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  1. Space Perception and the Fourth Dimension.Stephen H. Kellert - 1994 - Man and World 27 (2):161-180.
  • Inside Loops: Developmental Premises of Self-Ascriptions.Radu J. Bogdan - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):235-252.
    Self-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes depend on a sense of the intentionality of one’s own mental states, which develops later than, and independently of, the sense of the intentionality of the thoughts and attitudes of others. This sense of the self-intentionality of one’s own mental states grows initially out of executive developments that enable one to simulate one’s own actions and perceptions, as genuine off-line thoughts, and to regulate such simulations.
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  • Perceptual Symbol Systems.Lawrence W. Barsalou - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.
    Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statis- tics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement record- ing systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the (...)
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  • Dimensions of Reliability in Phenomenal Judgment.Brentyn J. Ramm - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (3-4):101-127.
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2011) argues that phenomenal judgments are in general less reliable than perceptual judgments. This paper distinguishes two versions of this unreliability thesis. The process unreliability thesis says that unreliability in phenomenal judgments is due to faulty domain-specific mechanisms involved in producing these judgments, whereas the statistical unreliability thesis says that it is simply a matter of higher numbers of errors. Against the process unreliability thesis, I argue that the main errors and limitations in making phenomenal judgments can be (...)
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  • Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions.Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):1-11.
    A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational responses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell calls this the empiricist approach to monothematic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. In place of empiricism Campbell offers a rationalist account of monothematic delusions, according to which delusional beliefs are understood as Wittgensteinian framework propositions. We argue that neither Campbell's attack on empiricism nor his rationalist (...)
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  • The Distribution of Representation.Lisa M. Osbeck & Nancy J. Nersessian - 2006 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 36 (2):141–160.
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  • Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater:Critiquing Critiques of Functional Neuroimaging.Martha J. Farah - 2014 - Hastings Center Report 44 (s2):S19-S30.
  • From Computer Metaphor to Computational Modeling: The Evolution of Computationalism.Marcin Miłkowski - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (3):515-541.
    In this paper, I argue that computationalism is a progressive research tradition. Its metaphysical assumptions are that nervous systems are computational, and that information processing is necessary for cognition to occur. First, the primary reasons why information processing should explain cognition are reviewed. Then I argue that early formulations of these reasons are outdated. However, by relying on the mechanistic account of physical computation, they can be recast in a compelling way. Next, I contrast two computational models of working memory (...)
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  • Explaining Embodied Cognition Results.George Lakoff - 2012 - Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (4):773-785.
    From the late 1950s until 1975, cognition was understood mainly as disembodied symbol manipulation in cognitive psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and the nascent field of Cognitive Science. The idea of embodied cognition entered the field of Cognitive Linguistics at its beginning in 1975. Since then, cognitive linguists, working with neuroscientists, computer scientists, and experimental psychologists, have been developing a neural theory of thought and language (NTTL). Central to NTTL are the following ideas: (a) we think with our brains, that is, (...)
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  • Cortical Color and the Cognitive Sciences.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):135-150.
    Back when researchers thought about the various forms that color vision could take, the focus was primarily on the retinal mechanisms. Since that time, research on human color vision has shifted from an interest in retinal mechanisms to cortical color processing. This has allowed color research to provide insight into questions that are not limited to early vision but extend to cognition. Direct cortical connections from higher-level areas to lower-level areas have been found throughout the brain. One of the classic (...)
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  • Mental Imagery: In Search of a Theory.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):157-182.
    It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is special, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive architecture, and (...)
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  • Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An Active Perception Approach to Conscious Mental Content.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 1999 - Cognitive Science 23 (2):207-245.
  • Visual Imagery Versus Visual Experience of Familiar Individuals.David J. Bryant - 1991 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 29 (1):41-44.
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  • S Eeingand Visualizing: I T' S N Otwhaty Ou T Hink.Zenon Pylyshyn - unknown
    6. Seeing With the Mind’s Eye 1: The Puzzle of Mental Imagery .................................................6-1 6.1 What is the puzzle about mental imagery?..............................................................................6-1 6.2 Content, form and substance of representations ......................................................................6-6 6.3 What is responsible for the pattern of results obtained in imagery studies?.................................6-8..
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  • The Importance of a Consideration of Qualia to Imagery and Cognition.Timothy L. Hubbard - 1995 - Consciousness and Cognition 5 (3):327-358.
    Experiences of qualia, subjective sensory-like aspects of stimuli, are central to imagistic representation. Following Raffman , qualia are considered to reflect experiential knowledge distinct from descriptive, abstract, and propositional knowledge; following Jackendoff , objective neural activity is distinguished from subjective experience. It is argued that descriptive physical knowledge does not provide an adequate accounting of qualia, and philosophical scenarios such as the Turing test and the Chinese Room are adapted to demonstrate inadequacies of accounts of cognition that ignore subjective experience. (...)
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  • Lucid Dreaming.S. LaBerge - 1985 - J.
  • Unconscious Imagination and the Mental Imagery Debate.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    Traditionally, philosophers have appealed to the phenomenological similarity between visual experience and visual imagery to support the hypothesis that there is significant overlap between the perceptual and imaginative domains. The current evidence, however, is inconclusive: while evidence from transcranial brain stimulation seems to support this conclusion, neurophysiological evidence from brain lesion studies (e.g., from patients with brain lesions resulting in a loss of mental imagery but not a corresponding loss of perception and vice versa) indicates that there are functional and (...)
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  • The Case for Connectionism.William Bechtel - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (2):119-54.
  • The Representation of Visual Scenes.Helene Intraub - 1997 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 (6):217-222.
  • First-Person Investigations of Consciousness.Brentyn Ramm - 2016 - Dissertation, The Australian National University
    This dissertation defends the reliability of first-person methods for studying consciousness, and applies first-person experiments to two philosophical problems: the experience of size and of the self. In chapter 1, I discuss the motivations for taking a first-person approach to consciousness, the background assumptions of the dissertation and some methodological preliminaries. In chapter 2, I address the claim that phenomenal judgements are far less reliable than perceptual judgements (Schwitzgebel, 2011). I argue that the main errors and limitations in making phenomenal (...)
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  • Conscious Thought as Simulation of Behavior and Perception.Germund Hesslow - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (6):242-247.
  • Detecting High-Level and Low-Level Properties in Visual Images and Visual Percepts.Romke Rouw, Stephen M. Kosslyn & Ronald Hamel - 1997 - Cognition 63 (2):209-226.
  • Components of High-Level Vision: A Cognitive Neuroscience Analysis and Accounts of Neurological Syndromes.Stephen M. Kosslyn, Rex A. Flynn, Jonathan B. Amsterdam & Gretchen Wang - 1990 - Cognition 34 (3):203-277.
  • Visual Imagery and Visual-Spatial Language: Enhanced Imagery Abilities in Deaf and Hearing ASL Signers.Karen Emmorey, Stephen M. Kosslyn & Ursula Bellugi - 1993 - Cognition 46 (2):139-181.
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  • The Stuff That Dreams Aren't Made Of: Why Wake-State and Dream-State Sensory Experiences Differ.Donald Symons - 1993 - Cognition 47 (3):181-217.
  • Imaginative Contagion.Tamar Szabo Gendler - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (2):183-203.
    The aim of this article is to expand the diet of examples considered in philosophical discussions of imagination and pretense, and to offer some preliminary observations about what we might learn about the nature of imagination as a result. The article presents a number of cases involving imaginative contagion: cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have. Examples are offered that involve visual imagery, motor imagery, fictional (...)
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  • Active Symbols and Internal Models: Towards a Cognitive Connectionism. [REVIEW]Stephen Kaplan, Mark Weaver & Robert French - 1990 - AI and Society 4 (1):51-71.
    In the first section of the article, we examine some recent criticisms of the connectionist enterprise: first, that connectionist models are fundamentally behaviorist in nature (and, therefore, non-cognitive), and second that connectionist models are fundamentally associationist in nature (and, therefore, cognitively weak). We argue that, for a limited class of connectionist models (feed-forward, pattern-associator models), the first criticism is unavoidable. With respect to the second criticism, we propose that connectionist modelsare fundamentally associationist but that this is appropriate for building models (...)
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  • There's More to Vision Than Meets the Eye.Peter Slezak - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (7):291-293.
  • How Crosstalk Creates Vision-Related Eureka Moments.George Terzis - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):393 – 421.
    The discussion begins with a familiar and defensible characterization of the eureka moment, according to which it is the unexpected product of separate and often seemingly incompatible perspectives. The principal aim of the discussion is to explain how, so characterized, vision-related eureka moments can occur. To fulfill this aim, the discussion employs a notion of crosstalk, in which cognitive interference slightly increases as a result of the creative thinker's considerable, albeit only partly successful, pre-eureka cognitive effort. Such crosstalk, it is (...)
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  • Computational Imagery.Janice Glasgow & Dimitri Papadias - 1992 - Cognitive Science 16 (3):355-394.
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  • Thinking Visually.Kris N. Kirby & Stephen M. Kosslyn - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (4):324-341.
  • Visual Imagery as the Simulation of Vision.Gregory Currie - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (1-2):25-44.
  • Beyond the Exclusively Propositional Era.William P. Bechtel & A. Abrahamson - 1990 - Synthese 82 (2):223-53.
    Contemporary epistemology has assumed that knowledge is represented in sentences or propositions. However, a variety of extensions and alternatives to this view have been proposed in other areas of investigation. We review some of these proposals, focusing on (1) Ryle's notion of knowing how and Hanson's and Kuhn's accounts of theory-laden perception in science; (2) extensions of simple propositional representations in cognitive models and artificial intelligence; (3) the debate concerning imagistic versus propositional representations in cognitive psychology; (4) recent treatments of (...)
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  • Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Beth Preston, Ronald G. Boothe, Stanley Munsat, Daniel Reisberg, Christopher Gauker, Robert A. Morris, Phillipe Dubosq, David C. McCarty, John Heil, Harvey Mullane, Michael Tomasello & Philippe Rochat - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):503-538.
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