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  1. The Rights of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas' Meta-Phenomenology as a Critique of Hillel Steiner's An Essay on Rights.Andrew Thomas Hugh Wilshere - unknown
    In contemporary philosophy about justice, a contrast between empirical and transcendental approaches can be identified. Hillel Steiner represents an empirical approach: he argues for building an account of justice-as-rights out of the minimal inductive material of psychological linguistic and moral intuitions. From this opening, he ultimately concludes that persons have original rights to self-ownership and to an initially equal share of natural resources. Emmanuel Levinas represents a transcendental approach: he argues that justice arises from a transcendent ethical relation of responsibility-for-the-Other. (...)
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  • Das „Problem“ der Habituskonstitution Und Die Spätlehre des Ich in der Genetischen Phänomenologie E. Husserls.Marco Cavallaro - 2016 - Husserl Studies 32 (3):237-261.
    Der vorliegende Aufsatz behandelt zwei Bereiche, deren Zusammenhang in der aktuellen Husserlforschung zu Unrecht in Vergessenheit geraten zu sein scheint: Zum einen konturiere ich den Habitusbegriff und das damit verbundene Problem der Habituskonstitution im Spätwerk E. Husserls. Zum anderen dient das Ergebnis dieser ersten Untersuchung dann als Grundlage für die Frage nach dem Wesen des Ich in der genetischen Phänomenologie. Die Untersuchung besteht aus drei Teilen: Zuerst stelle ich, um die Bedeutung des Begriffs „Habitus“ zu klären, Ingardens Interpretationsalternativen der Habituskonstitution (...)
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  • Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s Reappraisal.Marco Cavallaro - 2020 - In Iulian Apostolescu (ed.), The Subject(s) of Phenomenology. Rereading Husserl. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 107-133.
    In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Egosplitting. (...)
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  • Hegel and Husserl on the Emergence of the I Out of Subjectivity.Alfredo Ferrarin - 2017 - Hegel Bulletin 38 (1):7-23.