many counterexamples launched against reductive analyses of dispositional predicates in terms of counterfactual conditionals and (ii) a new anti-Humean faith in necessary connections in nature which, it is said, owes a lot to Kripke’s arguments surrounding metaphysical necessity. I aim to show in this paper that necessity is, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Functionalism, Causation and Causal Relevance.Kirk A. Ludwig - 1998 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4.
    causal relevance, a three-place relation between event types, and circumstances, and argue for a logical independence condition on properties standing in the causal relevance relation relative to circumstances. In section 3, I apply these results to show that functionally defined states are not causally relevant to the output or state transitions in terms of which they are defined. In section 4, I extend this result to what that output in turn causes and to intervening mechanisms. In section 5, I examine (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Causality and Unification: How Causality Unifies Statistical Regularities.Gerhard Schurz - 2015 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (1):73-95.
    Two key ideas of scientific explanation−explanation as causal information and explanation as unification-have frequently been set into mutual opposition. This paper proposes a “dialectical solution” to this conflict, by arguing that causal explanations are preferable to non-causal ones, because they lead to a higherdegree of unification at the level of explaining statistical regularities. The core axioms of the theory of causal nets are justified because they offer the best if not the only unifying explanation of two statistical phenomena: screening off (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Causal Production as Interaction.Rognvaldur Ingthorsson - 2002 - Metaphysica 3 (1):87-119.
    The paper contains a novel realist account of causal production and the necessary connection between cause and effect. I argue that the asymmetric relation between causally connected events must be regarded as a product of a symmetric interaction between two or more entities. All the entities involved contribute to the producing, and so count as parts of the cause, and they all suffer a change, and so count as parts of the effect. Cause and effect, on this account, are two (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Towards a Definition of Efforts.Olivier Massin - 2017 - Motivation Science 3 (3):230-259.
    Although widely used across psychology, economics, and philosophy, the concept ofeffort is rarely ever defined. This article argues that the time is ripe to look for anexplicit general definition of effort, makes some proposals about how to arrive at thisdefinition, and suggests that a force-based approach is the most promising. Section 1presents an interdisciplinary overview of some chief research axes on effort, and arguesthat few, if any, general definitions have been proposed so far. Section 2 argues thatsuch a definition is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A World of Fields.Daniel von Wachter - 2000 - In Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler & Max Urchs (eds.), Things, Facts and Events. Rodopi. pp. 305-325.
    Trope ontology is exposed and confronted with the question where one trope ends and another begins. It is argued that tropes do not have determinate boundaries, it is arbitrary how tropes are carved up. An ontology, which I call field ontology, is proposed which takes this into account. The material world consists of a certain number of fields, each of which is extended over all of space. It is shown how field ontology can also tackle the problem of determin-able properties (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Knowing Children's Minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.
  • Special Access Lies Down with Theory-Theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.
  • Disenshrining the Cartesian Self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.
  • On Leaving Your Children Wrapped in Thought.James Russell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):76-77.
  • Qualities and Relations in Folk Theories of Mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.
  • Why Presume Analyses Are on-Line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.
  • Theories of Mind: Some Methodological/Conceptual Problems and an Alternative Approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Theory-Theory Theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.
  • Matching and Mental-State Ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.
  • Representational Development and Theory-of-Mind Computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.
  • Limitations on First-Person Experience: Implications of the “Extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.
  • First-Person Authority and Beliefs as Representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.
  • A Plea for the Second Functionalist Model and the Insufficiency of Simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.
  • The Role of Concepts in Perception and Inference.David R. Olson & Janet Wilde Astington - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):65-66.
  • Developmental Evidence and Introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64-65.
  • Heuristics and Counterfactual Self-Knowledge.Adam Morton - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):63-64.
  • Mismatching Categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62-63.
  • Knowledge of the Psychological States of Self and Others is Not Only Theory-Laden but Also Data-Driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.
  • Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.
  • The Fallibility of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60-60.
  • Functionalism Can Explain Self-Ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.
  • Three Inferential Temptations.Alexander Levine & Georg Schwarz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):57-58.
  • Even a Theory-Theory Needs Information Processing: ToMM, an Alternative Theory-Theory of the Child's Theory of Mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56-57.
  • Self-Attributions Help Constitute Mental Types.Bernard W. Kobes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-56.
  • Common Sense and Adult Theory of Communication.Boaz Keysar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-54.
  • “Good Developmental Sequence” and the Paradoxes of Children's Skills.Brian D. Josephson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):53-54.
  • Gopnik's Invention of Intentionality.Carl N. Johnson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-53.
  • Qualia for Propositional Attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.
  • Analytic Functionalism Without Representational Functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.
  • Qualitative Characteristics, Type Materialism and the Circularity of Analytic Functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.
  • Unraveling Introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.
  • First-Person Current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.