Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Number of Moons Is Not a Number. Towards a Comprehensive Linguistic Approach to Frege's Commitment Puzzle.Borys Jastrzębski - 2016 - Filozofia Nauki 24 (2 (94)):31-49.
    Comprehensive Linguistic Approach to Frege's Commitment Puzzle There is a puzzle, noticed by Frege, about inferences from sentences like (F1) "Jupiter has four moons" to sentences like (F2) "The number of moons of Jupiter is four". They seem to be truth-conditionally equivalent but, apparently, they say something about completely different things. (F1) seems to be about moons, while (F2) about numbers. This phenomenon raises several puzzles about semantics, syntax, and is one of main tools of easy ontology. Recently, new linguistic (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Should Metaphysics Care About Linguistics?Tobias Rosefeldt - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (2):161-178.
    Naturalized metaphysics is based on the idea that philosophy should be guided by the sciences. The paradigmatic science that is relevant for metaphysics is physics because physics tells us what fundamental reality is ultimately like. There are other sciences, however, that de facto play a role in philosophical inquiries about what there is, one of them being the science of language, i.e. linguistics. In this paper I will be concerned with the question what role linguistics should and does play for (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Numbers and Cardinalities: What’s Really Wrong with the Easy Argument for Numbers?Eric Snyder - 2017 - Linguistics and Philosophy 40 (4):373-400.
    This paper investigates a certain puzzling argument concerning number expressions and their meanings, the Easy Argument for Numbers. After finding faults with previous views, I offer a new take on what’s ultimately wrong with the Argument: it equivocates. I develop a semantics for number expressions which relates various of their uses, including those relevant to the Easy Argument, via type-shifting. By marrying Romero ’s :687–737, 2005) analysis of specificational clauses with Scontras ’ semantics for Degree Nouns, I show how to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Building blocks for a cognitive science-led epistemology of arithmetic.Stefan Buijsman - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1-18.
    In recent years philosophers have used results from cognitive science to formulate epistemologies of arithmetic :5–18, 2001). Such epistemologies have, however, been criticised, e.g. by Azzouni, for interpreting the capacities found by cognitive science in an overly numerical way. I offer an alternative framework for the way these psychological processes can be combined, forming the basis for an epistemology for arithmetic. The resulting framework avoids assigning numerical content to the Approximate Number System and Object Tracking System, two systems that have (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How Do We Semantically Individuate Natural Numbers?†.Stefan Buijsman - forthcoming - Philosophia Mathematica.
    ABSTRACT How do non-experts single out numbers for reference? Linnebo has argued that they do so using a criterion of identity based on the ordinal properties of numerals. Neo-logicists, on the other hand, claim that cardinal properties are the basis of individuation, when they invoke Hume’s Principle. I discuss empirical data from cognitive science and linguistics to answer how non-experts individuate numbers better in practice. I use those findings to develop an alternative account that mixes ordinal and cardinal properties to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Giving the Value of a Variable.Richard Lawrence - 2021 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):135-150.
    What does it mean to ‘give’ the value of a variable in an algebraic context, and how does giving the value of a variable differ from merely describing it? I argue that to answer this question, we need to examine the role that giving the value of a variable plays in problem-solving practice. I argue that four different features are required for a statement to count as giving the value of a variable in the context of solving an elementary algebra (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Katharina Felka, Talking About Numbers: Easy Arguments for Mathematical Realism, Studies in Theoretical Philosophy, Vol. 3, Frankfurt Am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 2016, 188 Pp., €49.00. ISBN 978‐3‐465‐03879‐5. [REVIEW]Matteo Plebani - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (3):473-479.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Resolving Frege’s Other Puzzle.Eric Snyder, Richard Samuels & Stewart Shapiro - 2022 - Philosophica Mathematica 30 (1):59-87.
    Number words seemingly function both as adjectives attributing cardinality properties to collections, as in Frege’s ‘Jupiter has four moons’, and as names referring to numbers, as in Frege’s ‘The number of Jupiter’s moons is four’. This leads to what Thomas Hofweber calls Frege’s Other Puzzle: How can number words function as modifiers and as singular terms if neither adjectives nor names can serve multiple semantic functions? Whereas most philosophers deny that one of these uses is genuine, we instead argue that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Hofweber’s Nominalist Naturalism.Eric Snyder, Richard Samuels & Stewart Shapiro - 2022 - In Gianluigi Oliveri, Claudio Ternullo & Stefano Boscolo (eds.), Objects, Structures, and Logics. Cham, Switzerland: pp. 31-62.
    In this paper, we outline and critically evaluate Thomas Hofweber’s solution to a semantic puzzle he calls Frege’s Other Puzzle. After sketching the Puzzle and two traditional responses to it—the Substantival Strategy and the Adjectival Strategy—we outline Hofweber’s proposed version of Adjectivalism. We argue that two key components—the syntactic and semantic components—of Hofweber’s analysis both suffer from serious empirical difficulties. Ultimately, this suggests that an altogether different solution to Frege’s Other Puzzle is required.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Problem of Fregean Equivalents.Joongol Kim - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (3):367-394.
    It would seem that some statements like ‘There are exactly four moons of Jupiter’ and ‘The number of moons of Jupiter is four’ have the same truth-conditions and yet differ in ontological commitment. One strategy to resolve this paradoxical phenomenon is to insist that the statements have not only the same truth-conditions but also the same ontological commitments; the other strategy is to reject the presumption that they have the same truth-conditions. This paper critically examines some popular versions of these (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Pleonastic Propositions and the Face Value Theory.Alex Steinberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1165-1180.
    Propositions are a useful tool in philosophical theorizing, even though they are not beyond reasonable nominalistic doubts. Stephen Schiffer’s pleonasticism about propositions is a paradigm example of a realistic account that tries to alleviate such doubts by grounding truths about propositions in ontologically innocent facts. Schiffer maintains two characteristic theses about propositions: first, that they are so-called pleonastic entities whose existence is subject to what he calls something-from-nothing transformations ; and, second, that they are the referents of ‘that’-clauses that function (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Focus on Numbers.Jefferson Barlew - 2017 - Linguistics and Philosophy 40 (4):401-426.
    This paper contributes to the debate over the so-called “easy argument for numbers”, an argument that uses evidence from natural language to support the metaphysically significant claim that numbers exist. It presents novel data showing that critical examples in the literature are ambiguous between two readings, contrary to previous assumptions. It then accounts for these data using independently motivated linguistic theory. The account developed rescues the easy argument from the primary challenges leveled against it in the literature and sets the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Ontology Via Semantics? Introduction to the Special Issue on the Semantics of Cardinals.Craige Roberts & Stewart Shapiro - 2017 - Linguistics and Philosophy 40 (4):321-329.
    As introduction to the special issue on the semantics of cardinals, we offer some background on the relevant literature, and an overview of the contributions to this volume. Most of these papers were presented in earlier form at an interdisciplinary workshop on the topic at The Ohio State University, and the contributions to this issue reflect that interdisciplinary character: the authors represent both fields in the title of this journal.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Number Word Constructions, Degree Semantics and the Metaphysics of Degrees.Brendan Balcerak Jackson & Doris Penka - 2017 - Linguistics and Philosophy 40 (4):347-372.
    A central question for ontology is the question of whether numbers really exist. But it seems easy to answer this question in the affirmative. The truth of a sentence like ‘Seven students came to the party’ can be established simply by looking around at the party and counting students. A trivial paraphrase of is ‘The number of students who came to the party is seven’. But appears to entail the existence of a number, and so it seems that we must (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Number Sentences and Specificational Sentences. Reply to Moltmann.Robert Schwartzkopff - 2015 - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Frege proposed that sentences like ‘The number of planets is eight’ be analysed as identity statements in which the number words refer to numbers. Recently, Friederike Moltmann argued that, pace Frege, such sentences be analysed as so-called specificational sentences in which the number words have the same non-referring semantic function as the number word ‘eight’ in ‘There are eight planets’. The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, I argue that Moltmann fails to show that such sentences should be analysed (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Towards a Fictionalist Philosophy of Mathematics.Robert Knowles - unknown
    In this thesis, I aim to motivate a particular philosophy of mathematics characterised by the following three claims. First, mathematical sentences are generally speaking false because mathematical objects do not exist. Second, people typically use mathematical sentences to communicate content that does not imply the existence of mathematical objects. Finally, in using mathematical language in this way, speakers are not doing anything out of the ordinary: they are performing straightforward assertions. In Part I, I argue that the role played by (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Nominalization, Specification, and Investigation.Richard Lawrence - 2017 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    Frege famously held that numbers play the role of objects in our language and thought, and that this role is on display when we use sentences like "The number of Jupiter's moons is four". I argue that this role is an example of a general pattern that also encompasses persons, times, locations, reasons, causes, and ways of appearing or acting. These things are 'objects' simply in the sense that they are answers to questions: they are the sort of thing we (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Ontological Trivialism?Seyed N. Mousavian - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):38-68.
    How hard is it to answer an ontological question? Ontological trivialism,, inspired by Carnap’s internal-external distinction among “questions of existence”, replies “very easy.” According to, almost every ontologically disputed entity trivially exists. has been defended by many, including Schiffer and Schaffer. In this paper, I will take issue with. After introducing the view in the context of Carnap-Quine dispute and presenting two arguments for it, I will discuss Hofweber’s argument against and explain why it fails. Next, I will introduce a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Number Sentences and Specificational Sentences: Reply to Moltmann.Robert Schwartzkopff - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2173-2192.
    Frege proposed that sentences like ‘The number of planets is eight’ be analysed as identity statements in which the number words refer to numbers. Recently, Friederike Moltmann argued that, pace Frege, such sentences be analysed as so-called specificational sentences in which the number words have the same non-referring semantic function as the number word ‘eight’ in ‘There are eight planets’. The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, I argue that Moltmann fails to show that such sentences should be analysed (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Talking About Numbers: Easy Arguments for Mathematical Realism. [REVIEW]Richard Lawrence - 2017 - History and Philosophy of Logic 38 (4):390-394.
  • What ‘the Number of Planets is Eight’ Means.Robert Knowles - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2757-2775.
    ‘The following sentence is true only if numbers exist: The number of planets is eight. It is true; hence, numbers exist.’ So runs a familiar argument for realism about mathematical objects. But this argument relies on a controversial semantic thesis: that ‘The number of planets’ and ‘eight’ are singular terms standing for the number eight, and the copula expresses identity. This is the ‘Fregean analysis’.I show that the Fregean analysis is false by providing an analysis of sentences such as that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations