The Euthyphro objection is often perceived, rightly or wrongly, as the king objection to theistic meta-ethics. This paper proposes a response that hasn’t been much explored within the contemporary literature, based on the metaphysics of dispositions and natural law theory. The paper will first contend that there is a parallel between ways theists conceptualise God’s role in creating laws of nature and the ways God creates goods. Drawing upon these parallels I propose a possible response to the dilemma, where this (...) response parallels the dispositionalist response as to how God creates laws of nature. I do this by first explicating a natural law theory of goodness, then suggesting how the ontology of dispositions can be used in a novel way to account for goods, and finally by explaining how all this relates to the dilemma. I conclude the paper by posing some objections to myself and providing some replies. (shrink)

Whereas Mereological Essentialism is the thesis that the parts of an object are essential to it, Reverse Mereological Essentialism is the thesis that the whole is essential to its parts. Specifically—since RME is an Aristotelian doctrine—it is a claim not about objects in general but about substances. Here I set out and explain RME as it should be understood from the perspective of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition, as well as proposing a kind of master argument for believing it. A number of (...) objections (many of which have been raised by Kathrin Koslicki or Robert Koons) are then considered, the replies to which help further to clarify and motivate RME. The final section considers some important questions concerning parts and matter in light of Ross Inman’s recent defence of RME under the guise of what he calls Substantial Priority. Considering these questions further illustrates right and wrong ways of understanding RME. Overall, the case for Reverse Mereological Essentialism is strong albeit with a number of difficulties that need to be resolved through further investigation. (shrink)

Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and the (...) physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of ‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the case of the mental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying the way in which powers work. (shrink)

Steven Vogel argues that nature ought not be thought of as a category independent of humans, and instead much be understood as something built by human action. His point is fundamentally ontological: Vogel denies that there is a difference in kind between the natural and artificial. To establish this, Vogel argues against two separate conceptions of nature which are popular in environmental discourse in order to show that both are problematic. The first definition "Nature" is the notion of nature as (...) the parts of the world not touched by humans; the second definition is "Nature" which holds as natural anything which is physical. The former turns out to exclude all the things which humans know or encounter. The latter captures too much to be useful in distinguishing the natural and non-natural. If nature just refers to the physical laws of the universe, nothing human beings do in the world can possibly threaten the natural. After refuting these two views, he concludes that nature must be understood not as a self-subsisting thing but as something socially constructed.I argue that Vogel overlooks a third definition of nature which can be derived from Aristotle's notion of phusis and its subsequent development by the Aristotelian tradition, especially by St. Thomas Aquinas. I wish to clarify why Aristotle's notion of nature is distinct from those attacked by Vogel. Specifically, I believe that Aristotle's account is able to justify the ontological commitments it makes in contrast to either of the views Vogel criticizes. I will defend its relevance to contemporary environmental philosophy especially against the charge of ideology which Vogel makes against other conceptions of nature. (shrink)